Reputational Information in “Noisy” Interactions: Experimental Studies Motoki Watabe (Waseda University, JAPAN) Contributors: Yoshitsugu Yamamoto and Sho Tsuboi What I want to say Unconditional Cooperation strategy can produce more reliable reputational information than reciprocal strategies in noisy exchange. A Model of Reputational Information B A EXCHANGE Observe Person A and B exchange their resources repeatedly. ≒ They play PD repeatedly. Impression Ｘ Person A’s reputation 1. Source 1: A’s evaluation on him/herself 2. Source 2: B’s evaluation on A 3. Source 3: X’s evaluation on A Reliability of Reputational Information Person A’s reputation B A EXCHANGE Observe Impressi on Ｘ 1. Source 1: A’s evaluation on him/herself 2. Source 2: B’s evaluation on A 3. Source 3: X’s evaluation on A •Past research assume that reputational information is always objective and reliable. •Source 1 = Source 2 = Source 3 •Intuitively, •Source 1 < Source 2 < Source 3 •Source 3 seems to be the most objective and reliable. •However, the reliability of source 3 is not always guaranteed. Outline of the presentation People have a bias of reputational information processing. 1. Experiment 1 Reciprocal strategies reduce reliability of reputational in social exchange. 3. Unconditional strategies can produce reliable reputational information. 2. Experiment 2 & 3 A Model of Reputational Information B Person A and B exchange their resources repeatedly. ≒ They play PD repeatedly. A EXCHANGE Observe Impression Ｘ X’s impressions on A and B are reputational information to distribute other people. A is a person like @@@@@ B seems to be***** Two functions of reputation(Raub 2002, Yamagishi 1998) Control: In order to get future exchange partners, you need to have good reputation 2. Learning: In order to get a good exchange partner, you need to find a person with good reputation Given these functions, people always have motivations to establish good reputation. Prediction 1. Negative reputational information is more important to predict others’ behavior than positive reputational information. People have a bias of reputational information processing. Number of Good Reputation Number of Bad Reputation Total Score Experiment 1 Hypothesis: People take NEGATIVE reputation more seriously than POSITIVE reputation. Participants : Thirty seven undergraduate students Procedure They were in a hypothetical auction situation 2. They were assigned as “buyer” trying to seek a good deal for a $200-value product. 3. They looked at reputation of 64 sellers. 4. They evaluate degree of each seller’s trustworthiness as a potential partner in the hypothetical auctions. 1. Experimental Design : 64 different set of reputation Num of BAD info 0,1,2,3,8,12,24,48 この人は ％くらい信頼できると思う（0から100までの数字でお答えください） この人は ％くらい信頼できると思う（0から100までの数字でお答えください） 8x8=64 combinations Num of GOOD info 0,1,2,3,8,12,24,48 How much impact for one increment of information Analysis 15 Take absolute Values 10 5 Negative 0 0 1 2 3 Positive -5 -10 14 -15 12 10 8 Negative Positive 6 4 2 0 0 1 2 3 70 60 Impact of Information 50 Negative information has more impact than Positive information, especially when the number of information is small 40 Negative(All) 30 Positive(All) 20 10 0 0 1 2 3 8 number of information 12 24 48 70 60 Impact of Information 50 40 Negative (experienced) Positive(experienced） Negative(All) 30 Positive(All) 20 10 0 0 1 2 3 8 number of information 12 24 48 Reciprocal Strategies and Misunderstandings B A EXCHANGE Observe Ex.: B takes Tit-for-Tat and A takes unconditional defection. Both continue to defect except the first move. Impression Ｘ Both A and B are not Cooperative persons! ☹ Amplified misunderstanding by Noise B Noise A EXCHANGE Observe Ex：Both A and C take TFT. They are actually cooperative, but it often turns out mutual defection. Impression Ｘ Uhmmm… Both A and B are not cooperative! ☹ Social exchange are noisier than economic exchange (Kollock 1993) Strategies producing reliable reputational information Reciprocal strategies not good ones in terms of producing reliable reputational information Repeated Noisy Question: What strategy is good for production of reliable reputational information ? Always consistent behavior regardless others’ behavior Unconditional Defection (UD) Unconditional Cooperation (UC) UC has two advantages for creating reliable reputation. No.1: UC is more likely to be recognized as UC than reciprocal strategies UC Noisy situation Noise I don’t know exactly, but Pink Person seems to be GOOD! A EXCHANGE Strategy A Noise Evaluate Target Person Experiment 2 Participant looked at the Participant Noise Evaluation No Noise Evaluation Difference same set of players exchanging with and without noise Hypothesis: The evaluation on UC is more consistent across with or without NOISE than the evaluation on Reciprocal strategies (TFT) Experiment 2 Participants looked at actors playing repeated PD games (actually programmed, but they were told that the actors were real persons). They then evaluate target actor’s trustworthiness with 7point schale. (Beggan, Messick, & Allison, 1988) Exchange コンピューター同士の交換 by two programmed actors Repeated PD (10 times per set) Four strategies and noise Name Strategy 4x4=16 combinations Always cooperate UC TFT Cooperate at the first game, cooperate if and only if the other cooperated in the previous game. TFTB Basically same as TFT, but when the other have cooperated two times in the raw, this chooses defection with 67% of prob. in the current game. UD Always defect Exchange by two simulated actors With-Noise Condition: Each player misunderstands other’s choice with 10% of probability. Without-Noise Condition: No misunderstanding occurs Experiment 2 : results Participants: Forty seven undergraduate students Results Difference of trustworthiness between with-noise and without-noise conditions UC is the most robustly evaluated strategy F(3,135)=8.85, p<.001 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 UC is the least affected by noise. UC can produce robust reputation. 1.3 1.2 1.1 TFT TFTB UD UC Situation 1 X is reciprocal strategy STR X STR A X A EXCHANGE ? ? ? ? Observers No.2：UC is able to declare the other Situation 2 strategy’s characteristics. UC is STR A UC UC A EXCHANGE ! ! ! Cooperative ! AVulnerable seems to be＊ @xw& Easy to be recognized Basic Idea of Expt3 Target strategies (Programmed) A ② Very exploitive B ① Exploitive C ③ Less exploitive Difference between Well.. B is the Best I guess C is the worst! Participant She wrongly evaluates A and B One error occurs. Participant’s evaluation and actual ranking of exploitiveness. The more error, the less reliable reputational information. Independent Variables Target strategies (Programmed) Three kinds of strategies A Very exploitive B Exploitive C Not exploitive LessUC Error TF2T: Defects if and only if the partner defected two times in a raw (Generous) More Error Tit-for-Tat Experiment 3 (Design) Target strategies (Programmed) Name A Very exploitive B Exploitive C Less exploitive Description of strategy Less Exploitive Basically same as TFT. It defects just one time after the partner cooperated two games in the row. Exploitive Basically same as the above “Less Exploitive,” and it may defects two times in a raw with 67% of probability. Very Exploitive Basically same as the above “Less Exploitive,” and it may defects two times in a raw with 80% of probability. Procedure Participants: Eighty six undergraduate students. They looked at video clips that three pairs playing repeated PD game (15 times per pair) They then prioritized the three BROWN strategies as potential partners. Target strategies (Programmed) Observe & evaluate Participant UC, TF2T, or TFT A Very exploitive B Exploitive C Less exploitive Results of Experiment 3 Mean score of Error 2.5 F(2,81)=9.81, 2 p<.001 1.5 1 0.5 TFT TF2T UC Pink strategy UC produces more reliable reputational Information than reciprocal strategies Summary People have a bias in reputational information processing. 1. Negative reputation > Positive Reputation (Expt 1) Reciprocal strategies reduce reliability of reputational in social exchange. Unconditional 2. strategy(UC) can produce reliable reputational information. UC is easy to be recognized as GOOD even in noisy situation.(Expt 2) UC makes it clear the exploitiveness of other strategies(Expt 3). To do list… How about Unconditional Defection (UD)? My prediction Probably, UD also has the ability to produce reliable reputational information as well as UC. However, this ability is VERY BAD for UD to survive. Is this ability adaptive for UC ? Useful to survive? Already conduced a computer simulation study to find the conditions under which UC is adaptive for this bility. Preliminary results say that UC needs help from TFT, and TFT also needs help from UC in noisy conditions. Thank you ☺
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