PUBLIC MEETING
‘War and Peace: The Role of UN and NATO’
Tuesday, September 30th, 2014
Press Centre ‘Nieuwspoort’, The Hague
On Tuesday, September 30th 2014, the Netherlands Atlantic Association (NAA) organized a
public meeting with Herman Schaper. He is the most recent speaker in a series of public
meetings with prominent former Dutch diplomats organized by the NAA. The public
meeting was attended by some 60 people and took place at Press Centre ‘Nieuwspoort’ in
The Hague. The central theme of the meeting was what role the UN and NATO have in
international politics. The meeting was moderated by Robert van de Roer, diplomatic
expert.
What role should the UN and NATO take in the global peace and war paradigm? It is a
question the organizations themselves struggle with. With his extensive experience (he was
the Netherlands Permanent Representative at both organizations), Herman Schaper was
invited to shed more light on the identity crisis the UN in particular is going through.
Herman Schaper
“The UN is not just peace, and NATO is not
just war.” An unpopular saying among the
UN bureaucracy, but one which Herman
Schaper adheres to. The UN is not just
peace, it is also war. Schaper argued this can
be simply deduced from the UN Charter.
Nonetheless, he argued that the dominant
view of the UN as a peace organization is
the result of two trends.
First, the way in which peacekeeping
emerged and evolved in the ‘90s led
towards opposition for more robust peacekeeping operations among the UN bureaucracy.
As countries like the U.S., Great Britain and France were pushing for bigger peacekeeping
operations, countries like India and Egypt resisted as they were the main contributors to
these missions. Secondly, in Schaper’s experiences, the UN has an irresponsible approach to
military operations. Consequently, regional organizations such as NATO and the African
Union could take over these tasks. As a colleague of Herman Schaper put it: “The greatest
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threat to the Security Council are the regional organizations.” To subdue this ‘threat’ posed
by regional organizations, it is imperative to clearly define the role of the UN as a peace
organization.
Next to that, Herman Schaper argued that “NATO is the best place to go to for complex
military operations.” It possesses the capabilities and expertise to realize these operations.
This is the main reason why NATO became the organization to endeavor in more operations
in the ‘90s as many countries turned to NATO for military operations, not the UN.
Kosovo and Libya
Schaper elaborated on the previous arguments with the examples of Kosovo, Libya, Syria
and Ukraine. Within the international community there was a consensus about Kosovo that:
“There was a legal basis to intervene, but not what this basis entailed.” As doing nothing was
not an option, countries were quick to turn to NATO. Crises such as Kosovo led to the
establishment of the Responsibility to Protect norm in 2005, which was first used as a basis
for intervention in Libya. The outcome of the Libya mission was a success for NATO, but
countries like Russia and China were displeased with the outcome of regime change.
Herman Schaper finds these arguments nonsensical. He asserts that the notion of
responsibility to protect is by definition tied to regime change. Furthermore, he finds it
irresponsible how the UN handled the mission in Libya. In the mandate, the UN did not
mention anything about military advise, targets, what measures could be used or an exitstrategy. Criticism afterwards about the method and outcome of the mission is thus not
inappropriate according to Herman Schaper, as the UN mandate was very vague to begin
with. This vagueness, he argues, stems from the fact that the UN views itself as a peace
organization, not a military one, and thus it does not have the knowledge to set up military
operations.
Syria
This led Herman Schaper to the subject of Syria. In his opinion, the current crisis in Syria is
the result of non-intervention by third parties. Next to that, he has difficulty understanding
the weapons embargo which hits the moderate opposition the hardest, whilst Assad keeps
receiving weapons from Russia. Furthermore, the argument that most countries do not want
to arm the moderate opposition because it is likely the weapons will make the situation even
worse, is also puzzling for Schaper. He argues that the situation is already at its worst, so the
delivery of weapons is a measure the West can and should take.
Ukraine
Lastly, Herman Schaper wanted to make a few points about the situation in Ukraine. First
and foremost, he argued, it is not a conflict originating from tensions between the West and
Russia, but a conflict which originates from Putin’s disrespect of International Law. In 1994,
Ukraine decided to give up their nuclear arsenal with Russia, promising they would respect
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Schaper argued that this promise was clearly abandoned when
Russia invaded the Crimea. He reiterated what Putin said himself: “We can be in Warsaw and
Vilnius in 2 days.” If Russia would invade either Lithuania or Poland for the same reason it
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annexed the Crimea, it would mean NATO is not a sufficient deterrent for external
aggression. According to Schaper, this would mean the end of the alliance.
Next to that, Schaper argued that NATO and the EU are not influenced by Ukraine’s domestic
ambitions to join these organizations. Ukraine might join at some point, but not in the
foreseeable future as it cuts across Putin’s ambition to build a Eurasian Union. Schaper
therefore argued that NATO needs to strengthen its forces now, reconsider its relations with
Russia and focus its energy on preventing similar situation like in Ukraine. Most importantly,
the balance between NATO’s three pillars – collective security, cooperative defense and
crises management – needs to be reconsidered.
Discussion
Robert van de Roer had some follow-up questions after Herman Schaper’s speech. The
question was raised if Putin has given NATO new life. Schaper responded by saying: “NATO
does not need new life, national defense expenditures of NATO member states however do
need a new narrative.” Herman Schaper found it strange that member states never raised
defense expenditures out of self-interest, but only in the name of the alliance. That is how
this strange approach emerged of going into a country for 2-4 years and then leaving again.
Herman Schaper concluded by arguing that once you intervene, you need to remain until a
durable peace has been established.
Anne Bakker & Bas Braun
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