Situation at the Engineering workplace (direct control) – 2

To protect my life
and our members’ lives
International Railway Safety Conference 2008, Denver
Toru Miyano
Chairperson, Infrastructure Workers Section
East Japan Railway Workers' Union
Introduction

1975
– Employed at Japanese National Railways
(Kesennuma Engine Depot)

1987
– Breakup and privatization (Electric Power Depot)

1995
– Vice Director of the
Electrical Power
Sub-section in Head Office

2007
– Chairperson,
Infrastructure
Workers Section
Introduction
Division Liaison Council
Head Office
Sections
Sub-sections
Engineering
Track
Maintenance
Medical
treatment
Electric
Power
Transportati
on vehicles
Communications
Station Staffs
Architecture
Foremen and
Supervisors Office
Staffs
Civil
Engineering
Planning
Machinery
Construction
Work
Clerical
Introduction
Head Office
Track & Structure Maintenance and
Electric Engineering Staffs Section
Track Maintenance
Sub-section
Electric Power
Sub-section
Communications
Sub-section
Architecture
Sub-section
Civil Engineering
Sub-section
Machinery
Sub-section
Construction Work
Sub-section
Clerical
Sub-section
Introduction

We aim for ZERO passenger fatalities and injuries
and ZERO employee fatalities and injuries
(including employees in group companies and
partner companies).
Safety
(The top priority of management)
Reduction of railway operation accidents
to approx. 1/4
Summary Chart for Safety
Evacuation Errors
in the 2006-2007 Fiscal Year
Station related evacuation delays
Minakami Station Yard on the Joetsu Line
No. 47 switch stand
Station related evacuation delays
Minakami Station Yard on the Joetsu Line
No. 47 switch stand
Outbound platform
30m
Train lookout
position
Station related Refuge delays
Minakami Station Yard on the Joetsu Line
7 workers evacuated to the
outbound platform side
Outbound
Emergency stop
position
platform
30m
Evacuated to the passing track side
and backed up against snow wall
Situation at the Engineering
workplace (direct control) – 1
(Worker location)
369k940 m
Train lookout
Work manager
368k263 m
Sakaigawa RC
Around 369k345 m
Confirmed train approach
370k000 m (4053 lead car)
Around 369k570 m
Took evacuation
About 600ｍ
(Outbound)
4053
to Fukushima
to Aomori
8.9m
(Inbound)
Route 7 (bypass)
370k137 m
Okura (inbound) RC
BTC 369k478ｍ
BCC 369ｋ568ｍ
R＝800
下り線
上り線
Situation at the Engineering
workplace (direct control) – 2
450mm
350mm
Inbound Lookout
(722 k 600 m)
790mm
Worker in charge of closing track
(3) Work Manager (1 manager)
30mm
380mm
Situation at the Engineering
workplace (direct control) – 2
12 train
列車ダイヤ
12
diagram
29
51
44
01
24
15
Work with lookout
20
56
20
Slot 3
54
03
Slot 4
37
Slot 2
Slot 1
07
00
31
50
45
Work with lookout
15
Situation at the Engineering
workplace (direct control)

Reasons why sense of duty wins out over safety
1. If today's workload doesn't get done today,
it will get in the way of tomorrow's workload.
2. If observed defects don't get fixed now,
no one will fix them later.
3. If repair jobs aren't completed quickly,
superiors won't be happy with my performance.
4. The work time slot isn't sufficient for the
workload goal.
Accident occurring right before
track closing commences
(outsourced)
Ominato Line Diagram
19
20
21
22
23
24
Ominato
38
50
40
59
40
Shimokita
Train and trolley collision area
Around 50k790 m
Akagawa
Kanayazawa
Chikagawa
Track closing work schedule time slot for that day: 22:35～4:20
Arihata
Mutsuyokohama
20
733D – Delayed by running restrictions
due to high wind
8
9
28
5
35
Delayed by
風規制による遅れ
running restrictions
（１１６分遅れ）
due to high wind
(116 minute delay)
Accident occurring right before
track closing commences
(outsourced)
59m
to Noheji Station
to Ominato
station
Tracke
ﾄdvehicle
ﾛ
12
7D
Trolley 2
Trolley 1
Railway work chief
3m
3m
3m
2 backhoes
Worker in charge of closing track
Railway construction manager
Collision
point
Guiders
Extent of
Train damage
The trolley that
collided with the train
Derailed trolley
Accident occurring right before
track closing commences
(outsourced)
59m
to Noheji Station
to Ominato
station
Trolley
2
737D
Tracke
d
vehicle
Trolle
y2
Trolle
y1
Trolley
1
Trolley 2
Trolley
1
3m
3m
Railway work
chief
3m
Collision
point
Railway
construction
manager
2 backhoes
Worker in charge of
closing track
Guiders
Extent of
Train damage
The trolley that
collided with the train
Derailed trolley
Problems with outsourced
construction work

Problems extracted from this accident
1. The direction and command system at
the commencement of track closing is
disorganized.
2. The contracted company workers
wanted to exchange a large number of
crossties quickly.
The origin of fundamental
track closing
Early on February 21, 1999
The origin of fundamental
track closing
Early on February 21, 1999
Real problems

Real problems
Worksite with
guaranteed safety
Safety direction group
Secure
track closing
Confirmation of
task details
Discussion between
management and labor
The task in hand
Fight for a workplace that does not
sacrifice the workers.
職場からの議論

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