CDD Lab Meeting - CROSS

CDD Lab Meeting
August 15, 2014
CDD News and Updates
● No meeting 29 Aug (APSA)
● deterrence.ucsd.edu is live!
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Check your bio
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Let’s write!
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Lab meeting notes to be posted
● Post-doc hiring on the horizon
● Martin Kruger is new PM at ONR
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EG & JRL to brief project on 8/28
Upcoming Travel & Events
● JRL to PACOM 10-23 Aug
● APSA August 28-31, 2014 in Washington, DC
o CDD Panel & Opportunity to meet with DC contacts
o Brief ONR PM
● Minerva Conference September 10-11, 2014 in Washington, DC
o Project overview--how much, how long?
o Opportunity to meet with DC contacts
● CDD Annual Conference November 6-7, 2014 at UCSD
o Revised CDD paper--sent
o Awaiting paper topics (9/1) to formulate agenda
Lab Meeting Schedule
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August 15 (Jack): CDD insights from China S&T workshop
August 22 (Rupal): STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium Debrief
August 29: NO LAB MEETING (APSA)
September 5: (Erik) TBD
September 12 (Clara): Conference planning
September 19 (Rupal): TBD
September 26 (Shannon): TBD
Blake--Testing Thucydides?
Blog Schedule
Please check your inbox for an email from quote.ucsd.edu for log-in instructions
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Week of…
June 29: Rupal….
July 6: Clara
July 13: Shannon
July 20: Jack
July 27: Rupal...
August 3: Clara
August 10: Shannon
August 17: Jack
August 24: Rupal
August 31: Clara
September 7: Shannon
September 14: Jack
September 21: Rupal
September 28: Clara
deterrence.ucsd.edu
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Anybody in the CDD group can
post something, any time.
This schedule just ensures we
average something each week.
Beth moderates the posts
Topics can be on anything CDD
related, of any length:
● Commentary on current events
● Book or article review
● Thought piece
● Research note
Recent Publications
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Jon R. Lindsay, “Cybersecurity and International Relations: Evaluating the Threat from China,”
International Security (forthcoming Winter 2014/15)
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Jon Lindsay, “Commentary on the Cyber Revolution,” International Security 38, no. 4 (forthcoming 2014)
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Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in
Cyberspace,” Security Studies (forthcoming)
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Erik Gartzke, “An Apology for Numbers in the Study of National Security . . . if an apology is really
necessary,” H-Diplo/ISSF, no. 2 (2014): 77-90.
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Erik Gartkze, “The Myth of Cyber War: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International
Security 38, no. 2 (2013): 41–73.
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Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 365–404.
Papers in progress
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Erik, Jon & Clara: “Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity”
o Working paper, updated July 15, 2014.
o 15 July revision for Conference invitees, Aug APSA, Nov conference
Jon, Erik: “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited”
o Chapter in Kelly Greenhill & Peter Krause volume on Coercion
Michael: “Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy”
o Nov conference
Joe: “Latency and Cross-Domain Deterrence”
o Nov conference
Jon & Jack: “Interdependence in Space and Cyberspace in U.S.-China Relations”
o Aug APSA
Erik: “No Humans Were Harmed in the Making of this War: On the Nature and Consequences of `Costless'
Combat” [drone war]
o July RSIS (CENS)
Jon: “The Common Strategic Logic of Counterinsurgency and Cybersecurity”
o R&R with JSS
SITC Workshop: Notes and CDD Insights
Jack Zhang
University of California, San Diego
[email protected]
SITC Notes
● Great mix of participants
–Academia, government, military, industry etc
–Engineering, political science, history, physics, computer science etc
–See handouts for list of participants and topics
● Good syllabus, wealth of readings
–See PDFs in shared google drive ‘SITC Summer Workshop’ folder
● Long lectures with lots of PowerPoint…
SITC Notes
● Themes
–Structure vs agency (forthcoming edited volume)
–Typologies of innovation
–Organizational structure of China’s S&T bureaucracies, civil military
relations
–Historical development of China’s S&T policy, importance of leaders
–Case studies: cruise missiles, jet engines, HPC, human space program
● China-Minerva Database alpha version
–PIs: Cheung, Naughton, and Meyer
–Link: http://china-minerva.ucsd.edu/login.php
SITC: Implications for CDD
● Theoretical
–Structure vs agency
–Political economy of grand strategy
● Practical
–Importance of asking the right questions
–Economize in re-using existing materials
–Undergrad lecture rule of thumb: good graphics, simple theory
Structure Vs. Agency
● TMC: technological determinism vs strategic choice, focus on strong
agents vs weak agents
● Weak theory: not convinced agents/structure 2x2 predicts
innovation
● But how to move beyond Waltz and Allison/Jervis: how to better
capture interaction of structure and agency? (rather than controlling
or black-boxing one or other
Structure Vs. Agency
● What’s the right balance when considering CDD?
● Rationalist theories of war
–Rational expectations but agency-centric (at least more so than Waltz)
–Abstracts away perceptions (error term?)
–Ex. Chinese views of escalations dominance and controlled escalation
–What is the role of structure? (regime type? Court politics)
Political Economy of Grand Strategy
● Means matter: classical deterrence is about ends, but
CDD is also about means
● If so how is CDD different from grant strategy?
● Does CDD take means as given and fixed?
● If given, how is CDD different from combined-arms
warfare?
● Economizing over means is a matter of political
economy
Political Economy of Grand Strategy
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Case study of China in 1990s:
–USSR collapse, Taiwan elections, and Strait Crises altered the China’s security outlook
–It realized it had no means to achieve limited ends (prevent Taiwan independence)
–Resolved to develop ‘assassin's mace’ capabilities after 1999 Belgrade bombings
–Assassin’s mace = CDD (weapon to overcome much more power adversary)
–No single weapon system, but China has modernized its C4ISR, ballistic & cruise missiles,
submarines, strategic forces, and electronic warfare capabilities
–Effective CDD because A2/AD is now a beltway boggyman
–China now has means to expand its set of ends (ex. SCS)
Political Economy of Grand Strategy
● Takes a long time to develop new capabilities: the PLA of today is a
product of reforms initiated in 1993
● Weapons systems also have life-cycle costs, these are rarely considered
in strategic analysis
● Investing in the wrong capabilities today carries a high opportunity cost
tomorrow
● Deciding on which capabilities to invest in is as much a political calculation
as an economic one
Beyond Rock, Paper, Scissors
● A winning RPS strategy (randomize) is not a policy prescription because
its boring
● RPS is boring because the means are fixed (1/3 each)
● RPS becomes a much more interesting game if players had to purchase
means under incomplete information
● Most promising policy implications for CDD is in the strategy and political
economy of means acquisition
Questions?
Information Infrastructure: Space, Cyberspace, and U.S.-China
Relations
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Jon R. Lindsay
[email protected]
Jiakun Jack Zhang
University of California, San Diego
[email protected]
Thesis
● China threat narrative: cyber and space are vulnerable, thus conflict in
these domains are likely to be escalatory and destabilizing
● Technological determinist narrative: cyber and space are revolutionary
technologies that change nature of warfare
● Our thesis: same things that make cyber and space vulnerable also
makes it less likely that conflict occurs in these domains
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Space and cyberspace are vital for military performance. But their usefulness depends on a
common set of institutions/informational infrastructures to be valuable
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Neoliberal institutionalist analogy: commerce = infrastructure
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Vulnerability is mutually constituted, operate on the basis of standardized protocols
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They enhance warfighting, multiply force but does not project force, but does not change nature
of warfare, (not new domains? Discuss analogies to airpower)
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Dynamics in space and cyber should therefore be more similar to economic interdependence
–Mutual vulnerabilities: inform, constrain, transform
–Low intensity conflict persists, but high intensity conflict (which undermines the institution) is
unlikely
–Bottom line: we have observed constraint, this will continue
Outline
1.Introduction: present thesis and theory
2.Literature review: flaws in the China threat and technological determinism narratives
3.Defining cyber and space capabilities/threats: focus on information infrastructure as
institutions
4.Theory: analogy to commerce/economic interdependence
5.Why we should continue to expect constraint: logic of inform, constrain, transform
6.Expect low intensity conflict (espionage, sabotage etc), but these will not be
escalatory
7.Conclusion: policy implications
Questions?
Next Steps?
● Review lab meeting and blog schedule and let us know what, if
anything, needs to be rearranged
● Please post blog posts, focus on research notes/progress
● Meeting notes to be written, disseminated, uploaded
o Review previous meeting notes and last week’s notes; if no
comments, presentations will be posted as is
CDD Contacts
Program Content:
● Erik Gartkze, UCSD, [email protected]
● Jon Lindsay, UCSD, [email protected]
● Michael Nacht, UCB
● Celeste Matarazzo, LLNL
● Joe Pilat, LANL
Program Administration:
● Beth Prosnitz, Project Manager, [email protected]

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