Analysis McLocklin: indirect subscriptions of share capital SPEED READ McLocklin v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 042 (TC) involved a successful claim for share loss relief in circumstances where freshly issued shares were registered in the name of and paid for by a third party, and then subsequently sold to the taxpayer. McLocklin shows a court applying taxing statutes in a non-avoidance context by reference to the totality of the arrangements entered into. Such an approach gives practitioners a helpful tool to use in settlement negotiations with HMRC, as it arguably provides the parties with an avenue to avoid the dreaded ‘all or nothing’ classification under HMRC’s inflexible litigation and settlement strategy. Perminder Gainda is a senior associate in Herbert Smith Freehills LLP’s corporate tax group with experience in M&A, equity capital markets, property transactions and financing transactions (both conventional and Islamic financing). Email: perminder. [email protected]; tel: 020 7466 2472. Camilla Grundy is a trainee solicitor at Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, and is hoping to join the tax team upon qualification in September. Email: camilla.grundy@hsf. com; tel: 020 7466 2358. T he essential outcome of McLocklin was that a subscription of shares by a third party, registered in his own name and utilising his own funds, followed (ten months later) by a sale of those shares to the taxpayer (M) was treated as a subscription of shares by M himself. We consider here why the decision is not as surprising as it first sounds and why it is to be welcomed outside of the specific statutory context within which it arose. Background facts In 2005, the company in question (GPL) was suffering from short-term cash flow issues. As a result, the directors of GPL (W, S, T and M) agreed that they would each subscribe for a certain number of shares in GPL and that S, T and M would provide personal guarantees for GPL’s overdraft. However, M could not participate in the subscription in the same manner as the other directors as his assets had been frozen in divorce proceedings. Therefore, W agreed to subscribe for the 18 shares originally allocated to M, in addition to his own. To enable these 18 shares to be transferred to M once his assets were unfrozen, clause 1.3 of a shareholders’ agreement (between W, S and T) provided that W was ‘entitled to sell’ these shares to M within two years. Personal guarantees were still provided for GPL’s overdraft, as agreed. In July 2006, W transferred the 18 shares to M for £46,000 (this amount being equal to the subscription price paid by W to GPL for those shares). In 14 2008/09, the shares became of negligible value. M’s subsequent claim for share loss relief was refused by HMRC. M appealed this decision. Key provisions The shares in GPL did not qualify for EIS relief. However, as GPL was a qualifying trading company, share loss relief was prima facie available to M if relevant shares had ‘been subscribed for by [M]’ (ITA 2007 s 131). Section 135 further provided that ‘an individual subscribes for shares in a company if they are issued to the individual by the company in consideration of money or money’s worth’. Looking at the narrow facts of the case, it is clear that it was W who undertook a transaction, the legal substance of which constituted a subscription of shares, not M. Despite this, the tribunal allowed M’s appeal. Given the surprising result, it is perhaps to be expected that the manner in which the tribunal reached its conclusion is of some interest. Before looking at the details of the decision, we note that the tribunal’s analysis was an iterative process. However, for the purposes of this article, we have simplified that process into two stages. The wider arrangements First, the tribunal considered the subscription by W within a wider factual and legal context by attempting to understand the exact nature of the relationship between W and M. On the basis of the evidence before it, the tribunal was willing to infer that there must have been an undocumented agreement in place between M and W; this agreement entitled M to the shares acquired by W. The tribunal was particularly persuaded in this regard by the existence of M’s guarantee of GPL’s overdraft, i.e. it was reasonable to assume that M would only have given the guarantee in return for an entitlement to the shares in question. Having determined that M had an entitlement to the shares, the tribunal next examined the capacity in which W was acting at the relevant time. As W had utilised his own funds to acquire the shares, it was apparent that W was not acting at all like a nominee or bare trustee of M. It seems to have been accepted that it would have been more natural for W to have used his funds for M’s benefit by lending them to M for M to acquire and then charge the shares to W pending repayment of the loan. The existence of M’s divorce proceedings, however, prevented such an arrangement. Nonetheless, the tribunal considered that W had ‘agreed to provide some form of “temporary accommodation” to [M] by financing the subscription of [M’s] agreed share allocation’. W would be obliged to transfer the shares to M upon being reimbursed the subscription price. Further, it was held that W had a right to reimbursement of his £46,000 once M’s divorce was finalised. On this basis, the tribunal concluded that the arrangement between W and M was best understood as a security www.taxjournal.com ~ 23 May 2014 arrangement; the shares that W had acquired were security for M’s obligation to reimburse £46,000 once M’s divorce was finalised. cost of subscribing for the shares. Accordingly, M was held to have subscribed for the shares within the meaning, and in accordance with the policy, of ITA 2007 s 135. ‘Subscription’ and its statutory meaning The second element of the tribunal’s reasoning was an analysis of the types of transaction that could satisfy the concept of ‘subscription’, as used within the context of the share loss relief rules. The tribunal began by noting HMRC’s acceptance that an individual could be entitled to share loss relief without shares actually having been registered in the name of that individual, where the shares are subscribed for by that individual’s nominee. The tribunal, having noted that it was legitimate to have regard to the TCGA 1992 for the purposes of determining the appropriate meaning to be given to the concept of subscription (given that the relief in question was a CGT relief), then supported and further expanded upon the above analysis by reference to other TCGA 1992 provisions. The first such provision was s 60, which recognises that property vested in a nominee or bare trustee should be treated as property vested in the person for whom he is nominee or trustee. However, it was plain on the facts that W was no ordinary nominee or bare trustee of M, meaning his claim for relief would have failed if he was limited to relying on s 60. The tribunal then considered s 26, which, for example, provides that any dealings with an asset by a chargee should be treated as dealings by the chargor as though the chargee were acting as the chargor’s nominee. The tribunal took the view that its terms suggested that, as a general principle, security arrangements should be broadly ‘ignored’ for CGT purposes. Therefore, if an advance had been provided to subscribe for shares and those shares were issued as security to the lender, that lender should be treated as subscribing for the shares as the borrower’s nominee. The tribunal next examined why share loss relief is only available for subscriptions of share capital and not where shares are acquired from third parties, notwithstanding that losses can arise in both such cases. The tribunal noted that where existing shares are acquired, the consideration given for them represents the value of the company at the time of the disposal and that the price paid in such circumstances may not necessarily represent funds which have flowed into the company and been used in the course of its trade. Turning to the facts of the case, whilst M and W’s arrangement could not be described as a ‘straightforward loan’, having regard to the wider factual circumstances in which W’s subscription took place, it was nonetheless substantially similar to a loan under which W subscribed for the shares as security for M’s obligation to reimburse £46,000 to W. Furthermore, as M had agreed to participate in the issue of shares at the outset, he was not comparable to a usual third party purchaser. The totality of the arrangements between the parties meant that M was intended to ultimately bear the 23 May 2014 ~ www.taxjournal.com NatWest case The judgment indicates that HMRC had sought to rely on National Westminster Bank PLC v IRC [1994] STC 580, where it was held that shares could not be treated as ‘issued’ because they had not been registered by a specific date, meaning that claims for EIS relief failed even though the shares had been allotted and subscription monies provided before the relevant date. We assume HMRC cited this case in part to persuade the tribunal to take a narrow approach to the question of whether shares had been subscribed for. As the taxpayers in NatWest were effectively involved in an avoidance scheme, it is perhaps unsurprising that a narrow approach was taken to the specific question before the courts, since this ensured that the avoidance scheme failed. It would, however, be regrettable if that narrow approach were to deny relief in non-avoidance cases, where individuals have ultimately borne the subscription costs associated with shares held by them. Therefore, the tribunal’s approach appears to accord more with the underlying purpose of the relevant rules, namely that of encouraging equity investment in certain types of companies. This is to be welcomed, especially at a time when concerns are constantly being expressed about the unavailability of funding for UK SMEs. Final thoughts It is disappointing that a case such as this, where the costs of pursuing it would have greatly outweighed the tax at stake, was taken to the tribunal. Given HMRC’s current litigation and settlement strategy (LSS), which precludes HMRC from exercising discretion not to take cases forward on the basis of factors such as costs and litigation risk, this will not be the last time something like this happens. However, the case does provide another useful example of a court applying taxing statutes, outside of an avoidance context, by reference to the totality of the arrangements entered into. Such an approach is legitimate where the scheme of the legislation suggests that it permissible to look beyond the discrete steps undertaken by the taxpayer in determining whether the provision in question is satisfied. That a tribunal will not necessarily confine its factual enquiries to a specific transaction should always be borne in mind when seeking to negotiate a settlement with HMRC, as it may well indicate to the parties that the range of possible tax outcomes is much wider than it might first appear. Such an appreciation at an early stage of the dispute/enquiry would assist in avoiding the dreaded ‘all or nothing’ LSS classification and provide some much needed flexibility within the LSS confines. ■ For related reading, visit www.taxjournal.com Cases: McLocklin v HMRC (22.1.14) 15
© Copyright 2024 ExpyDoc