SOCIAL CHOICE FROM EVALUATING PRINCIPLES

ESCAPE
from
FREERIDERS
Jun Kobayashi (U of Chicago)
Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U)
Hideki Ishihara (Rikkyo U)
August 21, 2003
Marstrand, Sweden
1
1 QUESTION
In MODERN SOCIETIES…
We can CHANGE PARTNERS.
Divorce, Move, Change Job,
Immigration.
COOPERATION in Dilemmas…
when CHANGE PARTNERS?
2 THEORY
SELECTIVE INTERACTION (Dawes),
ESCAPING (Hayashi).
Prediction…
ESCAPE  COOPERATION.
D
C
D
D
C
C D
C
But NOT SELF-EVIDENT…
b/c Defectors FOLLOW.
3 HYPOTHESES
"ESCAPING TIT-for-TAT"…
TIT-for-TAT in a Group,
EXIT when DEFECTED,
Cooperate in NEW Group.
H1
SOME play "Escaping TFT."
H2
Earn MORE than DEFECTORS.
4 EXPERIMENT
WEB-BASED.
Repeat S.D. Game in a GROUP,
MOVE to Anther Group, No COST.
ANONYMOUS.
15-20 Subjects (students).
20-40 Games, 3-6 Moves.
6 Sessions, 111 Subjects.
2 Universities in Japan, Nov. 2002.
5 GAME
Work at one of 4 FIRMS.
If D (Work LAZILY), PAYOFF…
# Cooperators
4
.
# Workers in Firm
If C (Work HARD), PAYOFF…
D's Payoff － 2.
Payoff
Defection
Cooperation
# Cooperators
EACH MONTH
Each FIRM's
PAYOFF,
#Workers
Your CHOICE,
PAYOFF
HOW to WORK?
EVERY 6 MONTHS
History of Each FIRM's PAYOFF,
#Workers
Each FIRM's
AVERAGE
PAYOFF
WHERE to WORK?
6 RESULT
Ａgroup
3
4
4
0
0
4
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
4
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
4
15
0
0
0
4
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
0
4
0
7
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
18
4
0
0
4
4
0
Ｂgroup
19
0
4
4
0
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
4
4
0
0
0
0
3
4
4
0
0
0
0
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
18
4
4
4
0
4
4
11
0
0
0
12
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
0
20
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
4
4
0
0
0
4
Ｃgroup
17
0
0
0
0
4
0
19
4
4
4
4
0
0
4
0
4
0
8
0
0
0
4
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
4
4
0
0
0
6
4
4
4
4
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
4
4
4
15
0
0
0
19
4
0
4
11
0
0
4
4
4
0
8
4
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
4
0
0
4
14
4
0
0
0
0
4
Ｄgroup
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
4
4
4
4
4
0
7
0
0
4
4
0
0
ΣＮｃ
9
4
4
4
4
4
4
8
7
8
9
9
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
4
4
4
4
0
6
4
4
4
4
4
0
9
4
4
4
4
4
4
11
0
0
4
0
0
4
12
4
0
0
4
4
4
14
0
4
4
0
0
0
15
0
4
0
4
0
0
20
4
4
4
4
4
4
10
0
0
0
4
0
0
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
0
4
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
4
15
0
0
0
4
0
4
16
0
0
0
0
4
0
17
0
4
0
0
0
0
19
4
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
9
7
7
6
6
1
0
4
0
3
4
4
4
6
4
4
4
8
0
0
0
9
4
4
4
13
0
4
0
16
0
4
0
17
0
0
4
5
9
6
8
9
7
7
5
5
Mean SD
C
.40
.24
Move
.54
.24
Payoff .80
.38
6 Sessions
111 Subjects
-2 < Payoff < 4
7 ESCAPING TFT?
move
behav. ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM total
TFT
30
10
8
48
All C
1
4
1
6
All D
RAN
DOM
Other
7
3
2
12
12
10
5
27
8
8
2
18
total
58
35
18 111
27%
→YES!
8 BETTER?
move
behav. ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM
total
TFT
0.77
0.90
0.80 0.80
All C
0.09
0.66
1.01 0.62
All D
0.91
0.87
1.39 0.98
RAN
DOM
0.83
0.68
0.88 0.79
Other
0.74
0.87
0.25 0.74
total
0.79
0.80
0.84 0.80
→NO!
9 CONCLUSION
COOPERATION by ESCAPING?
Something MORE.
Theory… MOVING COST.
Test… More Experiments / Surveys.

Download Report