Critical Cause Analysis of Delayed Evacuation in the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami IRDR International Conference, Beijing 1 November, 2011 Junko Sagara CTI Engineering Co., Ltd. Japan ICHARM International Centre for Water Hazard Risk Management under the auspices of UNESCO 1 Forensic Investigation on Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) Meta & Longitudinal Analysis Characteristics of tsunami fatalities and losses Comparison with historical events Critical Cause Analysis Analysis of critical causes for human loss expansion caused by delayed evacuation Preparation of a question list for human loss vulnerability evaluation Scenario Analysis Estimation of damages and losses caused by tsunami of a similar magnitude to GEJET in central Japan. Identification of issues and proposal of measures to tsunami of an unexpected magnitude 2 Objectives Preliminary effort to conduct FORIN analysis of Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Investigate how the delay in evacuation from tsunami occurred, and how it lead to enormous human losses. Identify critical points for considering vulnerability of communities against human losses caused by delayed evacuation from tsunami. Outline 1. 2. 3. 4. Overview of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) Critical causes analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuation Case Study of Rikuzentakata Conclusion 3 1. Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) M9.0 earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Massive ground motion was observed throughout Japan Mega-tsunami of about 1,000 year return period and subsidence led to enormous damages Complex disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident) Historic Tsunami Events in the region ◦ 1897: [M8.5] 21,959 dead ◦ 1933: [M8.1] 3,064 dead or missing Seismic Intensity Japan Meteorological Agency 4 Overview of Damages Hirono(0) Kuji(4) Inundated area by tsunami：561km2 Noda(38) Fudai(1) Human casualties: 15,829 dead, 3,745 Tanohata(31) Iwaizumi(7) missing, 5,942 injured (as of Oct 25) Tarou(180) Building damages: 118,790 completely Iwate Miyako(362) destroyed, 184,343 half destroyed, 280 Yamada(823) Otsuchi(1,397) burned down, 10,961 inundated Kamaishi(1,091) (above floor), 13,867 inundated (below Ofunato(452) floor) Rikuzentakata(1,951) Kesennuma(1,405) Agricultural land losses: 23,600ha Miyagi Minamisanriku(901) Higashimatsushima(1,145) Direct damages to infrastructure stock Ishinomaki(3,959) Matsushima(2) Rifu(50) Onagawa(963) ： approx. 16.9 trillion yen (US$200 Shiogama(21) Shichigahama(71) Tagajou(189) billion, estimated by cabinet office, not Miyagino-ku, Sendai(293) Taihaku-ku, Sendai(53) Natori(984) Wakabayashi-ku, Sendai(332) Iwanuma(184) including damages caused by nuclear Watari(270) Yamamoto(691) accident) Fukushima Shinchi(110) Dead or Missing Soma(459) National Police Agency （As of Oct 25, 2011) 2011 White Paper on Disaster Management Minamisoma(663) Namie(184) Futaba(35) Okuma(81) Tomioka(25) Naraha(13) Hirono(3) 1～9 10～99 100～499 500～999 1000～ Iwaki(347) Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) Human losses in coastal municipalities 5 Human Losses 92.4% of people died in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima lost their lives due to tsunami. Tsunami was the main cause of death Crushed by buildings, etc 4.4% Unknown 2% Fire 1.1% 100% 80% 60% 65% of fatalities were 60 years or older 40% Tsunami 92.4％ 20% 0～9 10～19 20～29 30～39 40～49 50～59 60～69 70～79 80～ 0% Death causes in GEJET (Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima) Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management Population of Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima （As of Oct 2010） People killed in the GEJET （As of 8 Aug 2011） Age structure of population and people died in GEJET 6 （Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima） 2. Critical cause analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuation Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami? Strong ground motion (seismic intensity of 6 or greater) Large tsunami attack could have been conceivable by people? Quake occurred during the day. 30 minutes to 2 hours of time available before tsunami arrived. Evacuation actions could have been easily taken? Tohoku region (especially Iwate) have experienced tsunami disasters repeatedly in the past Lessons learned in the past not effectively utilized? Coastal levees had been constructed along much of the coast line Misperception about tsunami safety existed (people thought tsunami disaster will never occur)? The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET. 7 Magnitude of Tsunami in GEJET Miyagi Fukushima Tsunami height exceeded twice the height of coastal levees Tarou: levee height 10m, tsunami height 15.5m, runup height approx. 38m Otsuchi: levee height 6.4m, tsunami height 12.9m Rikuzentakata: levee height 6.15m, tsunami height 16.4m design levee height current levee height tsunami trace height Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) (m) (Number of fatalities & missing) / (population in inundated area) 25 10 ％ < 20 Iwate 5～10 ％ 15 3～5 ％ 10 1～3 ％ Hirono(0.0) Kuji(0.1) Noda(1.2) Fudai(0.1) Tanohata(2.0) Iwaizumi(0.6) Tarou(13.5) Miyako(2.4) Yamada(7.2) Otsuchi(11.7) Kamaishi(8.3) Ofunato(2.4) Rikuzentakata(11.7) Kesennuma(3.5) Minamisanriku(6.3) Ishinomaki(3.5) Onagawa(12.0) Higashimatsushima(3.4) Matsushima(0.0) Shiogama(0.1) Shichigahama(0.8) Sendai(2.4) Natori(8.1) Iwanuma(2.3) Watari(1.9) Yamamoto(7.7) Shinchi(2.4) Soma(4.4) Minamisoma(5.0) Namie(5.5) Futaba(2.7) Okuma(7.2) Tomioka(1.8) Naraha(0.7) Hirono(0.2) Iwaki(1.1) 5 0～1 ％ 0 % of people died or missing in inundated area Onagawa: levee height 4.4m, tsunami height 15.9m ※ levee height and tsunami trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT. 8 Effectiveness of Structural Measures Structural measures proved to be effective and protected lives in certain areas Hirono, Iwate Coastal levee (T.P.+12.0m）was higher than the tsunami height (tsunami runup height T.P.+9.5m) Fudai, Iwate City located far from the coast was protected by the gate. Town center No inundation Inundated area Fudai Gate Fudai Gate Inundation height near the gate T.P.+22.6m Estimated overflow depth 7.2m Levee height T.P.+12.0m Gate height T.P.+15.5m Tsunami height T.P.+9.5m Upstream of the gate Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake 9 Effectiveness of Structural Measures The greater the tsunami height compared to the levee height the greater the human losses. Many other factors influenced the extent or severity of human losses . % human loss in inundated area 16% Taro Otsuchi Rikuzentakata 14% Onagawa 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -10 -5 0 5 Tsunami height - Levee height (m) 10 15 Tanohata (urban center located far from the coast) ※ levee height and tsunami trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT. % Human loss based on the data announced on Sept 9 2011 by the Fire and disaster Management 10 Agency Flow of Human Losses due to delay in evacuation Flow of human losses due to delay in evacuation in case of tsunami to identify the critical points for human loss expansion. Fundamental action to be taken by people Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged info-reactive follow others Warning accessible quake Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Critical Point 3 Evacuation actions Arrived at evacuation shelters Critical Point 4 Obstacles during evacuation Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter not stricken by tsunami Critical Point 5 Safety of evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Escaped from tsunami Critical Point 6 Detection of danger and progressive evacuation Caught by tsunami Did not evacuate Warning not accessible 11 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake. Evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching 11% 1% 31% Evacuated after completing other actions quake Total N=870 Did not evacuate (already in safe area) 57% Immediately evacuated Timing of Evacuation Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake 12 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged Even among those who survived, many were not aware of tsunami risks. People who evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching didn’t evacuate immediately because “tsunami didn’t occur in past earthquakes” or “tsunami never came up to their mind” ※1 In Miyagi, about half of the people survived thought tsunami wouldn’t come or didn’t think about tsunami. Only 4% had seen tsunami hazard maps. ※2 quake Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011 13 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged Because the tsunami occurred during the day, many were away from home. Instead of evacuating people went searching for their family members. Many of the people that didn’t immediately evacuate were out of their homes. Instead of evacuating they went back home or went out to look for their families. ※1 The disaster occurred during the day time when family members were scattered. People worried about the safety of their family and moved immediately to get together with their family members. ※2 quake Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011 14 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. Disaster education in schools proved very effective. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged Disaster education and evacuation procedures in schools proved to be very effective, saving lives of school children. % Human loss in inundated area 60% Iwate Miyako 50% 40% 30% Ofunato Rikuzentakata Kamaishi Otsuchi Very small human loss rate in ages of 5 to 14 Yamada 20% 0% quake 0～4 5～9 10～14 15～19 20～24 25～29 30～34 35～39 40～44 45～49 50～54 55～59 60～64 65～69 70～74 75～79 80～84 85～89 90～94 95～99 100～ 10% Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011 15 CP2: Accurate evacuation information Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc. Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged Warning accessible quake Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Warning not accessible Average time required to obtain tsunami warning or advisory was 16.4 minutes. ※1 In tsunami prone areas 13% did not know that tsunami warning was announced. ※1 Many of usual communication methods became inaccessible due to power outage, overwhelmed phone lines, etc ※2 Underestimated preliminary forecast was misinterpreted as “safe”. ※3 Due to power outage, updated information was not accessible. ※3 Source: ※1 weathernews “Survey Results of Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami”（April 2011） ※2 Crisis and Environment Management Policy Institute “Preliminary Report on the Survey on Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami” (May 2011) ※3 Japan Meteorological Agency “Issues with regard to improvement of tsunami warning “ (June 2011) 16 CP3: Evacuation actions Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged info-reactive follow others Warning accessible quake Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Warning not accessible Critical Point 3 Evacuation actions Did not evacuate In average it took 17 minutes to begin evacuation. Almost 80% evacuated with others, 53% with their family members. ※1 Among people who heard evacuation warnings clearly from disaster management radio, 70 to 80% felt the necessity to evacuate. ※2 Many people lost their lives while convincing or guiding other people to evacuate, including over 300 fire and disaster department staffs, fire fighters and police officers delivering evacuation warnings or guiding evacuation. ※3 Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011 ※3: Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Police Agency 17 CP4: Obstacles during evacuation Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Many evacuated using cars and got trapped in traffic. Evacuated self-judged info-reactive follow others Warning accessible quake Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Warning not accessible Critical Point 3 Evacuation actions Did not evacuate Arrived at evacuation shelters Critical Point 4 Obstacles during evacuation Did not arrive at evacuation shelters 60% evacuated by cars and 1/3 were caught in traffic. ※1 Many used cars because they thought otherwise they wouldn’t make it, or they wanted to evacuate with family members. ※1 In Miyagi, many people older than 60 or women used cars. Among those caught in traffic, only 7.3% changed the mean of transportation. ※2 Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地ア ンケート” May 2011 18 CP4: Obstacles during evacuation Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self-judged info-reactive follow others Warning accessible quake Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Warning not accessible Critical Point 3 Evacuation actions Arrived at evacuation shelters Evacuation routes played big role in securing safety of people, especially school children. Critical Point 4 Obstacles during evacuation Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Emergency route from the second floor of Okirai Elementary School Did not evacuate Emergency route from Omoto Elementary School to national route highway Source: Asahi Newspaper Iwaizumi Town Paper (April 2011) 19 CP5: Safety of evacuation shelters Safety (location and structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some cases Critical In 11Point cities1 of Iwate prefecture 48 Arrived at Immediate recognition of Evacuated evacuation shelters out of 411 were evacuation necessity to evacuate shelters self-judged inundated. ※1 Critical Point 4 info-reactive In Onagawa Town, reinforced concrete Obstacles follow others buildings often used as evacuation during shelters were collapsed from the3 evacuation Warning Critical Point ※2 Evacuation foundation. accessible actions Critical Point 2 Accurate evacuation warning/ information Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter not stricken by tsunami Critical Point 5 Safety of evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Did not evacuate quake Source: ※1 Kahoku Shinpo (April 14, 2011) ※2 Japanese Society of Civil Engineers Emergency Investigation Group Report Warning not accessible 20 CP6: Detection of danger and progressive evacuation Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters. Among those who evacuated from tsunami in Miyagi, 60.8% evacuated Critical Point 1 Arrived at to from evacuation shelter Evacuated Immediate recognition of the primary evacuation necessity to evacuate the next. Among them 55.5% said the shelters self-judged first shelter was strickenCritical by tsunami. Point 4 ※1 info-reactive Obstacles For most people the primary during evacuation evacuation shelter Warning Critical Pointwas 3 “publicly designated shelter such as community Evacuation accessible Did not arrive actions centers and schools”. About 40% follow others at evacuation shelters moved further to evacuate to higher Critical Point 2 quake Accurate elevation evacuation warning/ Source: information or safer facilities. ※2 Evacuation shelter not stricken by tsunami Escaped from tsunami Critical Point 5 Safety of evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Critical Point 6 Detection of danger and progressive evacuation Caught by tsunami Did not evacuate ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake ※2: Survey Research Center “宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011 Warning not accessible 21 Check List to assess Human Loss Vulnerability quake CP1: Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Is the risk of tsunami recognized from past tsunami disasters or hazard maps? Are methods of safety confirmation among family members ensured？ Accurate evacuation information accessible CP2: Accurate evacuation warning/info Accurate evacuation information not accessible Are there ways to disseminate tsunami warnings or evacuation information? Are there ways to disseminate information at once? Is information accessible during power outage? Evacuated ・Self-judged ・Info-reactive ・Following others CP3: Evacuation actions Did not evacuate Is information disseminated received/understo od by people appropriately? Are there community efforts to promote evacuation among neighbors? Is the safety of officers providing evacuation guidance ensured? Arrived at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter was not stricken by tsunami CP4: Obstacles during evacuation CP5: Safety of evacuation shelters Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Is the evacuation route safety ensured? Are people aware of the location of evacuation shelters? Are evacuation shelters located in ways so that people can walk to shelters? Are there emergency routes secured that ensure immediate evacuation to higher elevation? Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Is the safety of evacuation shelter ensured (height & structural safety)? In flat areas far from hills, are there safe evacuation shelters (such as tsunami evacuation buildings) designated? Escaped from tsunami CP6: Detection of danger and progressive evacuation Caught by tsunami Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated evacuation shelters? Can the real time tsunami information be obtained to detect danger early? ３．Case Study of Rikuzentakata City Approx. 2,000 persons (10% of total population) are dead or Rikuzentakata missing in Rikuzentakata Population Fatalities 2500 250 Population 2000 1500 Population in inundated area 200 dead dead or missing 150 1000 100 500 50 0 0～4 5～9 10～14 15～19 20～24 25～29 30～34 35～39 40～44 45～49 50～54 55～59 60～64 65～69 70～74 75～79 80～84 85～89 90～94 95～99 100～ unknown Buildings destroyed 3,159 Dead and missing 2,191 Inundated area 1,300ha Population in inundated area 16,640 # households in inundated area 5,592 Rikuzentakata City Hall Rikuzentakata City Hall was devastated by tsunami Red ：Inundated Area Tsunami submerged up to 4th floor 0 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Lack of awareness regarding tsunami risks lead to delay in evacuation. Evacuation Evacuated self-judged info-reactive follow others Warning accessible Escaped shelter not from stricken by Only 33 out of 180 immediately tsunami tsunami Arrived at evacuated. Out of 33 only 1 died. ※1 evacuation shelters Among those who didn’t immediately evacuate half didn’t think tsunami would arrive to their location ※1 Evacuation shelter stricken by immediately Among 147 that didn’t tsunami Did not arrive evacuate 1/3 (42) died. ※1 at evacuation shelters Source: Caught by ※1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動－将来の防 tsunami 災へ向けて― ICHARM, UNESCAP Did not evacuate quake Warning not accessible 24 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Safety of evacuation shelters was not Evacuated secured. self-judged Arrived at evacuation shelters Examination of bodiesinfo-reactive indicated that many had finished evacuation or were follow others in the midst of evacuation. ※2 Warning Number of designated evacuation accessible Did not arrive shelters were located within the inundated area and many died at theat evacuation shelters evacuation shelters. ※1 Out of 68 primary evacuation shelters ※2 not 35 were inundated byDid tsunami. quake Source: evacuate ※1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動－将来の防 災へ向けて― ICHARM, UNESCAP Warning not accessible Evacuation shelter not stricken by tsunami Escaped from tsunami Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Caught by City Gymnasium was atsunami designated evacuation center but was inundated to 14m depth. 100 persons evacuated to this facility and most of them lost their lives. 25 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Arrived at Human loss of younger generations Evacuated could evacuation be explained by the fact that many lost shelters their lives at evacuation shelters upon self-judged completion of evacuation info-reactive % Human loss in inundated area 60% Iwate follow others Miyako 50% 40% 30% Warning High % human loss of younger generations in Rikuzentakata accessible Rikuzentakata Ofunato Kamaishi Otsuchi Yamada 20% Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter not stricken by tsunami Escaped from tsunami Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Caught by tsunami 10% quake Did not evacuate 0～4 5～9 10～14 15～19 20～24 25～29 30～34 35～39 40～44 45～49 50～54 55～59 60～64 65～69 70～74 75～79 80～84 85～89 90～94 95～99 100～ 0% Warning not accessible 26 Critical Causes for Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Lack of awareness regarding tsunami risks ◦ Hazard maps ◦ Urban development in areas of high tsunami risks (revealed by Meta Analysis) Inappropriate designation of evacuation shelters 27 ４．Conclusion The critical causes for human losses vary depending on the physical settings and social characteristics of the communities, and the extent of tsunami prevention/preparedness measures (both structural and non-structural). The current FORIN template is useful in obtaining the in-depth and exhaustive picture of the phenomenon of the disaster and its impact. But to do this in full scale it would require much time and resources. In order to identify critical causes or bottlenecks for certain area, utilization of hierarchical check list as prepared in this study could be useful. An investigation sheet consisting of check list can be prepared for different entities (administrator, community, general public, etc. ) to measure their vulnerability against disasters. Such tool could assist identifying weakness or necessity for future measures. 28 Thank you very much 29 Example of human loss vulnerability review sheet (municipality) quake CP1: Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Is a tsunami hazard map being prepared? Are there programs implemented to enhance disaster awareness of residents? Is disaster awareness education provided at schools? Accurate evacuation information accessible CP2: Accurate evacuation warning/info Accurate evacuation information not accessible Evacuated ・Self-judged ・Info-reactive ・Following others CP3: Evacuation actions Did not evacuate Arrived at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter was not stricken by tsunami CP4: Obstacles during evacuation CP5: Safety of evacuation shelters Did not arrive at evacuation shelters Evacuation shelter stricken by tsunami Is the evacuation Is information the safety of Is a tsunami hazard map being Isevacuation route safety disseminated shelter ensured? received/understo ensured (height & prepared appropriately? Are people aware of od by people structural safety)? the location of Are there programs implemented to appropriately? In flat areas far evacuation shelters? Are there from hills, are Are evacuation of enhance disaster awareness community efforts there safe shelters located in to promote residents (evacuationwaysdrills, etc)? evacuation so that people evacuation among shelters (such as can walk to Is disaster awareness education neighbors? tsunami shelters? Is the safety of evacuation Are there provided at schools? emergency routes officers providing buildings) Are there ways to disseminate tsunami warnings or evacuation information? Are there ways to disseminate information at once? Is information accessible during power outage? evacuation guidance ensured? secured that ensure immediate evacuation to higher elevation? designated? Escaped from tsunami CP6: Detection of danger and progressive evacuation Caught by tsunami Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated evacuation shelters? Can the real time tsunami information be obtained to detect danger early? Additional Suggestions to FORIN Question List In the GEJET many infrastructure services were impacted in enormous scale. Propagation of damages among infrastructure and its impact to socio economic activities are critical issue. By knowing critical points in damage propagation, effective measures could be implemented to mitigate propagation of damages and to minimizing extent of impacts. Further questions could be added to the FORIN Questions List. ◦ What were the consequences of breakdown or malfunctioning of infrastructure networks (e.g., electricity, water supply, sewerage, transportation, communication, health services, educational services, etc) ? ◦ How did the effect on an infrastructure network propagate to another infrastructure network? ◦ How were the economic activities of the affected area impacted and how did it propagate to other areas/regions? ◦ What actions were taken in order to compensate the infrastructure or service network failure . ◦ How were the infrastructure or service networks restored? 31
© Copyright 2024 ExpyDoc
