Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Contents Acknowledgments vii Notes on Contributors ix List of Abbreviations xii Introduction Alix Cohen 1 1 The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality Nancy Sherman 2 From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action Christine M. Korsgaard 33 Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character Marcia Baron 69 The Place of the Emotions in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy Angelica Nuzzo 88 3 4 11 5 Kant’s Pragmatic Concept of Emotions Wiebke Deimling 108 6 Kant on the Pleasures of Understanding Melissa McBay Merritt 126 7 Debunking Confabulation: Emotions and the Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics Pauline Kleingeld 146 8 Affective Normativity Patrick R. Frierson 166 9 Love of Honor as a Kantian Virtue Lara Denis 191 All You Need Is Love? Jeanine M. Grenberg 210 10 v Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 vi Contents 11 The Heart as Locus of Moral Struggle in the Religion Pablo Muchnik 224 12 Kant and the Feeling of Sublimity Michelle Grier 245 13 Enthusiastic Cosmopolitanism Katrin Flikschuh 265 Bibliography 284 Index 299 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Introduction Alix Cohen This volume assembles a distinguished cast of international scholars to discuss the connection between emotion and value in Kant’s philosophy, from his ethics to his philosophy of mind, aesthetics, religion and politics.1 It is inspired by the movement that began, at least in the Anglo-American world, with the Kantian ‘fore-mothers’ whose pioneer work on the role of emotions in Kant’s ethics is exemplified by the pieces reprinted in this volume by Marcia Baron, Christine Korsgaard and Nancy Sherman. In combining these reprints with ten new essays by a mixture of leading and up-and-coming Kant scholars and Kantian philosophers, this volume offers the first comprehensive assessment of Kant’s account of the emotions and their connection to value. By focusing on the numerous aspects of Kant’s approach to the nature of the emotions and their various roles, it goes well beyond standard discussions of the feeling of respect and covers a wide range of topics in Kant’s philosophy. Some essays are primarily exegetical, others focus on the Kantian contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of emotions and value; some mix interpretation and critical discussion, others focus on the continuing relevance of Kant’s work to philosophical debates. What they all have in common is an aim to show that, contrary to what is usually thought, Kant does have an important and philosophically rich account of the emotions. In contemporary debates on the emotions, Kant is often described as the cold-blooded philosopher par excellence, both personally and philosophically. Personally, he is caricatured as an emotionless, machine-like character who led a monotonous and regimented life.2 Philosophically, he is portrayed as a virulent opponent of the emotions, in morality of course but also in cognition and the conduct of life more generally. 1 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 2 Alix Cohen From the Groundwork to the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, his works seem to warrant this view. [T]he inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are so far from having an absolute worth, so as to make one wish to have them, that it must instead be the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free from them. (G 4:428) [Inclinations] are always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. (KpV 5:118) ‘virtue necessarily presupposes apathy’; it ‘forbid[s] him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of government in its own hands, his feelings and inclinations play the master over him.’ (MS 6:408) The passage from the Groundwork has been read as claiming that grudgingly obeying one’s duty is morally preferable to doing one’s duty with pleasure; the passage from the Critique of Practical Reason as claiming that the ideal will is a holy will, a purely rational creature entirely devoid of feelings and always solely governed by reason, in contrast with impure human wills; and the passage from the Metaphysics of Morals as claiming that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without feelings. This emotionless ideal seems to apply to cognitive matters as well as moral ones. For Kant, emotions distort cognition and the ideal cognizer is an emotionless one.3 [The power of judgment] is almost never so perfect in man that he could be wholly indifferent (VL-Vienna 24:860) [R]eally learned people, and philosophers, can keep a tight rein on their affects, ... they weigh everything that they take as objectum of their considerations cold-bloodedly, that is, with calm mind (VL-Blomberg 24:163) Emotions are defined in terms that are at odds with the very nature of cognition: they are subjective and contingent feelings whilst cognition consists in objective and necessary judgments. Whether in moral or cognitive matters, the ideal agent would thus be a cold-blooded rational being, and many readers of Kant have criticized this emotionless ideal of humanity, from Frederick Schiller’s well-known gibe to Charles Péguy’s disparaging remark, Susan Wolf’s denigration of Kant Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Introduction 3 as the ‘Rational Saint’, Annette Baier’s denunciation of Kant as a ‘misamorist’, Bernard Williams’ condemnation of Kant’s ‘purist view of morality’, and Simon Blackburn’s mocking reference to the ‘Kantian captain’.4 However, several Kant scholars, some of whom have contributed to this volume, have attempted to refute these rather harsh assessments. To this end, they have adopted a number of strategies. Some note that the overemphasis on the negative passages quoted above has obscured the more positive ones, and shedding light on the latter suggests a different picture of the emotions and their function. For, they can play a useful role in the conduct of life and in morality. For instance, Nancy Sherman argues that emotions ‘serve supportive roles’ ‘as modes of attention’ to moral salience, ‘mode[s] for conveying moral interest’ and possibly as an ‘emotionally embodied response [that] is morally worthy’ (Sherman (1997), 145–51). Along similar lines, Jeanine Grenberg investigates Kant’s notion of character in order to defend the claim that the cultivation of our emotional life supports our moral disposition, and in this respect it is a part of virtue (Grenberg (2005), 85–6). As Paul Guyer sums up, as ‘real human beings with feelings as well as reason, ... we must learn how to use our natural dispositions to action arising from those feelings as means to morally mandatory and permissible ends’ (Guyer (2006), 258). Others turn to Kant’s neglected works, his accounts of anthropology or history in particular, to vindicate his critical philosophy and make it more plausible. They argue that paying attention to the empirical dimension of Kant’s works, a dimension that had been traditionally overlooked, helps rebut an unfair portrayal of Kant as rigorist, formalist and abstract.5 The works of Robert Louden and Allen Wood can be read as going in this direction. Robert Louden spells out what he calls Kant’s ‘impure ethics’ or ‘the second part of morals’ (Louden (2000), especially 10–11, and (2003), 60). Allen Wood defends Kant against the ‘charges that Kantian ethics is unconcerned with the empirical realities of psychology, society, and history, that it sees no value in the affective side of our nature’ (Wood (1999), xiv).6 Others show the numerous and diverse roles that a Kant-inspired ethics can ascribe to the emotions.7 For instance, Barbara Herman puts forward a Kantian view of action that challenges the idea that the presence of competing inclinations compromises the worth of a dutiful act (Herman (1993), 1–22). In a similar vein, Marcia Baron suggests ‘corrections’ to Kant’s view as she understands it in order to make room for emotions in moral life (Baron (1995), ch. 6).8 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 4 Alix Cohen In his contribution, Patrick Frierson notes that ‘By now, anyone familiar with recent scholarship should reject the picture of Kant as a virulent opponent of emotion and recognize his sophisticated accounts of how emotions help as well as hinder moral life’ (Frierson (this volume), 167). Whilst this statement may be a tad optimistic, it is true that these endeavors have been successful in many respects. Yet what they have in common is that they generally attempt to redeem what is taken to be Kant’s standard account of the emotions by attributing to them positive roles in spite of their supposed shortcomings – whether it is as providing support for the moral motive in Sherman (1997), as detectors of moral salience in Herman (1993), or as expressions of our moral choices in Guyer (1993), to cite but a few. However, the belief, often unacknowledged as such, that for Kant emotions are of one kind can be questioned. As many essays in this volume show, Kant’s conception of the emotions encompasses a wide array of affective states, including desires, inclinations, affects and passions which differ from each other in a number of important ways.9 This insight suggests that Kant’s concept of the emotions does not form a single category of more or less identical affective states. I was originally going to defend this claim here in a paper entitled ‘Feelings in Kant’s Metaphysics: The Interests, Needs and Desires of Reason’, which had to be omitted due to restrictions of space. But to provide a bit of context to motivate my suggestion, recall that in his essay ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant talks of reason having feelings: ‘reason’s feeling of its own need’, ‘a felt need of reason’ (WDO 8:136, 139). A number of commentators have interpreted Kant’s use of the term ‘feeling’ (Bedürfnis) metaphorically. For instance, according to Kleingeld, the conative terms in which Kant describes reason should be understood as based on an analogy in order to avoid ‘confounding [Kant’s] distinction between reason and feeling’ (Kleingeld (1998), 96, 84). Similarly, according to Zammito, ‘Reason engenders a feeling, but it does so for reasons of its own: that is why Bedürfnis must not be read too literally as itself a feeling or need’ (Zammito (1992), 238). Interpreting Kant’s claim about reason’s feelings metaphorically enables commentators to preserve the distinction between them whilst retaining a sense, albeit weak, in which reason has feelings. But my suggestion is that there is another way of making sense of Kant’s claim, by allowing for a category of feeling that encompasses both the feeling of respect and the feeling of reason’s need. Let me discuss this suggestion briefly. Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Introduction 5 Two principles are usually taken to be at the basis of the Kantian system: 1. Feelings are of one kind: they are contingent, a posteriori, causally determined, and as a result cognitively unreliable and morally suspect. 2. There is an unbridgeable gap between the realms of reason and feeling: they are not only distinct, but more importantly incompatible, for what belongs to the former cannot also belong to the latter and vice-versa. However, the distinction between reason and feeling can be spelt out so that their characteristics are not only compatible, they are combined in a distinctive category of feelings: rational feelings. To spell out what makes them rational and what makes them feelings, we can examine more closely some of the central, peculiar features of the feeling of respect, their best known instantiation.10 What makes respect for the moral law a feeling is that: (1) It is connected to the faculty of desire and thus the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (KpV 5:117, 73, 76). (2) It is a ‘subjective ground of activity’ (KpV 5:79). (3) It ‘produces ... moral interest’ (KpV 5:80). In other words, the feeling of respect is functionally equivalent to feelings of pleasure and pain. [R]espect as consciousness of direct necessitation of the will by the law is hardly an analogue of the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of desire it does the same thing but from different sources. (KpV 5:117; my emphasis) However, Kant also points out that the feeling of respect is of ‘a peculiar kind’ (KpV 5:76): (1) It is ‘produced solely by reason’ (KpV 5:76). (2) It ‘is not of empirical origin’ (KpV 5:73). (3) It ‘can be cognized a priori’ (KpV 5:78). The features that make respect a feeling are meant to avoid a contradiction between on the one hand, Kant’s rejection of heteronomous forms of motivation based on feelings, and on the other hand, his need to Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 6 Alix Cohen account for an incentive that impels us to act for the sake of the moral law.11 For, by contrast with the feeling of respect, other feelings have the following features: (1’) They are ‘received by means of influence’ (G 4:401). (2’) They are ‘sensible’ and ‘pathologically effected’ (KpV 5:75). (3’) They ‘always belong[s] to the order of nature’ (MS 6:377). Notwithstanding their fundamental differences, Kant repeatedly points to a feature that is common to both the feeling of respect and sensible feelings: respect ‘is something that is regarded as an object neither of inclination nor fear, though it has something analogous to both’ (G 4:401). The analogy emphasizes what the feeling of reason shares with sensible feelings. Namely, it generates a ‘drive’, it has a conative dimension.12 Reason does not feel; it has insight into its lack and through the drive for cognition it effects the feeling of a need. It is the same way with moral feeling, which does not cause any moral law, for this arises wholly from reason; rather, it is caused or effected by moral laws, hence by reason, because the active yet free will needs determinate grounds. (WDO 8:139) What the analogy between theoretical reason’s feeling of its need and moral feeling suggests is that they share three features that set them apart from all other feelings: (1*) They are both called ‘feeling’ in a sense that needs to be qualified. a. For theoretical reason’s feeling, ‘[r]eason does not feel’, and yet there is ‘the feeling of a need’ (WDO 8:139). b. Practical reason’s feeling is a ‘singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological feeling’ (KpV 5:76). (2*) They are both caused by reason alone. a. Theoretical reason’s feeling ‘arises wholly from reason’ (WDO 8:139). b. ‘on account of its origin’, ‘the cause determining [the feeling of respect] lies in pure practical reason’ (KpV 5:75). (3*) They are both able to motivate. a. Theoretical reason’s feeling leads to a ‘drive for cognition’ (WDO 8:139). b. Practical reason’s feeling is a ‘subjective ground of activity’ that ‘produces an interest’ in the moral law (KpV 5:79–80). Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Introduction 7 The analogy between the feeling of reason’s need and moral feeling is not only apt but remarkably enlightening. Unlike ordinary feelings, the feeling of reason and the feeling of respect do not have a sensible cause; their cause is reason itself. As Kant notes repeatedly concerning the feeling of respect, what distinguishes it from all other feelings ‘received by means of influence’ is that it is ‘a feeling self-wrought’ (G 4:401). Whilst ‘every influence on feeling and every feeling in general’ is ‘pathological’ (KpV 5:75), the feeling of respect is ‘practically effected’ rather than ‘sensibly effected’: [T]he incentive of the moral disposition must be free from any sensible condition ... on account of its origin, [respect] cannot be called pathologically effected. (KpV 5:75) It is because the feeling of reason’s need and the feeling of respect ‘find their source in reason itself’ that they are ‘specifically different from all feelings of the first [sensible, pathological] kind’ (G 4:401). They are what we could call ‘autonomous feelings’, in reference to Kant’s distinction between the autonomous form of motivation, in which the will determines itself through the moral law, and heteronomous forms of motivation, where the will is determined by sensible feelings and natural impulses.13 For, they are not merely caused by reason but generated from within reason itself. They are immanent to reason, ‘self-wrought’ (G 4:401) and thus independent from any sensible cause. Whilst this is of course very sketchy, it points to a way in which, by questioning the claim that there is an unbridgeable gap between the realms of reason and feeling, Kant’s notion of feeling could be qualified so as to allow for the notion of rational feeling.14 Many essays in this volume similarly suggest that traditional dichotomies may not apply straightforwardly, or at all, to Kant’s account of the emotions. For instance, Angelica Nuzzo investigates the role that emotions play in the Critique of Judgment in order to determine whether they can play a role at the transcendental level. As she writes, although emotions may belong to the realm of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), it ‘is not coextensive with the empirical ... [and] also displays forms that have an a priori aspect’ (Nuzzo (this volume), 91). Similarly, Patrick Frierson argues that Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment reveals a kind of normativity that is unique to feelings. What he calls ‘affective normativity’ differs from both moral and cognitive normativity. By focusing on the context in which Kant considers feelings to be independent Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 8 Alix Cohen of cognition and volition, namely aesthetic pleasure, Frierson ‘adds a dimension to emotions’ “rationality” that is generally overlooked’ (Frierson (this volume), 167). Many contributions to this volume go in a similar direction although I cannot mention them all here. Taken as a whole, what they show is that insofar as the emotions lie at the intersection of many traditional boundaries, they offer the ideal standpoint to explore, question and even move these boundaries. This point is undoubtedly significant for the history of philosophy, for it calls for a re-interpretation of many standard accounts of Kant’s works. It also has far-reaching philosophical implications, for it suggests that many philosophical positions labeled as ‘Kantian’ are not in fact truly Kantian, and that many objections directed at Kantian ethics do not apply to Kant’s ethics. As I noted at the beginning of this introduction, Patrick Frierson’s statement regarding the state of Kant scholarship may have been overly optimistic. Yet this volume should hopefully contribute to making it more realistic. Notes 1. Of course, whilst the volume engages with central issues on the connection between emotion and value in Kant’s philosophy, as is unavoidable for such collections, exhaustiveness is impossible, and a number of issues are too briefly covered if at all. However, it should help give a sense of the current Kantian landscape. 2. As described by Heinrich Heine, ‘The history of Kant’s life is difficult to describe. For he neither had a life nor a history. He lived a mechanically ordered, almost abstract, bachelor life in a quiet out-of-the way lane in Königsberg’ (Heine (1962), 461 translated in Kuehn (2001), 14). As Kuehn notes, ‘Kant was deliberate and hardly ever showed his emotion’; he was ‘cool and reserved’ (Kuehn (2001), 324, 431). For a discussion of this caricature in the context of Kant’s biographers, see Kuehn (2001), 14–16. 3. For instance, ‘In most discussions of the relations between emotion and cognition, the emphasis has been on the assumption that the former distorts the latter. For Kant, emotion was an illness of the mind’ (Frijda, Mastead and Bem (2000), 2). 4. Wolf (1982), 430–2, Baier (1994), 48, Williams (1995), 104, Blackburn (1998), 252. ‘Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure / Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person / Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, / And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you’ (Schiller’s Uber die Grundlage der Moral, quoted in Paton (1948), 48). For Péguy, Kantianism has clean hands but it has no hands (Péguy (1916), 495; my translation). The passage Schiller mocks and that is generally quoted in the context of these criticisms is the following: ‘It was a sublime way of thinking that the Stoic ascribed to his wise men when he had him say, Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Introduction 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 9 “I wish for a friend, not that he might help me in poverty, sickness, imprisonment, etc., but that I might stand by him and rescue a human being.” But this same wise man, when he could not rescue his friend, said to himself, “What is it to me?” In other words, he rejected compassion.’ (MS 6:457) Along different lines, one could also think of Lacan (1966) or feminist critiques of Kant (e.g. Schott (1988), especially 106–7). For a useful summary of these criticisms, see O’Neill’s classification under the following headings: formalism, rigorism, abstraction, conflicting grounds of obligation, the place of the inclinations, and no account of wrongdoing (O’Neill (2003), 181–3). For a discussion of moral anthropology, see in particular Frierson’s defense of the possibility of the integration of Kant’s moral anthropology with his conception of freedom (Frierson (2003)). See also Brandt (2003), 92, Cohen (2009), 89–105, Munzel (1999), 37–8, Schmidt (2005), 72–3, and Stark (2003), 21. Of course, many commentators fall under more than one category. For instance, Wood often goes beyond his own interpretative framework (e.g. Wood (2008)), and vice-versa, Herman’s emphasis on the role of emotions as detectors of moral salience is now generally acknowledged as a valuable insight into Kant’s account in the Metaphysics of Morals (Herman (1993), 73–8). I would argue that these are not actually ‘corrections’ to Kant’s view, for as I have shown elsewhere, Kant recommends the cultivation of our ability to control our emotions rather than their annihilation since many of them are useful aids to the realization of our duty (Cohen (2009), 89–105). See Sorensen’s ‘taxonomy of the emotions’ for a discussion of the difference between Gefühl, Empfindung, Affekt, Begierde, Leidenschaft, Rührung, Trieb and Neigung (Sorensen (2002)). As Angelica Nuzzo notes, ‘Kant uses a wide range of technical terms to indicate the problematic realm that the contemporary discussion covers with the term “emotions”’ (Nuzzo (this volume), 88). Similarly according to Patrick Frierson, ‘Kant does not use the term “emotion,” and he does not have a general theory of “emotions.” ... Kant’s classification of paradigmatic “emotions” under different (often combined) mental faculties [cognition, feeling, or volition] belies any easy identification of “feeling” with “emotion.”’ (Frierson (this volume), 168). Although as Wiebke Deimling has argued, the diversity of affective states can be unified by what she calls Kant’s ‘pragmatic concept’ (Deimling (this volume)). However, this unification is pragmatic precisely because it is achieved through a shared function rather than a common make-up. There is of course a vast literature on Kant’s account of the feeling of respect, and I cannot even begin to make a dent in it here. For lengthy discussions of it, see for instance Reath (1989), McCarty (1993), Grenberg (2005). Human beings have ‘a need to be impelled to activity by something because an internal obstacle [i.e. an inclination] is opposed to it’ (KpV 5:79). As Banham notes, ‘What Kant’s treatment of anthroponomy shows is that an alternative to empiricist treatments of feeling does exist and resides in the setting out of pure feelings, feelings that are related to and based upon the moral law itself’ (Banham (2003), 205). Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 10 Alix Cohen 12. As Gardner formulates it, ‘[r]eason thus assumes its own cognitive motivation: it has to discover the conditions under which objects are as they are, and our judgments are true’ (Gardner (1999), 217). 13. See for instance G 4:433. Of course, to avoid making it sound like an oxymoron, I could simply call them ‘rational feelings’, which may be less controversial. See e.g. Geiger (2011). However, in the context of my interpretation, it would fail to emphasize the immanent nature of reason’s feeling. 14. For another perspective on this claim, see Wood’s recent statement that ‘Because Kant holds that feelings involve valuations, and even rational valuations, Kant’s claim that pure reason can of itself be practical (KpV 5:31) can be reconciled with his claim that duty can be motivated by respect for the moral law, as well as for other moral feelings’ (Wood (2014), 142). Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Index admiration, 98, 102–03, 131 aesthetic experience, 102–05, 245–62 affects, 17, 90, 113, 166, 168, 243, 244 agreeableness, 76, 173, 183, 188 akrasia, 28 ambition, 79, 199 anger, 17, 57, 84, 113, 117, 123, 124, 168 animals, 45, 114, 123 anthropology, 227–34, 242 moral, 11–12, 29–30, 32, 119, 241, 243 physiological, 109 pragmatic, 108–14, 122 apathy, 1–2, 234 arrogance, 208 autonomy, 41, 44, 52, 137, 156–57, 194, 226, 242 avarice, 191, 198 awe, 98, 102–03, 175, 185, 217, 236, 262 beauty, 81, 102, 105, 107, 126–29, 139, 141–42, 143, 144, 177–79, 182–83, 185, 188, 236, 245, 248 behaviorism, 112, 122 benevolence, 18, 22, 118, 211 capital punishment, 52 casuistry, 25 categorical imperative, 50, 61, 63, 64, 86 Formula of Humanity, 52, 207 Formula of Universal Law, 16, 43, 53 character, 12–15, 25–30, 45–50, 62, 66, 69–86, 144, 192–99, 207, 224–43, 261 cognitivism, 176, 184 colonization, 271, 281, 283 communication, 25–26, 103 community, 27, 30 compassion, 20–21, 23–25, 28, 52, 67–68, 73, 76, 120, 159, 217, 223 conscience, 31, 85, 192, 238 consequentialism, 49, 64–65, 149–50, 151, 164 constructivism, 68, 220 cosmopolitanism, 265–83 deontological ethics, 64–65, 82, 146–47, 149–52, 164 depravity, 229, 237–38 disinterestedness, 39–40, 104, 128–29, 248, 262 duty, 1–2, 9, 11, 14–29, 31–32, 33–68, 73–82, 85–86, 111, 120, 147, 158–63, 188–89, 191–98, 202–06, 208, 210–14, 221–22, 224, 229–39, 243, 264, 267, 270–72, 282–83 education, 23, 32, 71–72, 77–81, 85, 86, 144, 158–60, 243 egoism, 81, 189 enthusiasm, 239, 244, 257, 274 eudaemonism, 60–61 evil, 57, 60, 62, 166, 172, 176, 181, 188, 223, 228, 232, 237–39 existentialism, 186, 190, 216 fear, 6, 12, 102, 111–12, 115, 123, 124, 170–72, 249–50 free play, 104, 119, 126, 142, 183–84, 190 freedom, 8, 17, 44, 95–97, 193–94, 196–99, 208, 216–17, 225–29, 234–35, 237, 241, 242, 244, 261, 276–77 friendship, 23–24, 76–77, 78, 80 generosity, 18–19 good will, 16–17, 19–20, 31, 35, 42, 48–49, 61, 62, 86, 174, 177, 187, 188, 213, 215, 240 grief, 28, 115, 185 guilt, 179, 226 299 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 300 Index happiness, 33, 52–55, 58, 60, 61, 74–80, 85, 104, 174–75, 188, 194, 212, 217–18, 220–22 harmony, 62, 79, 99–101, 103–04, 106, 116, 143, 182, 240, 248, 249, 253 hatred, 17, 27, 168, 200, 224 health, 57, 67, 86, 112–15, 119, 132–45, 173–74, 207 heart, 28, 78, 224–43 holiness, 213, 219–20 honor, 51–52, 56, 61, 62, 127, 143, 168, 191–209 humility, 31, 198, 208 hunger, 57, 185 hypochondria, 115, 119 ideas of reason, 253, 258–61, 263 illusion, transcendental, 251–54 imagination, 57, 90, 102–05, 107, 119–20, 178, 183, 241, 247–50, 253–55, 258–60, 263 inclinations, 1–5, 8, 9, 16–17, 22–23, 28, 31, 32, 34–45, 48, 50–59, 60–62, 73–75, 78–83, 92, 108, 111, 166, 168, 182, 188, 192–93, 196, 200–05, 223, 229–37, 241, 243, 244, 247 infinite, 246–47, 252–54, 256–57, 260, 263 instinct, 48, 110, 111, 167, 168 institutions, 267–68, 269, 274, 280 intuitionism, 64–65, 156–57 judgment aesthetic, 7, 90, 99–104, 140, 178–79, 183, 249 moral, 66, 146–47, 149–57, 163, 164, 206, 229, 266, 282, 283 justice, 21, 236, 266, 269, 278–79 laughter, 112, 168 liberalism, 279–80, 283 love, 22–23, 28, 31–32, 51–52, 54, 76–77, 85, 111, 115, 120, 125, 166, 168, 171, 187, 191–209, 210–23, 225, 231–36, 243–44 lying, 191, 196–98, 203, 206 malice, 25, 230–31 moods, 104, 121, 125, 232, 243 moral law, 4–6, 10, 21–24, 30–32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 62, 93, 98, 106, 117–20, 124, 175, 192–205, 208, 212–15, 225–26, 229, 233, 236, 243 motivation, 5–6, 10, 17, 39, 44, 48, 51, 53, 63, 116–17, 210, 233, 238, 262 natural law, 62, 144 neuroscience, 146, 148, 151 nobility, 48–50, 64, 66 nomadic people, 267, 271, 275, 278–80 normativity, 43, 64, 97, 125, 136, 139–42, 147, 153–57, 163, 166–90, 269 noumenon, 252, 256–58 originality, 134–42, 144 passions, 17, 19, 34, 45, 48, 56–57, 66, 78–79, 82, 86, 89–90, 92, 107, 108, 109–11, 113, 166, 168, 234, 243 paternalism, 270–72 perception, 25, 33, 56–57, 63, 64, 66, 67, 92, 108, 126, 176, 217–18, 221–22 pessimism, 215–16, 266, 269 Platonism, 212, 216 pleasure, 4, 7, 17–18, 22, 28–29, 34–44, 52–59, 63, 67–68, 70, 84, 89, 93–94, 97–102, 110, 113–21, 123–24, 126–45, 168–90, 193, 197, 211, 214, 233, 236, 248–49, 259, 264 pragmatic, 9, 108–25, 139, 170, 174, 187, 188 predispositions, 20, 31, 52, 120, 124, 192, 197, 199–200, 204, 206, 240, 242 pride, 52, 195, 197, 198, 200, 203, 205, 208, 209 providence, 200 prudence, 36, 40, 49, 61, 174, 176, 181, 188, 265–67, 271 psychology, 146–63, 165, 171, 187 purposiveness, 94, 97, 99–102, 106, 139, 183, 245–46, 249–50, 257, 264 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643 Index 301 radical evil, 224, 227–28, 230–31, 240–41 realism, 68, 145, 156, 164, 217 reason instrumental, 45–46, 173 need of / feeling of, 4–6, 9, 10, 100–01, 106, 139, 141 practical, 5–6, 34, 85, 91–93, 120, 125, 163, 194, 195, 204, 223, 234–35, 235, 262–63 theoretical, 5–6, 34, 135, 167, 247, 253, 254–55, 262 regret, 13–16, 27, 28, 30, 180, 222 repulsion, 21, 154, 211, 245, 248–49 respect, 4–7, 9, 28, 31, 32, 43–44, 53, 55–56, 63, 76–77, 85, 93, 95, 98, 117, 120, 125, 168, 175, 180, 187, 188, 192–93, 197–206, 208, 211–20, 223, 226, 234, 236, 243, 249–51, 253, 256–58, 262 Romanticism, 11, 257 sin, original, 215, 238, 242 spontaneity, 34, 44, 60, 116, 135, 138, 237 state of nature, 271, 276–77 stoicism, 8, 25–26, 55, 79, 86, 89 sublime, 98, 102–03, 189, 197, 236–38, 245–64 subreption, 253–57, 263 sympathy, 18, 20–21, 28, 32, 34, 42–43, 51–53, 56, 58–59, 66, 68, 73, 76, 120, 125, 159, 180, 194 sadness, 3, 22, 83, 114, 121, 125 salience, moral, 3, 9, 12, 30 self-esteem, 31, 192, 197–98, 203, 206, 208, 209, 232 selfishness, 36, 39, 41, 44, 215 self-knowledge, 240 self-love, 37–41, 44, 58, 61, 63, 66, 73, 158, 200, 210, 214, 221–22, 223, 229, 236 self-mastery, 17, 125, 193, 196, 236, 243 self-reliance, 206, 231 self-righteousness, 226, 239, 273–74 self-sacrifice, 193 sentimentality, 18–19, 59 servility, 191, 203 shock, 168 vanity, 36, 199, 204 virtue, 1–2, 16–17, 21–30, 33–34, 45–47, 51–67, 76–77, 128, 143–44, 158, 166, 172, 179–81, 191–209, 214, 224–25, 230–41 virtue ethics, 64–65, 73–74, 82, 85 vocation, 33, 128, 143, 197, 206, 236, 249–51, 255–57, 259–61, 262, 264 voluntarism, 177 talents, 20, 74, 136 taste, 81, 99–103, 107, 126–45, 176–90, 246, 248 teleology, see purposiveness temptation, 161–62, 205 understanding, 88, 93–102, 105, 124, 126–44, 174, 183, 188–89, 245, 253 way of thinking, 8, 25, 80–81, 97–99, 139, 192, 195, 232–33, 240, 263 well-being, 76, 104, 144, 161–62, 172–74, 210–12, 220–22, 250–51 Willkür, 225, 242 wonder, 168, 215 Copyrighted material – 9781137276643
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