von Prof. Enste und Prof. Fetchenhaue

Korreferat zum Vortrag „Finanzindustrie: Das
Dilemma zwischen Kontrolle und Vertrauen“
von Prof. Enste und Prof. Fetchenhauer
Dr. Benjamin Braun
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
Zum empirischen Befund „Ich vertraue meiner Bank, aber
nicht dem Bankensektor“
Ø  Gennaioli/Shleifer/Vishny (2015), Money Doctors:
„In our view, financial advice is a service, similar to medicine. We believe,
contrary to what is presumed in the standard finance model, that many
investors have very little idea of how to invest, just as patients have a very
limited idea of how to be treated. … in our model money doctors help investors
make risky investments and are trusted to do so even when their advice is
costly, generic, and occasionally self-serving. And just as many patients
trust their doctor, and do not want to go to a random doctor even if equally
qualified, investors trust their financial advisors and managers.“
Ø  Kay (2015), Other People’s Money:
„… a book which advised readers to be their own doctor or lawyer would be
an irresponsible book; yet a recommendation to be one’s own investment
adviser is comparatively sound advice. The best and certainly least risky way
to better returns is to pay less in fees and charges to the finance sector.”
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„The growth of finance“ – zwei Interpretationen
Reflektiert wachsendes Vertrauen
o  Mehr Sparer nutzen den Investmentkanal weil sie Vertrauen in die
beteiligten Akteure haben (Gennaioli/Shleifer/Vishny, 2014; 2015)
Reflektiert sinkendes Vertrauen
o  “there has been an explosion of intermediation in equity investment,
driven both by a desire for greater professionalism and efficiency and by a
decline in trust and confidence in the investment chain” (The Kay Review of
UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, 2012)
o  Bsp. des Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, 1974):
Ø  „replaced the figure of the prudent man by that of the prudent
expert“ (Montagne 2007)
Ø  Trug maßgeblich bei zur Transition von „managed intermediation“ zu
„transparent intermediation“ (Kay 2015, Other People’s Money)
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Die Investmentkette, oder: Warum Standardlösungen für
Prinzipal-Agenten Probleme an ihre Grenzen stoßen
1. Mündige Konsumenten
2. Reputationsmechanismen und Marktdisziplin
3. Regulierung: Anreizkompatibilität und Transparenz
4
Die Investmentkette, oder: Warum Standardlösungen für
Prinzipal-Agenten Probleme an ihre Grenzen stoßen
19
Lusardi and Mitchell: The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy
1. Mündige Konsumenten?
Panel 1C. Financial literacy by education group
—(percent providing correct answers to all three financial literacy questions)
USA
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
63.8
80
69.8
60
44.3
31.3
12.6
Netherlands
40
19.2
28
35.1
Less than HS High-school Some college
College
Postgraduate
Upper
secondary
Higher
vocational
University
70.1
72
Post-secondary
Tertiary
41.7
0
Primary
Lower
secondary
43.1
44.9
26.6
Vocational
Upper
secondary
Middle
secondary
Germany
68.9
Primary or lower
secondary
55.4
20
Switzerland
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
54.4
Tertiary
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
51.6
52.4
55
Upper
secondary
non-GDR
GDR
21.7
Lower
secondary
Quelle: Lusardi/Mitchell (2014: 19)
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Die Investmentkette, oder: Warum Standardlösungen für
Prinzipal-Agenten Probleme an ihre Grenzen stoßen
1. Mündige Konsumenten
2. Reputationsmechanismen und Marktdisziplin
Ø  “A policy of ‘naming and shaming’ is ineffective if everyone
has been named and shamed” (Kay 2015: 261)
Ø  Oligopolistische Konzentration bei Asset Managern,
Investment Consultants, Proxy Voting Services
3. Regulierung: Anreizkompatibilität und Transparenz
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Die Investmentkette, oder: Warum Standardlösungen für
Prinzipal-Agenten Probleme an ihre Grenzen stoßen
1. Mündige Konsumenten
2. Reputationsmechanismen und Marktdisziplin
3. Regulierung: Anreizkompatibilität und Transparenz
Ø  Intermediationskette immer komplexer: Zunehmend unklar,
wer wessen Prinzipal
Ø  Zunehmend unklar, wer wem gegenüber treuhänderische
Pflichten hat (Bsp. Consultant vs. Broker/Dealer)
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Die Investmentkette, oder: Warum Standardlösungen für
Prinzipal-Agenten Probleme an ihre Grenzen stoßen
3. Regulierung: Anreizkompatibilität & Transparenz
Who is the principal? The share owner. Who is the share owner?
Whose name is on the share register?
Often a nominee
For whose benefit are the shares held?
e.g. a pension fund trustee
Who makes the decision to buy or to hold a stock?
Normally an asset manager
Who determines how the votes should be cast?
The pension fund trustee or
the asset manager or
a proxy voting firm
Who holds the economic interest in the security?
Individual savers
Quelle: Kay Review (2012: 30)
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3. Regulierung: Anreizkompatibilität & Transparenz
Proxy
voting firms
Capital
BlackRock
Vanguard
Top-20: 42%
Capital
Capital
Institutional
investors
This “transparent intermediation” the result
of the failures of “managed intermediation”?
Fees
Investment
consultants
Fees
S
a
v
e
r
s
ISS
Glass Lewis
Fees
Financial
advisers
Mercer
Towers Watson
Top-10: 82%
Asset
Managers
Broker/
Dealers
F
i
r
m
s
Das Dilemma zusammengefasst
Komplexe
Finanzmarktstrukturen ...
... erschweren
Schaffung von
Vertrauen
... sind das Ergebnis
eines Mangels an
Vertrauen
“The chain of investment should be shortened. … [I]n an
environment in which trust and confidence are lacking, the
process of hiring advisers to review the work of other advisers
can multiply indefinitely, creating a self reinforcing cycle of
mistrust and complexity.
(Kay Review 2012: 46)
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Wodurch würde sich die Investmentkette verkürzen?
Einige spekulative Diskussionspunkte
•  Rapides Wachstum im ETF Sektor
•  Robo Advisors?
•  Umlagefinanzierte Rente: Not so bad after all?
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