Give more tomorrow: Two field experiments on altruism

Give more tomorrow:
Two field experiments on altruism and
intertemporal choice
Anna Breman, Journal of Public Economic 95 (2011)
Student Presentation:
Ayse Erkmenli
June, 16th 2014
Agenda
I. Introduction
II. “Two field experiments”
III. Key features
IV. Results
V. Conclusion
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
2
I.
•
Introduction
intertemporal choices of donors with monthly contributions to charitable
organizations
•
two field experiments (Diakonia; Save the Children)
=> focus on long-run sustainable development in poor countries
•
donors are asked to increase their monthly contributions:
i.
immediately (control group; Give More Now [GMN])
ii.
in one month (treatment group; Give More Tomorrow [GM1])
iii.
in two month (treatment group; Give More Tomorrow [GM2])
Source: own illustration
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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I.
Introduction
•
donors already in monthly contribution scheme
•
aim: increase existing donors’ monthly contribution
•
benefits from donation (long-run)
-
•
realization of a public good
“warm-glow”
cost of donation (at time of payment)
-
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foregone consumption possibilities
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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II. „Two field experiments“
Diakonia
FE1
Save the Children
FE2
Implementation
Oct./Nov..2005
(Follow-up:Oct..2006)
March 2007
Introduction of MCS
10 years ago
early 1970s
Number of monthly
donors
~2,000
~70,000
Random sample
1,200
10,000
Statistical test
GMN (control)
GM2 (treatment)
GMN (control)
GM1 (treatment)
GM2 (treatment)
Source: own illustration
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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III. Key features
•
Monthly contribution schemes (MCS)
-
•
Telemarketing
-
•
regular fundraising campaign
donors already contribute monthly fixed amount to charity
donors are called by phone and asked to increase their
contribution
Randomization
-
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donors are randomly divides into GMN, GM1 and GM2 and
are called in random order by randomly selected caller
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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III. Key features
• Structure of phone calls
- opt out at any time
- yes / no
Source: own illustration
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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IV. Results
• summary statistics:
• frequency of large donations (SEK>=100):
- FE1: 80% higher in GM2 than in GMN
- FE2: 30% higher in GM2 than in GMN
FE1
GMN
average monthly contributions
(before experiments) [in SEK]
average increase in donations
per month [in SEK]
GM2
FE2
GMN
141
18.6
24.6
GM1
GM2
152
15.03
15.07 16.61
Source: own illustration
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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IV. Results
• average increase in donations in GM2 higher relative to
GMN in FE1 (SEK 7.21) and FE2 (SEK 1.77)
• heterogeneous treatment effects
- men respond to GM1 and GM2, while women respond less to
GM2 and not to GM1
- long-term donors increase contribution less than “newer” donors
• follow-up results
- no long-run differences in changes in donation and cancellation
rates between control and treatment groups
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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V. Conclusion
• commitment mechanism significantly increases monthly
contributions
- treatment effect: 32% [FE1] and 11% [FE2]
• commitment mechanisms are more effective on men and
“newer” donors
• charities can boost donations by commitment
mechanism in long-run
- large impact of intertemporal trade-offs on actual contribution
16/6/2014
Experimental and Behavioral Economics |
TU Berlin
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