R. Glauser Le problème de la liberté et du déterminisme

R. Glauser
Le problème de la liberté et du déterminisme
Indications bibliographiques
Textes introductifs
DILMAN, I., Free Will. An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, London / New
York, Routledge, 1999.
R. KANE, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2005.
— (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2002.
Th. PINK, Free Will. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2004.
R. TAYLOR, Metaphysics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1963, chapitre 4.
Philosophie moderne
DESCARTES, Méditations métaphysiques, Paris, Le Livre de poche, 1990, 4e Méditation.
— Principes de la philosophie, Ière Partie, in Oeuvres philosophiques, Paris, Classiques
Garnier, 1989, t. III.
— Lettre à Mesland du 9 février 1645, in op. cit., t. III.
HOBBES, De la liberté et de la nécessité, Paris, Vrin, 1993.
SPINOZA, Ethique, Paris, Seuil, 1988.
— Lettre LVI, in Oeuvres complètes de Spinoza, Paris, Pléiade.
CUDWORTH, R. A Treatise Concerning Eternal And Immuable Morality. With A Treatise
Of Freewill, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
LOCKE, Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain, Paris, Vrin, Livre II,
chap. 21.
LEIBNIZ, Discours de métaphysique et Correspondance avec Arnauld, Paris, Vrin.
— Théodicée, Paris, Garnier Flammarion.
— Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, Paris, Garnier Flammarion, Livre II,
chap. 21.
COLLINS, A., A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, La Haye, Nijhoff,
1976.
VAUVENARGUES, «Traité sur le libre arbitre», in Des lois de l’esprit, Paris,
Desjonquères, 1997.
EDWARDS, J., Freedom of the Will, Princeton, Yale University Press, 1957.
HUME, Enquête sur l'entendement humain, Paris, Garnier Flammarion, section 8.
REID, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, in Philosophical Works,
Hildesheim, Olms Verlag, 1983, Essay 4.
KANT, Critique de la raison pure, Paris, PUF: Dialectique transcendantale, Livre II,
chap. II "Antinomie de la raison pure".
— Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs, Paris, Vrin, sections 2 et 3.
— Critique de la raison pratique, Paris, Vrin.
MILL, J. St., An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, Londres,
Longman's, Green & Co., 1889, chap. 26.
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Philosophie contemporaine
J. L. AUSTIN, « Ifs and Cans » in Philosophical Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.
A. J. AYER, « Freedom and Necessity » in Watson.
H. BERGSON, Les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris, PUF, chap. 3.
C. D. BROAD, Ethics (ed. by C. Lewy), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, chap. 5.
R. CHISHOLM, Person and Object, Illinois, Open Court, 1976, chap. 2.
— On Metaphysics, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, Part 1.
— «Freedom and Action» in Freedom And Determinism , ed. K. Lehrer, 1966.
— « La liberté humaine et le moi » (1964) in M. Neuberg (éd.), La Responsabilité.
Questions philosophiques, Paris, PUF, 1997.
— « L’agent en tant que cause » (1976), in M. Neuberg (éd.), Théorie de l’action,
Liège, Mardaga, 1991.
R. CLARKE, « Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free-Will », in T. O’Connor
(ed.), Agents, Causes and Events. Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, 1995.
— « Agent Causation and Event Causation » (1996), in D. Pereboom (ed.), Free Will,
2009.
— Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2003.
L. W. EKSTROM, Free Will. A Philosophical Study, Westview Press, 2000.
J. M. FISCHER & M. RAVIZZA, Responsibility and Control. A Theory of Moral
Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
D. DAVIDSON, «Liberté d’action», in M. Neuberg (éd.), Théorie de l'action.
D. DENNETT, Elbow Room, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.
J. M. FISCHER, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994.
H. FRANKFURT : « Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility » in The Importance
Of What We Care About -Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press,
1988.
— «What We Are Morally Responsible For», in (1988).
C. GINET, On Action, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
— « Freedom, Responsibility and Agency » (1997), in R. Kane (ed.), Free Will, 2002.
R. E. HOBART, "Free Will As Involving Determination And Inconceivable Without It",
Mind, vol. XLIII, no. 169, 1934.
R. KANE, « Free Will : New Directions for an Ancient problem », in R. Kane (ed.),
Free Will, 2002.
M. KLEIN, Determinism, Blameworthiness and Deprivation, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1990.
A. MELDEN, Free Action, Londres, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
G. E. MOORE, Ethics, Londres, Williams and Norgate, 1912, chap. 6.
— (1952), «A Reply To My Critics», in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E.
Moore, Tudor, New York, 2nd edition.
J. O’LEARY HAWTHORNE & Ph. PETTIT, «Strategies for Free Will Compatibilists»,
Analysis, 56.4, 1996.
D. J. O’CONNOR, Free Will, Londres, Macmillan, 1971.
T. O’CONNOR, « Agent Causation » in T. O’Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes and Events.
Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, 1995.
— Persons and Causes. The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2000.
— « The Agent as Cause » in R. Kane (ed.), Free Will, 2002.
— « Agent-Causal Power » (2009), in D. Pereboom (ed.), Free Will, 2009.
D. PEREBOOM, Living Without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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Th. PINK, The Psychology of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
J-P. SARTRE, L'Etre et le néant, Paris, Gallimard, 4ème Partie.
M. SCHLICK, Fragen der Ethik, Suhrkamp, 1984, chap. 7.
I. THALBERG, « How Does Agent Causality Work ? », in M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.),
Action Theory, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1976.
TIMPE, K., Free Will, London / New York, Bloomsbury, 2013.
P. VAN INWAGEN, An Essay on Free Will, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
R. WEATHERFORD, The Implications of Determinism, Londres, Routledge, 1991.
D. WIGGINS, «Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism», in Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1991.
Recueils d'articles
G. DWORKIN (ed.), Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall, 1970.
L. W. EKSTROM, (ed.) Agency and Responsibility, Westview Press, 2001.
J. M. FISCHER & M. RAVIZZA (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1993.
P. FRENCH, H. WETTSTEIN & J. M. FISCHER (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility,
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol 29, Boston and Oxford, Blackwell, 2005.
T. HONDERICH (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action, Londres, Routledge, 1973.
S. HOOK (ed.), Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, New York,
Collier, 1958.
R. KANE (ed.), Free Will, New York, Blackwell, 2002.
M. NEUBERG (éd.), Théorie de l'action, Mardaga, Liège, 1991. [trad. fr. de Chisholm,
Davidson, Frankfurt, Melden, Nozick, et al.].
— (éd.) La responsabilité, Paris, PUF, 1997. [textes traduits, lorsque nécessaire, de :
Schlick - Chisholm - Frankfurt - Hart - Bergson - Sartre - Strawson - Fauconnet
- Foot - Thomson - Rachels – Spaemann - Jonas - Zimmerli – Neuberg].
T. O’CONNOR, (ed.), Agents, Causes and Events. Essays on Indeterminism and Free
Will, Oxford University Press, 1995.
D. PEARS (ed.), Freedom and the Will, Londres, Macmillan, 1963.
D. PEREBOOM, (ed.), Free Will, Indianapolis, Hackett, 2009.
Th. PINK & M. STONE (eds.), The Will and Human Action. From Antiquity to the
Present Day, London, Routledge, 2004.
U. POTHAST (ed.), Seminar : Freies Handeln und Determinismus, Suhrkamp, 1978.
G. WATSON (ed.), Free Will, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.
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AUNE, B. (1967), «Hypotheticals and 'Can': Another Look» in Watson, ed. (1982).
COPP, D. (1997), «Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness
and Moral Responsibility», Noûs, 31, 4.
GINET, C. (1996), «In Defence of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why I Don't
Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing», in Tomberlin, ed. (1996).
KAPITAN, T. (1996), «Modal Principles in the Metaphysics of Free Will», in
Tomberlin, ed. (1996).
LEHRER, K. (1968), «Cans Without Ifs», in Watson, ed. (1982).
LOCKE, D. (1980), «Digging Deeper Into Determinism», Mind, vol. 89, no. 353.
MCINTYRE, A. (1994), «Compatibilists Could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility
and Negative Agency», The Philosophical Review, 103, 3.
MOORE, G. E. (1912), Ethics, Williams & Norgate, London.
— (1952), «A Reply To My Critics», in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E.
Moore, Tudor, New York, 2nd edition.
PARFIT, D. (1984), Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
TOMBERLIN, J., ed. (1996), Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, Ridgeview,
Atascadero.
WIDERKER, D. (1995), «Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities», The Philosophical Review, 104, 2.

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