DAVID ALTMAN SEMINARIO ICP / 7 junio 2013 Título: Status Quo

DAVID ALTMAN
SEMINARIO ICP / 7 junio 2013
Título:
Status Quo, Authorities, or Instigators: Who Wins in the Context
of Direct Democracy?
Abstract:
Common knowledge suggests that people are risk averse and tend to
support the status quo whenever possible. Simultaneously, some scholars
argue that mechanisms of direct democracy systematically favor executives.
This is so because executives can use many resources at their disposal to win.
As Lijphart says, “when governments control the referendum, they will tend
to use it only when they expect to win” (Lijphart 1984: 203). The literature
also suggests that by using instruments of direct democracy citizens are able
to shift policy to favor their objectives. This chapter examines these
propositions empirically. Do mechanisms of direct democracy give way to a
status quo bias? Do governments systematically benefit from these bluntly
majoritarian
institutions?
Do
organizers
(instigators)
benefit
through
MDDs? To answer these questions, I use a novel database that includes all
the mechanisms of direct democracy (referendums, popular initiatives, and
plebiscites) used at the national level around the world since 1980. I find that
MDDs are neither as status quoist as depicted by the literature, nor do they
always play in favor of authorities, nor do organizers benefit directly from
their results.