Alasan Penghakiman

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: K-05-311-12/2013 (PHL)
BETWEEN
RHIAN DE GUZMAN
...
APPELLANT
...
RESPONDENT
AND
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
(In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Alor Setar
Criminal Trial No: 45A-45-08/2012
Between
Public Prosecutor
And
Rhian De Guzman)
CORAM:
AZIAH BINTI ALI, JCA
TENGKU MAIMUN BINTI TUAN MAT, JCA
AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWI, JCA
1
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[1]
The appellant was charged in the High Court at Alor Setar for
trafficking in dangerous drugs, an offence punishable under section
39B(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (the Act).
[2]
The appellant was detained after he went through the Kompleks
Kastam, Imigresen dan Kuarantin, Bukit Kayu Hitam. At the custom’s
check point, the bag carried by the appellant (exhibit P8) was found to
contain substance which was later confirmed by the chemist to be
3790.1 gram of Methamphetamine. The drugs were found after several
layers of concealment were uncovered. This fact was established
through the evidence of the customs officer, PIKK Azizan bin Abdullah
(SP6) where he states (pg 29: Rekod Rayuan):“... Apabila zip beg tersebut dibuka, saya dapati ada satu batang logam yang
merentangi di bawah beg tersebut. Saya terpaksa membuka beberapa skru
untuk mengeluarkan batang logam tersebut. Setelah batang logam tersebut
dibuka saya dapati ada sekeping poliform warna putih yang menutupi papan
lapis yang disalut dengan pita pelekat hitam. Saya cuba mengopak kepingan
papan lapis tersebut dan berjaya melihat satu bungkusan bersalut pita pelekat
warna coklat muda. Saya mengeluarkan papan lapis tersebut yang mana
terlekat satu bungkusan yang disalut pita pelekat coklat tadi. Apabila saya
tarik bungkusan tersebut yang terlekat kuat pada papan lapis itu, terkoyak
sedikit di bahagian atas. Apabila terkoyak, saya dapat lihat hablur Kristal
berwarna putih. Saya mengambil sedikit hablur tersebut untuk membuat ujian
test kit dadah. Hasil ujian didapati positif dadah jenis methamphetamine.”.
[3]
At the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge found
that a prima facie case has been made out. The appellant was called
upon to enter his defence.
2
[4]
The appellant gave evidence under oath. His defence was that he
had no knowledge of the drugs in the bag (exhibit P8). The appellant
testified that P8 was given to him by Laura whom he had befriended in
Bangkok for about 5 or 6 months prior to the incident and that Laura had
asked the appellant to bring the bag to Kuala Lumpur. According to the
appellant, when Laura gave him the bag at the hotel room, the bag
contained Laura’s clothes but Laura took out her clothes and put the
appellant’s clothes in the bag instead. At first the appellant was reluctant
to take the bag but the appellant finally agreed when Laura promised to
pay him USD2500.
[5]
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the High
Court. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. We had
unanimously dismissed the appeal. We now give the reasons.
The Appeal
[6]
It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the
learned trial judge had erred in calling for the defence on the charge of
trafficking and that at the highest, the appellant was guilty of passive
possession. The argument was premised on the following findings of the
learned trial judge (pg191-192:Rekod Rayuan):“[17] Dalam kes ini setelah meneliti keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh
pihak pendakwa saya dapati pihak pendakwa tidak dapat mengemukakan
keterangan secara langsung yang menunjukkan tertuduh mempunyai
kawalan dan jagaan secara fizikal ke atas bungkusan P17 yang berada di
dalam beg P8 tersebut. Pihak pendakwa juga tidak dapat mengemukakan
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keterangan secara langsung yang menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh tahu
tentang kandungan P17 adalah dadah berbahaya.
[18]
Berdasarkan peruntukan seksyen 37(d) ini, pihak pendakwa boleh
bergantung ke atas anggapan untuk membuktikan bahawa tertuduh
mempunyai pemilikan dan pengetahuan ke atas dadah berbahaya tersebut.
Bagi membolehkan pihak pendakwa bergantung ke atas anggapan statutori di
bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 tersebut, pihak pendakwa perlu
terlebih dahulu membuktikan syarat duluan iaitu tertuduh mempunyai kawalan
dan jagaan ke atas “anything whatsoever containing drug”. Anggapan
statutori tersebut tidak boleh diguna pakai jika pihak pendakwa tidak dapat
membuktikan pra syarat tersebut.
[19]
Dalam kes ini pihak pendakwa telah mengemukakan keterangan yang
menunjukkan dadah berbahaya tersebut dijumpai di dalam beg P8 yang
dibawa oleh tertuduh. Walau pun semasa pemeriksaan balas SP5 mengakui
dia tidak melihat tertuduh meletakkan beg tersebut ke dalam mesin
pengimbas namun keterangan jelas menunjukkan tertuduh yang mengambil
beg tersebut setelah diimbas. Tertuduh juga mengakui arahan yang diberikan
oleh SP5 untuk mengeluarkan pakaian dari dalam beg tersebut dan juga
mematuhi arahan untuk beg tersebut diimbas semula. Keterangan ini telah
menunjukkan tertuduh mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan ke atas beg tersebut.
Beg P8 tersebut adalah “sesuatu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya”
(anything whatsoever containing dangerous drug).
[20]
Dari keadaan di dalam kes ini saya dapati pihak pendakwa boleh
bergantung kepada anggapan di bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952
bagi membuktikan tertuduh mempunyai pemilikan dan pengetahuan ke atas
dadah berbahaya tersebut kerana keterangan jelas menunjukkan tertuduh
mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan ke atas beg yang mengandungi dadah
berbahaya tersebut.
[21]
Pihak pendakwa selanjutnya kena buktikan tertuduh melakukan
perbuatan mengedar dadah tersebut. Bagi membuktikan perbuatan mengedar
dadah berbahaya tersebut pihak pendakwa boleh bergantung kepada
keterangan langsung yang menunjukkan tertuduh telah melakukan mana4
mana perbuatan yang termasuk kepada perbuatan mengedar seperti yang
diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 atau dengan
mengguna pakai anggapan statutori di bawah seksyen 37(da) Akta Dadah
Berbahaya 1952.
[22]
Dalam kes ini pihak pendakwa telah mengemukakan keterangan yang
menunjukkan tertuduh datang dari luar negara dan sedang melalui
pemeriksaan Kastam serta sedang membawa beg P8 yang mengandungi
dadah berbahaya, pada masa dia ditahan. Melalui keterangan ini pihak
pendakwa telah membuktikan pada masa itu tertuduh sedang membawa
dadah berbahaya tersebut dan keterangan ini telah membuktikan tertuduh
sedang melakukan perbuatan membawa (carry) adalah antara perbuatan
mengedar di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.
[23]
Oleh yang demikian saya dapati pihak pendakwa telah berjaya
membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap tertuduh dan tertuduh hendaklah
membela diri terhadap pertuduhan tersebut.”
[7]
Learned counsel argued that the learned trial judge had made a
finding that the appellant had no knowledge and hence, his Lordship
erred in calling for the defence for trafficking.
[8]
In our view, the submission of learned counsel is misconceived.
The finding of the learned trial judge must be looked at in totality. From
the above, it was clear that in calling for the defence, the learned trial
judge found that possession had been proven under section 37(d) of the
Act and trafficking was found to have been proven under section 2.
[9]
The learned trial judge’s finding that the appellant had no
knowledge was in respect of the discussion on the absence of direct
evidence. Knowledge is one of the elements essential to be proved in
order to prove possession. The other element is custody and control.
5
While custody and control may be proved by direct evidence, as has
often been said, knowledge which is a mental element is difficult to
prove by direct evidence. It is always a matter of inference.
[10] Due to the difficulty in proving knowledge by direct evidence and
hence possession, the law allows the prosecution to resort to the aid of
presumption, namely either presumption of possession under section
37(d) or presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the Act. In the
instant appeal, the learned trial judge had invoked the presumption of
possession under section 37(d) which he was allowed to do so under the
law (see Muhammed bin Hassan [1998] 2 MLJ 273).
[11] We do not find any error of fact or law committed by the learned
trial judge. In our judgment, the appellant was rightly convicted for
trafficking. In PP v Abdul Manaf bin Muhamad Hassan [2006] 3 MLJ
193, Arifin Zakaria FCJ (as his Lordship then was) said:“[17] ... the prosecution may positively prove possession without relying on
the presumption under s 37(d) of the Act and go on to rely on the presumption
of trafficking under s 37(da) of the Act to support a charge under s 39B of the
Act. ... Conversely, the prosecution may rely on the presumption under s
37(d) to prove possession and seek to prove by affirmative evidence
(independent of the presumption under s 37(da) that the accused was in fact
trafficking in the dangerous drugs.
[18]
...
[19]
It is not in dispute that when he was arrested, the respondent was in
fact carrying the said drug. Trafficking under the Act, by definition includes
carrying. This is found in s. 2 of the Act which reads:
6
‘trafficking’ includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say,
manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying,
selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying,
sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous
drug otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations
made under the Act; ...”
[12] Although the Federal Court in the above case stated that the mere
act of carrying is not sufficient to constitute the offence of trafficking, the
Federal Court took into consideration the large quantity of the drug
involved and ruled that it cannot be seriously contended that the drug
was for his own consumption. The Federal Court upheld the conviction
and death sentence of the respondent for trafficking in dangerous drugs
under section 39B of the Act.
[13] Similarly in the instant appeal. From the quantity of the drugs, it
may reasonably be inferred that the drugs were carried from Thailand
into Malaysia for purposes of trafficking. We therefore found that the
learned trial judge was correct in calling for the defence on the charge of
trafficking.
[14] At the end of the defence case, the learned trial judge found:[38]
Selepas mempertimbangkan keterangan tertuduh saya dapati watak
Lora mungkin sebenarnya wujud dan telah memberikan beg tersebut untuk
dibawa tertuduh ke Kuala Lumpur. Bagaimana pun saya dapati pembelaan
tertuduh telah gagal mengakas anggapan bahawa tertuduh mempunyai
milikan dan tahu tentang dadah berbahaya dalam beg P8 tersebut.
Keterangan tertuduh jelas menunjukkan dia sendiri merasa sangsi dengan
berat beg tersebut. Seseorang yang munasabah, yang menerima beg
tersebut dan sangsi denga berat beg tersebut akan memeriksa dan mencari
7
punca mengapa beg tersebut berat dari keadaan biasa dan pemeriksaan
sebegini boleh menjumpai punca tersebut. Dalam kes ini jelas dibuktikan
pada dasar beg tersebut terdapat 4 bungkusan yang menjadi punca berat dari
keadaan biasa. Jika tertuduh membuat pemeriksaan tersebut dia akan
menjumpai dadah berbahaya tersebut.”
[15]
In our judgment, the learned trial judge erred in accepting that
Laura exists in the light of the inconsistencies of the defence version in
court and in his cautioned statement (exhibit D1).
[16] In his evidence, the appellant testified as follows (pg 77-78: Rekod
Rayuan):“Q:
When you met Laura, what happen?
A:
Laura told me that she want going (sic) to Malaysia but unable to go
through immigration.
Q:
Who was unable to enter through immigration?
A:
Laura
Q:
When she told you that, what did you say?
A:
I told her I am going to Malaysia because my ticket from Malaysia to
Philippine
Q:
Then what happen?
A:
She gave me something
Q:
What was there?
A:
She gave me one bag
Q:
After your conversation with Laura, what happen?
A:
Before she mention (sic) she unable to enter Malaysia, she asked me
whether I am able to carry her bag. She told the bag was at other
place. I asked her what inside the bag. She told me, no need to ask
anything.
8
And at pg 79-80:-
Q:
What Laura said when she gave you the bag?
A:
She told me just bring the bag to KL
Q:
When Laura told you to bring the bag to KL, what did you say?
A:
I told why the bag is very heavy
Q:
What she said?
A:
No need to ask because she know what is inside the bag
..
...
Q:
When Laura open the bag at the hotel room, what inside the bag?
A:
Laura’s clothes
...
...
Q:
When she took out the clothes, what you see inside the bag?
A:
Didn’t seen anything
Q:
After she took out the clothes, what did she do?
A:
She put my things inside her bag”.
[17] In exhibit D1, the appellant gave a different version or explanation
why he had no knowledge of the drugs (pg 305-316: Rekod Rayuan):“Saya tak tahu kerana beg tersebut bukan milik saya. Di Hadyai, saya
bertemu dengan seorang wanita berhampiran terminal bas Hadyai. Wanita ini
seorang warganegara Filipina tetapi saya tidak tahu nama beliau. Wanita ini
meminta saya untuk membawa sebuah beg yang kosong ke Kuala Lumpur.
Apabila sampai di Kuala Lumpur wanita itu menyuruh saya menempah bilik di
mana-mana hotel di sana dan menghubungi beliau untuk memberitahu hotel
9
mana yang saya tempah. Wanita itu juga memberitahu dia akan memberi
saya wang apabila dia mengambil beg itu kembali daripada saya di Kuala
Lumpur. ... Setelah itu wanita tersebut membawa saya ke sebuah hotel di
Hadyai untuk mengambil beg tersebut. ... Tiba di bilik tersebut wanita itu
memberikan kepada saya sebuah beg yang kosong. Wanita itu kemudian
menyuruh saya memasukkan semua pakaian saya yang berada di dalam beg
sandang milik saya sendiri. Saya pun memasukkan pakaian saya ke dalam
beg tersebut .. “
At pg 309: Rekod Rayuan, the appellant gave the following statement:“S21: Adakah kamu tanya dia kenapa dia tidak bawa beg itu sendiri?
J21: Ada, wanita itu beritahu saya dia tidak boleh pergi ke Kuala Lumpur
kerana dia tidak ada tiket penerbangan pergi dan balik ke Filipina.”
Further, at pg 315:“S64: Adakah wanita itu beritahu kamu berapa upah yang dia akan beri pada
kamu?
J64: Tidak.”.
[18]
Learned counsel argued that despite not being raised by the
appellant, the learned judge ought to consider the defence of innocent
carrier. On the finding that the appellant should be suspicious as the bag
was heavy, learned counsel argued that the inference made by the
learned trial judge was against the facts of the case for the following
reasons: the bag was already heavy when the appellant took it; the
drugs were hidden and could not be seen with naked eyes; the appellant
was shown the bag and he saw that it was empty and at the check point,
the appellant made no attempt to run or escape.
10
[19] In our judgment, the defence of the appellant that he had no
knowledge of the drugs in the bag was not credible or probable. Surely,
there cannot be a different version of whether it was Laura whom the
appellant knew or the female stranger who had given him the bag, if
indeed the bag was not his and that it was given by someone to him. We
therefore agreed with the learned trial judge that the appellant had failed
to rebut the presumption of possession under section 37(d) of the Act
and had failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.
[20] On the totality of the evidence, we found the conviction of the
appellant to be safe. We unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the conviction and sentence of the High Court.
Dated 7th January 2015
(TENGKU MAIMUN BINTI TUAN MAT)
Judge
Court of Appeal, Malaysia.
Counsel/Solicitors:
For the Appellant:
Yagoo Subramaniam
Messrs. Yagoo & Associates.
For the Respondent:
Muhamad Yasser bin Mohd Nasri
Timbalan Pendakwa Raya
Jabatan Peguam Negara.
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