EL Mahdi ENA Migration Paper - Information and Training Seminars

This project is funded by
the European Union
This project is implemented by the Ecole
nationale d’administration
Migration from South Mediterranean countries to EU:
Economic Aspects
Alia El Mahdi, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics
Cairo University
May 2014
1
Introduction
International migration is a global phenomenon that has been changing in scope,
complexity, composition, features and impact over time. Migration is both a cause and
effect of broader development processes and an intrinsic feature of our ever globalizing
world. While no substitute for development, migration can be a positive force for
development when supported by the right set of policies. The rise in global mobility,
the growing complexity of migratory patterns and its impact on countries, migrants,
families and communities have all contributed to international migration becoming a
priority issue for the international community.
In this session we will try to discuss the main economic and social reasons as well as
implications of Southern Mediterranean migration - with emphasis on the Arab
migrants- to the European Union. The first section will deal with the definition of
migration; the second section will introduce the main theories on migration; the third
section will focus on the Mediterranean Arab migration flows to the EU; the fourth
section will deal with the economic impact of remittances; the fifth section will discuss
the impact of migration on both sending and receiving countries; the sixth section will
discuss the main concluding remarks; Finally, the last section will present the case of
Egypt.
1-Labor Migration in the context of global economic freedom
Migration has been defined as “a move from one place in order to go and live in
another place for a continuous period of at least one year”. The line has been drawn at
one year to allow for comparison with international recommendations, as well as to
exclude seasonal migration across international borders. International labor migration
is defined as the movement of people from one country to another for the purpose of
employment. Labor mobility has become a key feature of globalization and the global
economy.
Movement of labor is one of the four fundamental economic freedoms, along with free
movement of goods, services, and capital of the four, it has met with the least
receptivity on the part of countries in the international economy, whether developed or
developing. The contrast between the desire to promote capital mobility and
investment flows and the reluctance to envisage corresponding labor mobility is stark.
More than 2,800 bilateral investment treaties have been signed to date, but nothing
equivalent exists in the area of labor. The number of trade agreements covering
services is growing rapidly, yet willingness to incorporate meaningful provisions on
labor mobility into the services package is limited, and most agreements contain very
modest market access opportunities for foreign workers. Several recent free trade
agreements (FTAs) contain no provisions at all in this area. Leaving aside formal
bilateral and regional trade agreements, it is extremely difficult to determine the
number of bilateral agreements worldwide that incorporate arrangements for temporary
worker programs and no single institution has been designated as a repository of
agreements and promoter of labor mobility.
Whereas most governments sponsor investment promotion agencies to encourage
inward flows of capital and foreign direct investment, there is no similar institution for
workers. In nearly all countries, the agency that deals with the influx of foreign labor is
the immigration authority, whose concern is to regulate and restrict, not to promote. To
complicate matters further, immigration authorities are primarily focused on setting
2
rules for permanent rather than temporary migration. Temporary migration, however,
is the object of international trade policy and is the focus of this discussion1. Moreover,
Migration has become global, but there is no global regime to govern the international
movement of persons. There is no migration law that could reasonably be described as
“international” 2
2-Theories of international migration
Several authors have reviewed the existing theories and models of international
migration. From these and other studies, it is obvious that there is no integrated theory
on the process of international migration, but rather a set of partial theories and models
that have been developed from different disciplinary viewpoints. Many, especially
earlier, theoretical models concentrate exclusively on the process of labour migration,
while more recent theoretical models have tried to explain why migration continues
once it has started. So, we can conclude that the opportunity differentials are at the
heart of most migration3. In the international literature there are many theories and
model of immigration, meanwhile, the most common theories are neoclassical theory
and push-pull theory.
a-Neoclassical macro-economic theory: Neoclassical macro-economic theory
explains the development of labor migration within the process of economic
development. Wage differentials, caused by differences in the ratio of labour to
capital, induce workers from low-wage countries to migrate to countries with high
wages, thereby seeking to maximize individual incomes. Migration causes wage
differentials to decrease, ultimately leading to an equilibrium in which the remaining
wage differential only reflects the material and immaterial costs of moving4. In this
type of model that focuses completely on labour markets, wage differentials
measured in terms of observed wage rates at origin and at destination are the main
explanatory variables.
b-Neoclassical micro-economic theory: Neoclassical micro-economic models focus
on labour markets as well, but assume that individuals make rational cost-benefit
calculations, not only about the decision whether to migrate or not, but also when
considering alternative destinations. Against the benefits of expected higher wages being a function of wage differentials and employment rates – there are various costs.
Such costs are, for instance, those related to travel, to wages foregone while looking
for work, to efforts involved in adapting to another country (learning a new language
and culture, making new friends, etc.), and to the psychological costs of leaving
friends and family. Individual characteristics explain why individual cost-benefit
calculations produce different outcomes with regard to the decision to migrate. In
general, the larger the difference between countries in terms of expected returns, the
larger the size of the migration flow.
1
Sherry Stephenson and Gary Hufbauer (2011) LABOR MOBILITY, in, " Preferential Trade
Agreement Policies for Development", A HANDBOOK Editors; Jean-Pierre Chau our • JeanChristophe Maur. World bank
2 Ryszard Cholewinski, et al, eds., International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key
Challenges (The Hague: TMC Acer Press, 2007).
3 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, (2012) ‘Migration Meets Slow Growth,’ Finance and Development 49
no. 3, p 18-22
4
Massey, D., et al. (1993), Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. In: Population
and Development Review, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 431-466.
3
c-Push-pull theory: One of the most commonly known theoretical concepts in
migration research, implicit in economic models of migration, is the so-called pushpull model for the explanation of the causes of migration. In its most limited form,
the push-pull model consists of a number of negative or push factors in the country of
origin that cause people to move away, in combination with a number of positive or
pull factors that attract migrants to a receiving country. Lists of push factors include
such elements as economic, social, and political hardships in the poorer countries,
while the pull factors include the comparative advantages in the richer countries.
Combinations of push and pull factors would then determine the size and direction of
flows5. The fundamental assumptions are that the more disadvantaged a place is, the
more likely it will produce migration, and that, given inequalities, there will be
migration. The main push and pull factories of migration as follow:
Push factors are reasons that encourage a person to leave a particular place. The main
push factories of migration are:
Economic factors:
Lack of employment
Natural disasters (earthquakes, floods)
Lack of food or shelter
Lower standard of living
Social Factors:
Lack of social and health care
Lack of quality educational opportunities
Lack of religious tolerance
Poor quality of life
Political Factors:
Unfair legal system
Lack of Political freedom and democracy
War, genocide and terrorism
Persecution
Natural disasters
Man-made disasters
Pull factors are reasons that encourage a person to relocate in a new place. The main
pull factories of migration are:
Economic Factors:
5
Portes, A. and J. Borocz (1989), Contemporary immigration: theoretical perspectives on its
determinants and modes of incorporation. In: International Migration Review, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 606630
4
Hope for better employment opportunities
Higher expected income
Better housing environment
Hope for family to have a higher standard of living
Improved quality of life
Social Factors:
Reuniting families
Encouragement from family and friends
Better social and health care
Better educational opportunities
Religious tolerance
Political Factors:
Freedom from persecution, of speech, of religion, etc.
To gain protection under the law
Right to vote and freedom from persecution
Safety and security
3- Mediterranean Arab Migrants to the EU
The migration flows between the SEMC and the EU have been on-going for quite a
long time, though they varied according to country of origin. Whereas countries such
as Turkey, Morocco and Algeria were sources of strong migratory flows towards
Europe, Egypt, Lybia and Syria had relatively insignificant flows of migrants to the
EU. Several factors were cited as the main reasons behind the migration flows, such as
income expectations, job expectations, security issues, but also institution’s quality.6 Dramatic
increase in migration flows was also usually connected to wars or internal conflicts. The
examples of Palestine (1950-1985), Tunisia (1960-65), Algeria (1960-65) or Lebanon (197590) are relevant examples. However, the main factors explaining short migration flows are the
GDP gap between sending and receiving countries and the poor institutional quality in the
sending countries. Migration is a sign of institutional malfunctioning. Migrants are leaving
their country when the administration fails in providing a requested quality in public services.
What adds to the migration issue are the illegal migration flows between the two regions. The
tough the EU regulations on legal migrations could be the factor triggering the growing flows
of illegal migrants.7
6 Najman, B. (2011) Human capital as a determinant of migration flows in MED11 Migration’s scenarios for
MED11 countries, Draft report, p.16.
7
Ayadi,R. and A. El Mahdi, (2013), Human Capital, Inequality and Migration in Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean Countries: Towards a coherent policy agenda, CEPS
5
The Mediterranean Arab population has been migrating from their countries of origin
to other destinations for a long time. Being colonized by France, Italy and Britain for
extended periods opened the way to the migration to these destinations beside the new
world countries such as the USA, Canada, and Australia. The beginning of the sixties
witnessed new directions for the Med Arab migrants especially to the oil producing
countries in the Gulf of Arabia as well as Iraq and Libya.
Over the years the reasons for migration differed and the educational levels changed
based on the destination countries needs. Internal factors such as the high fertility rates,
the youth bulge and the high unemployment rates mattered significantly in the drive to
migrate, while external factors such higher income potential, better socio-economic
standards of living and the chances to improve their educational attainment and realize
personal achievement in the destination countries helped in attracting new migrants8.
The data of World Bank revealed that there were more than 214 million international
migrants in the world in 2011 9, or 3 percent of the world population, live outside their
countries of birth.
The percentage of immigrants from the Mediterranean Arab countries to their total
population was 4% and more than the world average (3%).
The largest proportion of immigrants to the population was in Lebanon, where the
percentage of immigrants to the population in Lebanon, about 12%, followed by
Morocco (8.1%) and Tunisia (5.5%) (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Percentage of total immigrants to population in the Mediterranean Arab
Countries, 2011
percentage of total
population (%)
14
12
12
10
8,1
8
5,5
6
4,4
4
4
2,3
2,1
2
1
0
Lebanon Morocco
Tunisia
Algeria
Average
Egypt
Syria
Libya
Source: calculated by author, based on data from table 1. In Philippe Fargues (2013) International Migration
and the Nation State in Arab Countries, Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 5–35. P. 14
The Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean are partners of the European
Union within the framework of the Barcelona Process. All of them happen to be
countries of emigration, while all the EU members have now become countries of
immigration. Not all of Arab emigration is destined for Europe, just as not all
immigration in Europe is coming from the Arab world, but the numbers involved in the
Mediterranean migration system go into the millions. The Barcelona Process was
8
9
See table 1 in Statistical Appendix.
World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Second edition
6
launched in 1995 with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity through the
progressive establishment of free trade10.
Despite the relative ease with which EU nationals can live and work in other
Member States, intra-EU movement is relatively small compared to other forms of
migration. While 4.1 percent of EU residents are from outside the European Union
(‘third-country nationals’), only 2.5 percent are EU nationals living in another Member
State (see Table 1). Most foreign nationals reside in the ‘old’ European Union, the socalled EU-1511.
In spite of, Arab Mediterranean countries' share of immigration to the European Union
is very weak, where the proportion of immigrants from those countries of the European
Union only about 7% of the total EU immigrants12. European Union represents the first
destination for Arab immigrants, where it has about 47% (4.9 million immigrants) of
Arab immigrants in 2011. While there are 14% of Arab immigrants move to the Arab
Gulf states (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Structure of Arab Migrants to the world according to Region of Residence,
2011
Other couriers
8%
Other Arab
countries
31%
European Union
47%
Gulf States
14%
Source: calculated by author, based on data from table 1. In Philippe Fargues (2013)
International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries, Middle East Law and
Governance 5 (2013) 5–35. P. 14
Currently, immigration to Europe is possible through several channels such as:
employment or student permits for skilled workers; by marriage immigration and
family reunification; or asylum and illegal immigration.
Family reunification is one of the most common ways to immigrate to Europe today.
This means that immigration laws in host countries have transformed immigrant youth
into virtual human visas. The commonality of cousin marriages to aid the extended
10
Philippe Fargues (2004) Arab Migration to Europe: Trends and policies. In "Arab Migration in a
Globalized World" League of Arab States and the International Organization for Migration. P. 135. May
11
Meghan Benton and Milica Petrovic (2013), How free is free movement? Dynamics and drivers of
mobility within the European. Migration Policy Institute Europe Union, P. 3. March.
12
Source of Total migrant world side: United Nations (UN/DESA), International Migration Stock
Source of Migration from Arab Mediterranean countries to EU: Philippe Fargues (2013) International
Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries, Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 5–
35. P. 14.
7
family or to keep resources within the family encourages marriages between
immigrants and family members back in the host country. The Western legal system
reinforces tribal marriage patterns by giving families incentives to use marriage to
work around the European immigration system. In Norway, for example, the
proportion of cousin-marriages within the Pakistani immigrant community is greater
than in Pakistan itself. Marriage immigration also perpetuates itself. Studies show that
the age at which an immigrant woman first becomes a mother increases and the
number of children decreases the longer her family is in Europe. That is, a first
generation immigrant would exhibit behavior closer to her native country while a
second and third generation immigrant would tend to be more similar to the local
population. Marriage immigration therefore ensures a continued high level of fertility
among the immigrant population13.
The EU's share of total immigrants worldwide was 33% of the total migrants
(69.8 million migrants14). The Mediterranean Arab countries were the source of 10.5
million immigrants in 2011. Palestine, Morocco and Egypt were the largest exporters
of migrants. Where about 27% of the total Arab immigrants from Palestine, followed
by Morocco at about 24% and Egypt at about 17% (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Structure of the Arab Mediterranean Countries Migrants to the world, 2011
30
% of Total Arab Migrants
25
28
25
18
20
15
15
10
6
5
5
4
1
0
Palestine Morocco
Egypt
Algeria
Tunisia
Lebanon
Syria
Libya
Source: calculated by author, based on data from table 1. In Philippe Fargues (2013) International Migration and the
Nation State in Arab Countries, Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 5–35. P. 14
As to the most important destinations of the Arab Mediterranean countries they can be
shown in the following table. The top migrant destination country for Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia was France followed by Spain and Italy.
The rest of the Arab Med countries prefer to travel to other Arab countries or to the
USA and Canada and Australia.
13
Esther Ben-David (2009) Europe's Shifting Immigration Dynamic, Middle East Quarterly. Spring, pp.
15-24
14
United Nations (UN/DESA), International Migration Stock.
8
Table 1 The 3 top countries distinations of the Med Arab immigrants
1st Country
France
France
France
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Palestine
USA
Jordan
Country of origin
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Palestine
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
The 3 top countries distenation
2nd country
3rd country
Spain
Italy
Spain
Israel
Italy
Libya
UK
Chad
Jordan
Libya
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
USA
Australia
Canada
Kuwait
USA
Source: World Bank (2011) Migration and remittances Fact book 2011, Second edition
The percentage of total migration from Arab Mediterranean countries to the European
Union indicates that almost half of the migrants (49%) from Morocco, and 30% from
Algeria, 11% of Tunisia. Migration from these three countries account for 90% of Arab
immigrants to the European Union (Figure 4)
Figure 4: The relative share of all the countries of the Mediterranean Arab
countries of the Migration to European Union's
Arab Mediterranean countries' share of
immigration to the European Union (%)
60
50
49
40
30
30
20
11
10
4
3
2
1
0,2
Lebanon
Syria
Libya
Palestine
0
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Egypt
Source: calculated by author, based on data from table 1. In Philippe Fargues (2013) International Migration
and the Nation State in Arab Countries, Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013) 5–35. P. 14
4-Remittances of Arab Mediterranean countries Immigrants from EU
Remittances are generally defined as economic transfers that follow unidirectional
paths from an immigrant worker to his or her sending country and households. The
amount of money returned by immigrant workers is large and often far more valuable
to most countries than direct aid; yet remittances are about more than the formal
unidirectional flow of money. Social scientists understand that formal remittances are
important to sending countries. Remittances can influence the balance of trade and
support national investments, and remittances also drive investments and sometimes
development
9
The recorded remittances received by all countries, estimated to be US$ 440 in 2011,
US$ 325 billion of that total have been received by developing countries. The contribution of
the immigrants of Arab Mediterranean countries in the remittances received by developing
countries was only 8.5% (US$ 28 billion) (World Bank, 2011). The top recipient Arab
Mediterranean countries of recorded remittances as a share of GDP was Lebanon (22%)
followed by Morocco (7%).
Table 2: Remittances and their percentage to GDP in the Arab Mediterranean countries
Remittances (US$
Country Billion)
Morocco
6,447
Algeria
2,031
Tunisia
1,960
Libya
16
Egypt
7,681
Lebanon
8,177
Syria
1,407
27,719
Total
GDP in Current price (US$
Billion)
% of Remittances to
GDP
90,771
161,778
44,378
62,360
218,888
37,124
59,147
674,446
7
1
4
0
4
22
2
4
Source: Remittances: World Bank (2011) Migration and remittances Factbook 2011, Second
edition GDP:
http://data.worldbank.org/country. Accessed in October 2, 2013
Some studies refer to the formal/ recorded remittances as less than the total refinances
as a result of informal remittances. Broadly speaking, remittances are transferred
through formal channels and informal or “invisible” channels. The formal channels
employ official means and are recorded in the balance of payments as “remittances
without counterpart”. A portion of these remittances is made by social or benefactor
institutions in favour of the migrant or his family. This includes pensions, retirement
funds, family allocations, medical expenses, and other similar items.
The informal channels evade official statistics and involve various operations15:
Money the migrant brings into the country during her visits home, or sent
through third persons. This flow of funds involves informal networks of
collection and of delivery to the countries of origin, that depend on family and
commercial ties. This channel seems to be preferred by Mauritanian emigrants.
Compensations among compatriots: this mechanism is used when an immigrant
makes payments on behalf of his fellow citizen in the country of destination.
On return, his or his family’s account in his home country is credited in his
national currency. This type of compensation is the result of the inconvertibility
of the Maghreb currencies and the existence of exchange controls.
All material goods brought home by the emigrant during his leave, such as cars,
electric household appliances, furniture, electronic devices and similar items.
Such products are intended for private consumption, but are also introduced
into the informal economy of the country of origin (petty trade). This channel,
based on geographic proximity, is widespread in Morocco and Algeria, where
the “suitcase trade” constitutes a relatively important portion of transfers.
15
Mohamed Khachani (2004) Moroccan Migration to Europe: Wheat Impact on That Economies of
Countries of Origin?. In "Arab Migration in a Globalized World" League of Arab States and the
International Organization for Migration. P. 37. May.
10
5- Impact of migration on Sending Countries and Countries of Residence
In fact, migration has become a major force shaping international reality. Migration is
a powerful force of social change and cultural interaction in implicated countries. It
provides migrants themselves with significant opportunities to progress. It is also a
factor that has diverse developmental effects on both the home and host countries. The
international community has recognized these facts in its deliberations on migration
and has accepted the need to establish a more coherent political response to the
phenomenon.
Table 3 Immigration Impact on Sending Countries
Possible Positive Development Effects
Possible Negative Development Effects
of Migration
of Migration
Increased global economic efficiency
Loss of highly skilled workers and
reduced quality of essential services.
Welfare of the individual (in most
cases), especially due to new
opportunities for workers not
available in the home country.
Reduced growth and productivity
because of the reduced stock of
highly skilled workers and negative
externalities.
Inflow of remittances and foreign
exchange
benefiting
receiving
individuals and countries.
Selective migration may cause
increasing income disparities in
sending country.
Emigration
may
reduce
unemployment pressures in sending
countries.
Sending country may lose potential
tax revenue.
Technology, investments and venture
capital from Diasporas.
Risk of creating a ”remittance
economy” and dependency among
receivers, a problem exacerbated
when remittances diminish over time.
Potential increased trade flows
between sending and receiving
countries.
Inflationary potential of remittances,
especially on real estate, in some
areas.
Possibility of emigration may
stimulate investment in education
and individual human capital
investments.
Reduces
classes”
the
size
of
”political
Charitable activities of Diasporas can
assist in relief and local community
development.
Table 4 Immigration Impact on Residence Countries
Possible Positive Development Effects
Possible Negative Development Effects
of Migration
of Migration
11
Attract well educated and highly
skilled immigrants.
Promote more
existing jobs.
completion
Illegal migration
Outflow of remittances
for
Immigrants may compete with
native-born workers in the labor
market,
displacing
them
in
employment or bidding down wages.
Lower wages
More availability of workers to
perform jobs that are not welcomed
by the citizens of the recipient
country.
Increase unemployment of local
workers
Social and culture integration
between immigrants and natives
Concluding Remarks
The mobility between the Southern Mediterranean countries and the EU will continue
to exist for several historical, economic and political reasons, therefore all policies that
deal with this phenomenon have to take that into account. Mobility Partnerships should
be based on the principle of equality and should view mobility as an asset. In this case,
mobility schemes are not uni-directional but involve the movement of workers,
students, business people etc. from the EU to the Southern Mediterranean and vice
versa. There are credible prospects for human mobility. A similar bi-directionality
would take place with regard to strengthening the rule of law – this issue would be
addressed in both regions – the EU and the Arab Mediterranean - as true ‘capacity
building’ to ensure proper checks and balances and human rights protection.
The EU’s External Action Service and Foreign Ministries should take over the policy
agenda instead of leaving it to the DG of Home Affairs16.
The role of the EU’s External Action Service in the domain of the external dimension
of migration should be strengthened by increasing the service’s institutional capacities
in this portfolio and revisiting the division of responsibilities between the EEAS and
Commission DGs such as DG Home. In the negotiation phase, the EEAS should act as
the prime interlocutor for the dialogue vis-à-vis the North African states.
A new approach is hence needed that replaces the paradigm of mobility as an
insecurity/threat with one exploiting the potential of mobility to foster economic
growth, human capital and political reform. For this approach to materialise, stronger
links should be established between migration and other domains of sectoral policy
cooperation between the EU and SEMCs, including trade, employment, education and
training, and human rights.
The Dialogues should be re-focused on the central aim of opening and supporting
channels for legal migration, including labor migration. Given that admission of third
country national workers is currently highly restricted by national laws, consideration
should be given to allocating the EU greater capacity in this domain. This should be
flanked with concrete arrangements within Mobility Partnerships to facilitate mobility,
16
Ayadi,R. and El Mahdi, (2013) Human Capital, Inequality and Migration in Southern and
Eastern Mediterranean Countries : Towards a coherent policy agenda, CEPS, Brussels, pp4-5.
12
including the recognition of qualifications of immigrant workers, guarantees for the
portability of social security rights and schemes to encourage training and educational
exchanges.
The EU should make use of international agreements (similar to those used in the
context of readmission and asylum cooperation) in place of Joint Declarations as the
framework for Mobility Partnerships. This should better ensure their compliance with
rule of law and fundamental rights as well as the credibility of the EU’s position.
The EU and the North African states should agree on a ‘Roadmap to Mobility’ which
would sequence the steps needed from both sides. To ensure an equal partner dialogue,
this cannot be a rigid conditionality approach, but rather a way to build mutual trust by
offering specific incentives on both sides. The EU should streamline the dialogue into
the overall approach to the North African countries. Mobility should not be
‘exchanged’ for measures stemming irregular migration flows, but should be used
rather to encourage reforms needed for safeguarding human rights, building
independent courts and narrowing socio-economic differences. In return, the Dialogue
should also include obligations and measures to improve compliance with human
rights standards in the EU, including in EU migration and border policies17.
7- Egypt: Case Study
Evidence from the region confirms the common sense intuition pointing to
employment prospects as the main driver of migration, although wages and living
conditions tend to play a greater role than unemployment as such.
A field survey was carried out by the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and
Emigration to determine the push factors in Egypt as identified by current and potential
migrants. The results of this survey indicate that push factors in Egypt are
overwhelmingly economic. Egyptian youth regard migration – legal or illegal – as a
possible way to escape poverty and unemployment. With respect to the reason for
migration, the study indicates that the main reasons behind migration are the low
wages and salaries in Egypt compared to Europe, bad living conditions and the lack of
job opportunities in Egypt, especially among new graduates. An important factor that
plays a major role in stimulating migration streams to Europe is the wealth of
successful migrants and return migrants.
Remittances of Egyptian migrants who work in European countries are
important factors that stimulate a continuous stream of migration. Potential migrants
claim that the “savings of one-year work in Europe is more than a lifetime salary in
Egypt”. The current stream of Egyptian irregular migration to Europe started on the
eve of the 21st century with massive number of newly-graduated and poorly educated
unemployed youth engaged in irregular migration to Europe either across the
Mediterranean Sea via Libya or by over staying on tourist Schengen visas. the main
reasons behind this new type of migration are not related to the tightened policy
17
Carrera, S., L. Den Hertog and J. Parkin (2012), EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring:
What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?, MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15, CEPS,
Brussels (http://www.medpro- foresight.eu/publication/eu-migration-policy- wake-arab-spring-whatprospects-eu-southern- mediterranean-relations).
13
adopted by the European Union, but instead to: (i) unemployment: the increasing
severity of unemployment is one of the main push factors that stimulate a strong
irregular migration stream to Europe; (ii) associated with unemployment is the
difficulty for Egyptian youth to find employment opportunities in the Arab Gulf
countries due to the competition they face there from the cheap South East Asian
labour now arriving in massive numbers; and (iii) geographical proximity and the ease
of travelling to Libya where most of the migrant boats to Europe set-off18.
The value of remittances of Egyptians immigrants has grown up over the
chosen period, through the first four years it slightly changed and varied between 2.9
and 3.1 million USD; however it started to increase significantly from the year
2004/2005 as it was USD 4.4 million till it reached USD 17.7 million in 2011/201219.
The dramatic change in the value of the remittances during the last two years has still
to be analyzed and explained as there have not been any significant movements of
Egyptian labor to the outside world. Thus this significant increase in remittances could
have political rather than economic reasons.
Figure 5: The value of remittances of Egyptians immigrants (US$ Billion) (2000/2001 2011/2012)
20
17,7
15
12,3
8,4
10
5
2,9 3,1
2,9
3
4,4
4,9
6,2
7,6
9,5
0
The data of remittances revealed that Saudi Arabia has lost its position over the chosen
period as the second largest source of remittances of Egyptians labor working abroad
after the USA which recorded the largest source over years, while Kuwait and United
Arab Emirates competed on the second and third positions, to leave the fourth position
to Saudi Arabia in the year 2008/2009. In general, the remittances transferred from the
EU do not represent one of the top four sources of remittances coming to Egypt.
18
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010) "Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab
Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects”, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affair, occasional papers, NO 60, April.
19
Central bank of Egypt, monthly bulletin, different issues
14
Table 5 The Top Four Remittances’ Countries of Egyptian Migrants
2001/2002
Co
unt
ry
US
A
Sa
udi
.A.
Ku
wai
t
UA
E
Value of
Remittance
s (mn$)
% to
total
Remit
tance
s
2005/2006
2008/2009
Rank
by
countr
y
Value of
Remittance
s (mn$)
% to
total
Remittan
ces
Rank
by
countr
y
Value of
Remittance
s (mn$)
% to
total
Remittan
ces
Rank
by
countr
y
956
32
1
1516
30
1
2269
29
1
621
21
2
775
15
3
976
13
4
376
13
3
923
18
2
1549
20
2
349
12
4
729
14
4
1380
18
3
List of References
Ayadi, R. and Alia El Mahdi, (2013) Human Capital, Inequality and Migration in
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Towards a coherent policy agenda,
CEPS, Brussels; http://www.medpro-foresight.eu/publication/human-capital-inequality-andmigration-southern-and-eastern-mediterranean-countries-towa
Carrera, S. etal., (2012) EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring, Center of
the European Policy Studies (CEPS) , Brussels ; http://www.medproforesight.eu/publication/eu-migration-policy-wake-arab-spring-what-prospects-eu-southernmediterranean-relations.
Ben-David, E. (2009) Europe's Shifting Immigration Dynamic, Middle East
Quarterly.Spring.http://www.meforum.org/2107/europe-shifting-immigration-dynamic
Central
Bank
of
Egypt,
monthly
bulletin,
different
issues.
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Publications/Monthly+Statistical+
Bulletin/August+2013+Statistical+Bulletin.htm
Cholewinski, R. et al, eds. (2007), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms
and Key Challenges (The Hague: TMC Acer Press, 2007).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010) "Labour Markets Performance and Migration
Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects”, DirectorateGeneral for Economic and Financial Affair, occasional papers, NO 60, April.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp60_1
_en.pdf
European Commission, home affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/immigration/index_en.htm.
European Commission, home affairs. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/immigration/index_en.htm.
15
Fargues, P. (2013) International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries,
Middle
East
Law
and
Governance
5
(2013)
5–35.
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/fargues/Documents/MELG_005_01_01Fargues.pdf.
Fargues, P. (2012) Demography, Migration and Revolt in the Arab Countries, in
Merlini, C.and O. Roy,) Ed., The Arab Society in the Southern Mediterranean,
Brookings
Institute,
Washington,
http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/fargues_arab_revolt_brooki
ngs_2012.pdf
http://data.worldbank.org/country.
Khachani, M. (2004) Moroccan Migration to Europe: Wheat Impact on That
Economies of Countries of Origin?. In "Arab Migration in a Globalized World"
League of Arab States and the International Organization for Migration. P. 37. May.
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Arab_migration_globalized_world.pdf
Massey, D., et al. (1993), Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal.
In:
Population
and
Development
Review,
vol.
19,
no.
3.
http://cis.uchicago.edu/outreach/summerinstitute/2011/documents/sti2011-parkstheories_of_international_migration.pdf
Najman, Boris. (2011) Human capital as a determinant of migration flows in MED11
Migration’s scenarios for MED11 countries, CASE, (under publication)
Papademetriou, D.G (2012) ‘Migration Meets Slow Growth,’ Finance and
Development
49
no.
3.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/papademe.htm
Portes, A. and J. Borocz (1989), Contemporary immigration: theoretical perspectives
on its determinants and modes of incorporation. In: International Migration Review,
vol. 23, no. 3. http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jborocz/apbjimr.pdf
Stephenson, S. and Gary Hufbauer (2011) LABOR MOBILITY, in, " Preferential
Trade Agreement Policies for Development", A HANDBOOK Editors; Jean-Pierre
Chauour•
Jean-Christophe
Maur.
World
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/C13.pdf
United Nations (UN/DESA), International Migration Stock.
World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Second edition.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf
16
Statistical Appendix:
Table 1 Selected Mediterranean Countries: Unemployment Rates and Total
Fertility Rates
Country
UER 2012
TFR 2013
Algeria
10.2
2.78
Egypt
13.5
2.9
Gaza Strip
22.6
4.41
Jordan
12.5
3.3
Lebanon
10
1.75
Libya
13
2.09
Syria
18
2.77
Morocco
9.2
2.17
Tunisia
17.4
2.01
Source: Source: CIA, World Factbook,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/print_2129.html
17

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