Editorial

Ap: 2014nr7
Editorial
3
Atlantic Alliance redefined?
In the early days of the US, George Washington
warned Americans against the dangers of foreign
entanglements in his famous ‘Farewell Address’
(1796): “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”
Washington thought it would be wise to stay out
of other countries’ affairs, especially the war-torn
European continent. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823,
drafted by John Quincy Adams, effectively realized
George Washington’s foreign policy goals: the US
would stay out of European conflicts, as long as the
European states would not interfere with or try to
re-colonize territories in the western hemisphere.
Of course, the young nation faced very different
circumstances than the US later did and presently
does. One of the greatest threats to the security of
the newborn US was to get squashed by the European
power politics of that time. Keeping this strategic
reality in mind, George Washington, John Quincy
Adams, and James Monroe stood at the cradle of
a strong isolationist tradition, that still resonates
today. In fact, it is quite easy for the advocates of an
isolationist American foreign policy to dismiss the
current fight against ISIS as a policy “in search of
monsters to destroy”, relating to another important
document by John Quincy Adams.
The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which founded
NATO, was the first ‘permanent alliance’ of the
US with any foreign nation since the founding
era. During the twentieth century the US adapted
its foreign policy to a new strategic reality, much
different compared to Washington’s times: as a global
superpower, the US seemingly had no choice but to
stay engaged in European security affairs and play a
leading role in the Alliance, as it still does. However,
almost 25 years after the end of the Cold War and
the demise of the original adversary, the Atlantic
Alliance is still looking for ways to redefine its role.
The biennial summits provide a platform to discuss
NATO’s role and purpose. What are the outcomes of
the Wales Summit of September?
This issue of Atlantisch Perspectief contains a special
section about NATO after the last summit: ‘Atlantic
Alliance redefined?’. Tomas Ries (Swedish National
Defence College) argues that Putin’s actions are a
“blessing in disguise”: they force complacent Western
leaders to re-examine their strategic thinking, before
it is too late and Russia escalates its policies into
something much worse than proxy wars in former
Soviet territories. Jamie Shea (NATO) lays out the
main topics that Jens Stoltenberg, the new Secretary
General, has to address. His daily agenda is partly
defined by “business as usual”, but keeping the next
summit in mind (Warsaw 2016), “it may be worth
aiming for larger goals.” Margriet Drent and Dick
Zandee (Clingendael Institute) state that NATO is
still “relevant as a guarantor against hard security
threats”. But is the Alliance ready for this task when
faced with new security threats, of a different nature?
Finally, Isabelle Duyvesteyn analyzes the scientific
debate about cyber war. At the Wales Summit, the
Allies have decided that cyber attacks can warrant
collective action under the NATO treaty stipulations.
What does this mean for doctrinal and strategic
thinking?
Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, famously
stated the purpose of NATO was: “to keep the
Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans
down.” Although isolationism remains a strong force in
US foreign policy and despite Washington’s warnings,
the Americans are firmly ‘in’ the Alliance since its
inception in 1949. NATO remains the most important
organization for transatlantic collective defense, and
redefining its role to adapt to new security challenges
only proves its lasting importance.
Maarten Katsman
28 October 2014
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