Abstract für den Vortrag von Prof. Bart Streumer (Universität Groningen) am 27.05.2015 an der Universität Bielefeld Why Reductive Realism is False According to reductive realism, normative properties are descriptive properties: that is, normative properties can be ascribed with descriptive predicates. In this talk, I first argue that reductive realists need to give a account of what makes it the case that a particular normative property (such as, say, rightness) can be ascribed with a particular descriptive predicate (such as, say, ‘maximises happiness’). I then argue this makes reductive realists face a dilemma: either the account they give is wholly descriptive, in which case reductive realism wrongly guarantees that certain normative judgements are correct, or the account they give is partly normative, in which case reductive realism faces a regress. I conclude that this is why reductive realism is false. I end by drawing some more general conclusions about metaethics.
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