Informationen_Prof. Michelon

Freiburger Vorträge zur Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie
Herr Prof. Dr. Claudio Michelon
(University of Edinburgh)
wird am 19. November 2015 um 18 Uhr c.t.
im KG II, 4. OG, Raum 2408
zum Thema
The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law
sprechen.
Zur Person:
An der Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brasilien) absolvierte Prof.
Claudio Michelon das Studium der Philosophie, das er 1992 mit einem LL.B und
1996 mit dem Master in Philosophie abschloss. 2001 promovierte er an der
University of Edinburgh. Von 2001 bis 2006 lebte Prof. Michelon in Brasilien, wo
er als Rechtsanwalt praktizierte und Assistant Professor an der Federal University
of Rio Grande do Sul war. Seit 2007 ist er Professor für Rechtsphilosophie an der
University of Edinburgh.
Abstract:
The Structure of Arguments by Analogy in Law
This paper discusses the structure of arguments by analogy in law. The first part
of the paper takes issue with the best known (contemporary account of the
structure of legal analogical argument: Martin P. Golding’s. Golding’s account
gives expression to a very popular picture of analogical arguments. For him,
arguments by analogy fit the following scheme:
(1)
x has characteristics F, G . . .
(2)
y has characteristics F, G . . .
(3)
x has characteristic H.
(4)
F, G . . . are H-relevant characteristics.
Therefore (from (1), (2), (3), and (4)),
(5) Unless there are countervailing considerations, y has characteristic H.
This paper presents two objections to conceiving analogical argument in these
terms: (a) the source case is argumentatively idle and (b) the argument fails to
account for the normative nature of the conclusion of legal analogies.
The second part of the paper presents and defends an alternative account of the
structure of arguments by analogy in law. There are (at least) three advantages
of the proposed characterisation.
First, the scheme discharges the two burdens identified in the discussion of
Golding’s scheme: it accounts for the normative character of analogical
arguments in law, and retains the argumentative relevance of the source case.
Second, the theoretical framework that informs the scheme allows for an
integrated understanding of how precedent works in legal argument. Third, the
scheme and the theoretical framework also enable one to make sense of some
popular claims about judicial reasoning. One example is the idea law might in
some instances develop on the back of reasoning “from case to case” without the
necessary articulation (at any given step) of any general unifying rules.

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