Pour une différenciation pédagogique sans stigmatisation

How can the school try to
fight against the social
inequalities of success?
Summary
1. Are social inequities of school success
universal?
2. What is ineffective!
1. The ZEP policy
2. Grade retention
3. Social mixity of the schools (and the classes):
a crucial parameter
4. Beyond ability grouping: the Joplin plan,
cooperative learning and tutoring
5. Teachers’ beliefs and self efficacy
Are social inequities of school
success universal?
Insight from PISA
Différences de performances en lecture en fonction de l'occupation des
parents
Moyenne du score des élèves issus du quart
de familles les moins f avorisées
Moyenne du score des élèves issus du quart
de familles les plus favorisées
Différences en
points
Corée
33
Différence les plus faibles
52
Islande
53
Finlande
66
Canada
68
Italie
68
Espagne
Norvège
70
71
Pays-Bas
Suède
73
78
Danemark
78
Irlande
Autriche
80
83
France
Nouvelle Zélande
85
87
Australie
89
Pologne
États-Unis
90
94
Comm. flam.
96
Portugal
97
Hongrie
97
Royaume-Uni
Tchéquie
98
113
Allemagne
Suisse
115
Com. franç.
124
350
400
450
500
550
600
Différence les plus grandes
103
Luxembourg
Observations
• Everywhere in the world, the children of
favored families (High SES) succeed better
than the children of modest ones
• So, it is true that the familial background is
important
• The size of the disparities vary considerably
according to countries
• It is possible to reduce the scale of the social
inequities on school learning
The more the educational system is
effective, the less it is unequal
or
The more the educational system is
egalitarian, the more it is effective
The solution of the countries of the
North of Europe (Finland, Norway, …)
• Long unique structure ( 9 years) without grade retention
• This means
– Common Curriculum (target on the basic competencies) for all the
pupils during 9 years
– No grade retention
– No marks during the first year of schooling
– Importance of the child well-being
– Importance of a rapid and targeted help when a pupil copes with
difficulties
• The Tuttle principle: « Let us remember that running solves
nothing: we have to start moving at the right moment ».
What is ineffective
The ZEP Policy
• Positive « discriminations », corrective justice:
• Give more to those who have least
• Two ways (see Dutrévis & Crahay, 2009):
– Target specific categories of public (USA, Québec)
– Target zones (territorial logic): France (ZEP) and
England (EPA and EAZ) ==> To avoid the
stigmatization of the populations
Effects ?
• In the US, preschool compensatory programs
have long-term effects, both from the point of
view of the success at school and on that of the
professional success (Crahay & Dutrévis, 2012)
• Attention, in the US, there is no official free
« école maternelle »; therefore the studies
compare school intervention to nothing
• Somewhere else weak or no effects.
• In France, the Moisan-Simon report show that
sometimes, it works, but frequently it doesn’t
work
Problems
• It is frequent to e observe phenomena of
stigmatization of the children and the families
that are in these programs
• Autonomy of the actors:
– Erroneous "educational" conceptions(designs):
rejection(discharge) of the programs DIM in the
United States while they are effective.
– the projects of school are not still targeted on the
underachieving students and/or are not suited.
• The additional resources do not affect(touch)
the aimed population
Repeating a year is ineffective
Some words about quasiexperimental studies of grade
retention
Études comparatives
Evidences
• The repeaters do not obtain better scores
than the pupils of the group of control
• In most of the research, their scores are lower
Longitudinal studies
Année
Fin 81 Scolaire 81-82
Groupe
«expérimental Prétest
»
Groupe
de contrôle Prétest
Fin 82
Fin 83
Fin 84
Redoublement
Post-test Post-test Post-test
1
2
3
Promotion
Post-test Post-test Post-test
1
2
3
Same age comparison
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Promus
1P
test
2P
test
3P
test
4P
test
5P
test
6P
Doublants
1P
test
1P
test
2P
test
3P
test
4P
test
5P
Pupils have same age, but they aren’t at the
same grade.
The repeaters are one grade down
Same grade comparison
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Promus
1P
test
2P
test
3P
test
4P
test
5P
test
6P
Doublants
1P
test
1P
test
2P
test
3P
test
4P
test
5P
Pupils’ performances are compared are at the end of the
same grade, but the haven’t the same age. The repeaters
are older (+ one year)
Evidences
• Same grade comparison: the repeaters obtain
the same scores as the non repeaters
• Same age comparison: the repeaters obtain
lower scores than the non repeaters
Strong pupils
Average pupils
Low pupils
(non repeaters
Repeaters
Social mixity of the schools (and
the classes): a crucial parameter
With the collaboration of Christian
Monseur (University of Liège)
Secondary analysis of PISA data
AT THE SCHOOL LEVEL
Analysis of aggregation effects in
school (Pisa 2000)
Schools attended
by a majority of
low SSE pupils
Schools = social
mixity
Schools attended
by a majority of
high SSE pupils
Pupils from
« poor » family
Pupils from
« rich » family
Reading performance
Reading performance
Reading performance
Reading performance
Reading performance
Reading performance
Procedure
• In each country, we kept two categories of pupils
– Disadvantaged pupils =these ones with the lowest 25% SES
– Advantaged pupils =these ones with the highest 25% SES
• In each country, the schools are classified in three categories:
– The pupils’ SES has been standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation =
1; thus, SES vary between 1,00 and + 1,00)
– Three categories
• Disadvantaged schools : SES mean is below - 0,35
• « Mixed » schools = SES mean is between -0,35 and +0,35
• Favored schools = SES mean is beyond +0.35
• Reading performance = residual scores
– Equation of regression: prediction of reading scores by the SES
– Therefore,
• Negative residual value = performance is under the average predicted
score
• Positive residual value = performance is above the average predicted
score
Ecoles défavorisées
Allemagne
Argentine
Australie
Autriche
Belgique
Brésil
Canada
Corée
Danemark
Espagne
Etats-Unis
Finlande
élèves
défavorisés
-56,37
(8,04)
-25,23
(10,27)
-6,68
(5,57)
-51,68
(5,23)
-45,74
(9,08)
-17,89
(5,39)
-11,92
(4,22)
-25,54
(9,22)
-5,48
(6,47)
-14,72
(5,36)
-34,61
(9,95)
-3,51
(9,53)
élèves
favorisés
-62,71
(10,00)
-38,42
(7,18)
-29,97
(4,63)
-57,33
(5,82)
-55,86
(6,12)
-21,85
(7,81)
-24,54
(3,48)
-27,97
(6,10)
-9,22
(5,96)
-17,59
(4,29)
-38,90
(9,15)
-13,61
(5,84)
Ecoles moyennes
élèves
défavorisés
30,87
(6,58)
16,72
(11,71)
1,04
(4,94)
24,40
(6,06)
26,31
(7,71)
10,22
(4,64)
5,70
(2,38)
10,74
(4,75)
1,96
(4,89)
0,78
(4,29)
11,58
(6,52)
5,38
(3,36)
élèves
favorisés
-4,16
(4,04)
-3,32
14,54)
-8,00
(3,95)
8,58
(4,03)
3,71
(5,91)
-4,48
(3,64)
-2,03
(1,54)
2,88
(3,18)
-2,83
(2,95)
-1,18
(3,08)
-4,77
(5,08)
2,39
(2,14)
Ecoles favorisées,
élèves
défavorisés
113,05
(13,08)
87,58
(12,87)
61,48
(15,48)
74,25
(8,98)
94,24
(5,74)
73,85
(16,12)
26,59
(6,68)
37,91
(7,20)
11,37
(20,20)
44,33
(9,56)
64,72
(16,61)
13,23
(9,74)
élèves
favorisés
54,52
(4,35)
40,21
(5,88)
34,19
(6,22)
30,64
(5,25)
35,11
(3,84)
26,06
(6,33)
19,16
(2,64)
13,92
(5,42)
13,73
(3,81)
20,45
(2,89)
37.08
(8.15)
-0.82
(5.88)
Ecoles défavorisées,
France
Grande-Bretagne
Grêce
Hong-Kong
Hongrie
Indonésie
Irlande
Islande
Israël
Italie
Japon
élèves
défavorisés
-34,83
(4,66)
-17,61
(5,46)
-43,93
(7,84)
-35,84
(11,34)
-36,70
(5,47)
-18,84
(6,59)
-18,67
(9,06)
7,63
(5,65)
-28,42
(7,48)
-38,57
(6,65)
-35,26
(33,51)
Ecoles moyennes
élèves
élèves favorisés défavorisés
-53,12
22,52
(4,53)
(7,74)
-27,84
11,02
(5,71)
(3,65)
-70,52
29,66
(11,30)
(5,80)
-49,27
6,22
(9,56)
(5,22)
-72,93
37,62
(6,40)
(5,05)
-37,47
17,20
(4,67)
(4,67)
-44,04
6,38
(9,08)
(5,40)
-20,80
3,20
(4,69)
(3,75)
-53,22
3,23
(8,17)
(16,08)
-54,23
21,57
(5,64)
(5,17)
-43,30
-10,10
(20,78)
(8,17)
élèves
favorisés
1,72
(4,95)
-7,25
(2,82)
0,93
(5,80)
0,28
(3,96)
-0,87
(4,64)
-1,62
(5,03)
4,09
(3,06)
-2,70
(1,89)
-6,13
(11,15)
-3,27
(5,61)
-3,07
(6,36)
Ecoles favorisées
élèves
favorisés
élèves
défavorisés
82,82
38.08
(8,09)
(3.68)
52,05
31.81
(15,47)
(5.41)
45,09
28.96
(11,38)
(7.81)
46,56
39.76
(14,89)
(8.85)
97,03
48.57
(9,41)
(4.31)
42,23
30.66
(8,34)
(8.03)
38,36
16.27
(11,51)
(4.13)
8,17
9.76
(11,52)
(3.27)
87,63
36.14
(13,91)
(7.49)
69,44
33.68
(8,97)
(4.65)
66,23
40.66
(16,40)
(8.09)
Lettonie
Lichtenstein
Luxembourg
Macédonie
Mexique
Norvège
Nouvelle-Zélande
Pays-bas
Pérou
Pologne
Portugal
Russie
Suède
Ecoles
défavorisées,
élèves
défavorisés
-52,69
(12,12)
-45,29
(15,91)
-34,46
(6,43)
-31,06
(4,44)
-26,69
(5,35)
-0,66
(7,45)
-17,83
(7,47)
-58,51
(7,67)
-24,88
(6,56)
-45,79
(8,42)
-32,00
(6,69)
-30,95
(8,88)
-3,88
(5,22)
Ecoles
défavorisées,
élèves
favorisés
-47,14
(9,14)
-85,45
(15,86)
-48,86
(4,14)
-46,85
(4,37)
-46,75
(5,08)
-22,57
(6,99)
-28,27
(6,12)
-72,80
(11,98)
-38,90
(6,87)
-70,21
(9,05)
-57,64
(6,56)
-42,79
(9,25)
-12,32
(5,96)
Ecoles
Ecoles
Ecoles
moyennes moyennes favorisées,
élèves
élèves
élèves
défavorisés favorisés défavorisés
11,87
0,09
34,93
(5,76)
(5,60)
(10,49)
4,40
-2,97
103,15
(13,29)
(5,88)
(9,56)
6,24
0,19
67,56
(4,01)
(2,21)
(9,06)
5,95
-8,43
89,25
(4,08)
(2,33)
(10,05)
28,12
-1,93
83,33
(6,46)
(4,90)
(16,39)
1,25
0,98
9,38
(4,26)
(3,13)
(8,59)
5,34
-1,99
43,21
(4,95)
(3,01)
(11,40)
30,19
8,53
84,97
(8,11)
(4,87)
(12,17)
1,53
-9,45
86,18
(7,44)
(5,27)
(19,44)
42,98
-4,63
105,09
(6,46)
(6,31)
(12,89)
18,68
3,90
41,90
(5,93)
(3,96)
(12,52)
8,05
-3,96
45,68
(5,28)
(4,10)
(9,23)
0,24
-3,73
27,52
(3,35)
(2,66)
(9,90)
Ecoles
favorisées,
élèves
favorisés
35,48
(8,35)
58,92
(7,66)
42,62
(2,36)
46,81
(2,77)
39,10
(5,97)
12,76
(5,31)
24,07
(6,97)
32,73
(6,97)
63,51
(6,20)
47,71
(8,22)
32,23
(6,13)
43,21
(6,13)
18,46
(3,96)
Suisse
Tchéquie
Thaïlande
Ecoles
défavorisées,
élèves
défavorisés
-31,49
(5,83)
-40,91
(5,41)
-5,86
(5,12)
Ecoles
défavorisées,
élèves
favorisés
-31,43
(7,55)
-55,19
(6,16)
-15,29
(4,73)
Ecoles
Ecoles
Ecoles
Ecoles
moyennes moyennes favorisées, favorisées,
élèves
élèves
élèves
élèves
défavorisés favorisés défavorisés favorisés
-7,22
-10,21
108,65
48,55
(6,43)
(3,81)
(10,34)
(5,86)
20,94
-7,13
80,34
48,32
(4,22)
(2,92)
(11,18)
(4,46)
0,93
-5,24
55,89
23,13
(7,00)
(4,05)
(10,15)
(10,45)
Observations
• In all the countries, residual values are
negative when the pupils – disadvantaged o
advantaged -attend disadvantaged school
• In all the countries, residual values are
positive when the pupils – disadvantaged o
advantaged attend disadvantaged school.
• Residual values are positive or slowly negative
when the pupils attend a « medium » school
Observations
• In all the countries, we notice an effect of the
socioeconomic composition of schools on the
performances in reading of the pupils
• Thus, everywhere to the world, we observe effects of
aggregation which influence the performances of the
pupils in reading.
• The importance of these varies according to
countries.
– These effects of aggregation are almost non-existent in
countries as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
– They are important in most of the other countries.
About the native versus non-native
differences (same kind of analysis)
Native pupils
Non-native pupils
Schools with a
majority of native
pupils
Mean scores
Mean scores
Schools with a
majority of nonnative pupils
Mean scores
Mean scores
Difference between native
and non-native mean
scores per country
Difference between native
and non-native mean
scores per country
Allemagne
Ratio
2,95
Autriche
2,96
Belgique
2,80
Danemark
2,20
Espagne
2,83
Finlande
3,91
France
2,33
GrandeBretagne
Grce
2,51
Hongrie
3,51
Irlande
2,09
Islande
1,93
Italie
2,74
Lichtenstein
1,50
2,13
Ecoles favoris
e s
Natif
Non natif Diff
r ence
496,82
495,14
1,68
(3,93)
(8,18)
517,41
493,58
23,83
(3,98)
8,77)
542,85
526,04
16,81
(4,18)
(8,24)
502,13
490,64
11,49
(2,58)
(7,61)
495,98
482,98
13,00
(3,56)
(11,00)
546,94
525,54
21,40
(3,28)
(18,06)
516,62
515,45
1,17
(4,42)
(7,20)
517,87
522,88
-5,01
(2;97)
(6,98)
479,07
486,19
-7,12
(5,97)
(9,02)
463,45
480,93
-17,48
(6,27)
(16,29)
521,76
528,21
-6,45
(4,03)
(8,03)
503,20
504,71
-1,51
(1,91)
(9,92)
483,36
506,32
-22,96
(6,36)
(12,36)
517,84
489,05
28,79
(5,75)
10;57)
Ecoles dfavoris
es
Natif
Non natif Diff
r ence
491,63
427,46
64,17
(6,98)
(7,67)
511,26
457,71
53,55
(6,64)
(6,15)
487,44
434,79
52,65
(9,70)
(6,70)
504,37
456,89
47,48
(4,79)
(9,23)
491,17
468,19
22,98
(4,81)
(9,81)
549,67
517,04
32,63
(3,69)
(9,86)
502,40
474,66
27,74
(5,71)
(6,62)
544,49
522,07
22,42
(9,40)
(10,71)
468,53
438,99
29,54
(12,12)
(17,43)
509,06
497,15
11,91
(7,75)
(10,36)
531,91
536,14
-4,23
(5,01)
(6,77)
511,96
509,33
2,63
(2,60)
(7,15)
493,96
481,61
12,35
(5,87)
(6,45)
459,96
419,99
39,97
(14,09)
(11,92)
Luxembourg
Ratio
1,56
Norvge
2,34
Pays-Bas
2,32
Pologne
-
Portugal
2,10
Su
de
2,02
Suisse
2,07
Tch
qu ie
2,67
Moyenne
gn
r a le
Ecoles favoris e s
Natif
Non natif Diff
r ence
497,08
456,97
40,11
(2,12)
(3,31)
504,72
489,19
15,53
(3,46)
(9,78)
549,09
517,39
31,70
(6,30)
(10,35)
479,42
466,20
(6,00)
521,86
(2,83)
517,02
(4,78)
482,06
(5,35)
466,24
488,32
(8,94)
509,80
(5,61)
477,68
(7,48)
504,20
(10,00)
386,22
-22,12
12,06
39,34
-22,14
Ecoles dfavoris
es
Natif
Non natif Diff
r ence
430,05
366,92
63,13
(3,50)
(3,29)
517,03
486,09
30,94
(4,90)
(6,84)
528,38
478,48
49,90
(8,33)
(13,55)
486,25
452,13
34,12
(20,45)
476,01
469,70
6,31
(8,13)
(8,80)
525,95
485,30
40,65
(4,14)
(5,96)
504,87
457,74
47,13
(6,59)
(8,28)
503,48
499,10
4,38
(5,40)
(6,64)
476,40
440,82
Observations
• Natives and non-natives is bigger when the pupils arise
from schools in which there is a majority of nonnatives
• Again, we observe the influence of social school
composition on the pupils performances, with a
negative of social segregation
• Again, The importance of these varies according to
countries.
– These effects of aggregation are almost non-existent in
countries as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
– They are important in most of the other countries.
Monseur, C. et Crahay, M. (2008). Composition académique et sociale des
établissements, efficacité et inégalités scolaires : une comparaison
internationale, Revue Française de Pédagogie, 164, 55-65 (Numéro spécial
sur l’éducation comparée, dirigé par N. Mons)
CONFIRMATION OF THESE OBSERVATION
WITH A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Bibliography
• Monseur, C. et Crahay, M. (2008). Composition académique et
sociale des établissements, efficacité et inégalités scolaires : une
comparaison internationale, Revue Française de Pédagogie, 164,
55-65 (Numéro spécial sur l’éducation comparée, dirigé par N.
Mons de l’Université de Grenoble).
• Crahay, M., & Monseur, C. (2006). Différences individuelles et effets
d’agrégation en ce qui concerne les performances en lecture.
Analyse secondaire des données PISA 2000. In C. Houssemand, R.
Martin & P. Dickes. Perspectives de psychologie différentielle (pp.
23-34) Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
• Crahay, M. & Monseur, C. (2007). Fins a quin punt l'alumnat
immigrant és víctima de segregació escolar? Anàlisi secundària de
l'estudi PISA 2000…. In Nouvinguts, fins quan? Vè Simposi: llengua,
educació i immigració Coordination : Institut de Ciències de
l'Educació Josep Pallach. Universitat de Girona Édition : Edicions a
petició Collection : Acta
About ability grouping at the
classroom level
• Natural studies :
– Ability grouped class have been created by the
directors(managers) of the school; the researchers
observe what happens and refrain from bending what
takes place there
• Experimental or quasi experimental studies
– The objective is to measure the specific effect of
ability grouping independently of other variables (to
do it, they manage the condition in order to neutralize
the effects of other parameters, in particular the
attitude of the teachers and the OTL offered to the
pupils of the different groups).
Evidence
Natural studies
• Weak pupils suffer to be
grouped in low ability
grouped class;
• The receive less OTL, less
encouragement and
positive feedback, less
challenging question
• Phenomenon of
stigmatization in
comparison of other pupils
Experimental or quasiexperimental studies
• No difference between
heterogeneous classes and ability
grouped ones for strong and
weak pupils
• When the implemented
curriculum is kept constant
and that the teachers are
equally motivated and
enthusiastic, grouping has
no effect
When teachers are affected to a class with a
reputation of weakness, they decrease their
requirements and especially reduce the OTL
ABILITY GROUPING IS NOT
IMPORTANT PER SE
WHAT IS IMPORTANT, IT IS THE
TEACHERS’ EXPECTATIONS
Beyond ability grouping: the
Joplin plan, cooperative
learning and tutoring
Joplin plan = high efficacy and high
equity
• Time spent in homogeneous groups is inferior
to thetime spent in heterogeneous classes.
The latter = group of identification
• Constitution of homogeneous groups is based
on the assessment of a specific competence
(e.g. reading) and not on that of a general
capacity
• The groups are flexible; the are reorganized
regularly according to the pupils’ progress.
Also for reaching efficacy and equity
• Mastery learning (Bloom)
• Tutoring
• Cooperative learning
Teachers’ beliefs and selfefficacy
• Passage de classe selon les
réglementations existantes, 2009/2010
Secondaire inférieur
Primaire
Redoublement possible
Restrictions
Progression
automatique
Source: EACEA Eurydice, Grade Retention during Compulsory Education in Europe: Regulations and Statistics
Proportion de jeunes de 15 ans ayant répété au moins
un an au niveau primaire, 2009
pays avec restrictions et sans restrictions
%
Main conclusion of the EURYDICE
report
• No clear relation between regulations (laws)
and rate of grade retention
• Grade retention practice depends more on the
school culture and on the assessment practice
of the teachers than the administrative
regulations;
• Therefore, the issue is the teachers beliefs and
knowledge rather than the administrative
regulations
Is it possible? If yes, how
BUT HOW DO CHANGE THE
TEACHERS’ BELIEFS AND
KNOWLEDGE

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