Fall 2014 - New York University

Comparative Political Systems
Instructor: Andrew W. Bausch
Email: [email protected]
Office: Porter Hall, 223H
Meeting Time: Mondays and Wednesdays, 9-10:20
Meeting Place: Doherty Hall 1117
Office Hours: Monday 10:30-12:00 or by request
Course Description
This course is an introduction to the study of comparative political science. The main goal of
the course is to provide students with a framework to examine how political institutions influence
behavior, which in turn, influence political outcomes. Therefore, this course focuses on concepts
and methods useful for understanding the political world rather than presenting an in-depth study
of a few countries.
The substantive topics this course addresses include overcoming collective action problems,
differentiating between democracies and dictatorships, democratic transitions, electoral systems,
and civil conflict. The course aims to provide you with methodological tools for analyzing these
topics. For example, you will be introduced to making causal inferences, solving game-theoretic
models, and interpreting regression results.
Readings and Quizzes
Many of the readings for the course will be taken from Clark, Golder, and Golder’s textbook.
Additional readings have been selected from political science journals. Some of these readings make
use of sophisticated statistical models to advance their arguments. While students should make
some effort to understand the statistical methods, the primary focus should be on understanding
the theory and substantive conclusions and implications. Throughout the semester, unannounced
quizzes will be administered to ensure students have read the material. These will be straightforward and focus on definitions used by the author or broad conclusions the author reaches. The
lowest of your grades on these quizzes will be dropped. Make-up quizzes will only be administered
under extraordinary circumstances.
Midterm Exam
The midterm exam will cover topics from the first half of the semester. Questions directly
related to the readings will make up the bulk of the questions, though concepts introduced in the
lecture and through discussion may also appear.
Homework
Throughout the semester, homework will be assigned and will generally be due at the beginning
of a specified class period. The assignments will fall into two categories. First, problem sets
related to the game-theoretic models will be assigned to help students practice applying these
models. Second, reaction papers will be assigned. The goal of these papers is to demonstrate an
understanding of a set of readings and prepare students to discuss the reading in class. These
papers should be approximately two pages. A short summary of the readings may be necessary,
but then an attempt should be made to synthesize readings from different days or to apply a theory
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developed in one reading to a case presented in another. Late homework will be penalized at 1%
per hour.
Paper
In lieu of a final exam, a final paper is due during finals week. The general approach to the paper
should be for the student to apply a theory discussed in class to specific cases. Students should
select two events and explain why they played out differently. For example, you could compare
two elections in the same country or in similar countries under different electoral rules. You could
also compare two young democracies and explain how and why democracy developed differently in
each. A wide variety of paper formats are possible and will be considered on a case-by-case basis by
the instructor. A one-page outline of your topic is due by October 27 and must be approved by the
instructor. On November 17, two-page justification of the cases you have selected and a description
of what can be learned by comparing these cases is due. This justification can be inserted, with
modifications, directly into the final draft of the paper.
The final version of the paper should be seven to ten pages in length and a coherent first draft
of the paper is due on December 1. However, to ensure feedback from the instructor on the first
draft, you may submit a draft of your paper by November 24. These drafts will be distributed to
the entire class and will serve as the assigned reading for the final class. Each student will present
their paper and other students will offer comments. The first draft and the presentation will be
graded. Furthermore, extra credit can be earned by bringing a draft of your paper to the Global
Communication Center at CMU. The final draft will be due on Wednesday December 10, at 5pm.
Late papers will be penalized at 1% per hour.
Required Texts
• “Principles of Comparative Politics, 2nd edition” by Clark, Golder, and Golder, CQ Press,
2013 (referred to below as CGG).
• “Playing Politics: The Nightmare Continues” by Michael Laver, Oxford University Press,
1997 (free download at: https://files.nyu.edu/ml127/public/Playing%20Politics.pdf )
Attendance and Class participation
Students are expected to attend class having read the assigned readings. With the exception of
extraordinary circumstances, more than three absences will result in the lowering of this portion of
the grade. Consistently late, unprepared, or inattentive students’ grades will suffer as well.
Grading
• 10% Reading Quizzes
• 20% Midterm Exam
• 20% Homework
• 5% Paper Justification
• 5% First Draft of Paper and Presentation
• 30% Final Paper
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• 10% Attendance and Class participation
Grade Grievances You may contest grades on assignments or exams as follows: First, submit
an email to the instructor within one week of receiving your grade. The email should clearly
state the problem with the grade and reference relevant class readings or lecture notes. Verbal
contestations will not be permitted and contestations submitted more than a week after the return
of your assignment or exam will be disregarded. The instructor will review your statement and
re-grade your assignment. You grade may be raised or lowered. The instructor and student will
then meeting to discuss the new grade.
Key Dates
• October 15: Midterm Exam
• October 27: Paper topic due
• November 17: Paper justification due
• November 24: First draft of paper due (optional)
• December 1: First draft of paper due
• December 10: Final paper due at 5pm
Course Schedule
Monday, August 25
• Introduction and Syllabus
• Primitive Politics from Laver
Wednesday, August 27 - Do Rules Matter?
• Discussion of Primitive Politics exercise
• Laver p23-24, 35-44.
• Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2007). Leopold ii and the selectorate: An account in contrast to a
racial explanation. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, pages 203–221
• Introduction to Causality
Monday, September 1
• No Class - Labor Day
Wednesday, September 3 - Public Goods
• Public goods - introduction
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• Public goods game
Monday, September 8 - Public Goods
• Discussion of Public Goods game
• Fehr, E. and G¨
achter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments.
The American Economic Review, 90(4):980–994
• Hamman, J. R., Weber, R. A., and Woon, J. (2011). An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods. American Journal of Political Science,
55(4):738–752
Wednesday, September 10 - What is Politics?
• CGG, Chapter 3
• Backward induction
Monday, September 15 - What is Politics?
• CGG, Chapter 3
Wednesday, September 17 - Origins of the Modern State
• CGG, Chapter 4
• Normal form games
Monday, September 22 - Conceptualizing Democracy and Dictatorship
• CGG, Chapter 5
• Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3):75–88
Wednesday, September 24 - Economics and Democracy
• CGG, Chapter 6
• Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2009). How development leads to democracy: what we know
about modernization. Foreign Affairs, pages 33–48
Monday, September 29 - Resources, Culture, Human Rights, and Corruption
• Ross, M. L. (2008b). Oil, islam, and women. American Political Science Review, 102(1):107
• Vicente, P. C. (2010). Does oil corrupt? evidence from a natural experiment in west africa.
Journal of Development Economics, 92(1):28–38
Wednesday, October 1 - Democratic Transitions
• CGG, Chapter 8
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• Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A. (2009). Hit or miss? the effect of assassinations on institutions
and war. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Focus on pages 55-58 and 82-85.
Monday, October 6 - Democratic Transitions
• Diamond, L. (2008). The democratic rollback: the resurgence of the predatory state. Foreign
Affairs, pages 36–48
• Merkel, W. (2010). Are dictatorships returning? revisiting the democratic rollback hypothesis.
Contemporary Politics, 16(1):17–31
Wednesday, October 8 - Democratic Success and Failure
• Aspinall, E. (2010). The irony of success. Journal of Democracy, 21(2):20–34
• Kapstein, E. B. and Converse, N. (2008). Why democracies fail. Journal of Democracy,
19(4):57–68
Monday, October 13 - Midterm Review
• Midterm Review
Wednesday, October 15
• Midterm
Monday, October 20 - Democracy vs. Dictatorship and Types of Dictatorships
• CGG, Chapter 9
• CGG, Chapter 10
Wednesday, October 22 - Dictatorships and Disasters
• CGG, Chapter 10 (finish)
• Quiroz Flores, A. and Smith, A. (2013). Leader survival and natural disasters. British Journal
of Political Science, 43(04):821–843
Monday, October 27 - Median Voter Theorem
• Paper topic due
• CGG, Chapter 11 (focus on p427-439)
Wednesday, October 29 - Voting Behavior
• Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2009). Myopic voters and natural disaster policy. American
Political Science Review, 103(03):387–406
• Healy, A. J., Malhotra, N., and Mo, C. H. (2010). Irrelevant events affect voters’ evaluations
of government performance. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(29):12804–
12809
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Monday, November 3 - Types of Democracies
• CGG, Chapter 12
• Principle-Agent Problems
Wednesday, November 5 - Elections and Electoral Systems
• Coalition Game
• Laver p83-85, 97-100
• CGG, Chapter 13
Monday, November 10 - Clientelism
• Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14:289–310
• Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment
in benin. World Politics, 55(3):399–422
Wednesday, November 12 - Ethnic Politics
• Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? World Politics, 56:327–362
• Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why chewas and tumbukas
are allies in zambia and adversaries in malawi. American Political Science Review, 98(4):529–
545
Monday, November 17 - Ethnic Politics and Public Goods
• Paper justification due
• Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political Science Review, 101(04):709–
725
Wednesday, November 19 - Violence and Voting
• Getmansky, A. and Zeitzoff, T. (2013). Terrorism and voting: The effect of exposure to rockets
on voting in israeli elections
• Blattman, C. (2009). From violence to voting: War and political participation in uganda.
American Political Science Review, 103(2):231–247
Monday, November 24 - Civil Conflict
• Langer, A. (2005). Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in cˆote d’ivoire.
Oxford Development Studies, 33(1):25–45
• Ross, M. L. (2008a). Blood barrels: Why oil wealth fuels conflict. Foreign Affairs, pages 2–8
Wednesday, November 26
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• No Class - Thanksgiving
Monday, December 1 - Post-Conflict Society
• First draft of paper due
• Annan, J., Blattman, C., Mazurana, D., and Carlson, K. (2011). Civil war, reintegration, and
gender in northern uganda. Journal of conflict resolution, 55(6):877–908
• Gilligan, M. J., Pasquale, B. J., and Samii, C. (2013). Civil war and social cohesion: Lab-inthe-field evidence from nepal. American Journal of Political Science
Wednesday, December 3 - Paper Presentations
• Student papers and presentations
Wednesday, December 10 - Final Paper
• Final paper due at 5pm
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