Bio Incident Prevention and Response

CBRNE
Bio Incident Prevention and Response:
Lessons Learned from International
Tabletop and Field Exercises
MAJ Dana Perkins, PhD
20th CBRNE Command, Det. 2, Civil Affairs
(former member of the Group of Experts supporting the UN Security Council 1540 Committee)
CSCM World Congress on CBRNe Science and Consequence Management
1-5 June 2014, Tbilisi, Georgia
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release.
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Disclaimer
The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions
expressed in this presentation are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views,
official policy or position of the US Army,
Department of Defense or the US Government
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Outline
•
Southern Caucasus Workshop on Public Health, Security, & Law Enforcement
Partnership in Bio-Incident Pre-Planning & Response and the Southern
Caucasus BioShield 2010 Tabletop Exercise (TTX), 11-12 May 2010, Tbilisi,
Georgia,
•
Trilateral (US-Romania-Moldova) Civilian-Military Forum on Outbreak
Response and Bioterrorism Investigation (ORBIT Forum and TTX), 19-21
October 2010, Chisinau, Moldova
•
Countering Biological Threats: National Implementation of the Biological
Weapons Convention & Multinational Outbreak Response & Bioterrorism
Investigation Demonstration, with TTX on the UN Secretary General's
Mechanism on Investigation of Alleged Use of Biological and Chemical
Weapons, 17-19 May 2011, Tbilisi, Georgia
•
BIO Georgia 2012 Field Training Exercise (FTX), 26 September 2012, Rustavi,
Georgia
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Objectives of Tabletop Exercises
• Implementing national measures consistent with the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540),
and WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs) to deter, prevent, or
respond to bio incidents/ threats
• Link the international RESPONSE to a bioterrorism incident stemming
from the convergence of criminal / terrorist networks, with PREVENTION
via nonproliferation mechanisms such as BWC and UNSCR 1540
• Foster improved understanding of the respective procedures and
requirements of public health, security, & law enforcement communities in
response to bio incidents, & enhance inter-sectoral effectiveness in
preparedness & response at the national, regional, and international level
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Southern Caucasus Workshop on
Public Health, Security, & Law Enforcement
CBRNE
Partnership in Bio-Incident Pre-Planning & Response
• Workshop and associated Tabletop Exercise (TTX),
Southern Caucasus BioShield 2010, held in Tbilisi,
Georgia, 11-12 May 2010
• These events were a joint effort of:
– US (DOD/DTRA and HHS/ASPR) and
– Georgia (MoLHSA, National Center for Disease
Control & Public Health)
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•
Workshop organization
~ 80 participants were in attendance, from:
– Inter-governmental organizations (WHO,
INTERPOL, NATO);
– Non-governmental organizations (VERTIC,
Bechtel, & Global Green USA);
– US Government (Departments of Defense,
Health & Human Services, Energy, State, and
FBI);
– Public health, security, or law enforcement
organizations from Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and
Romania.
•
Strength is in Unity
The workshop was organized as a series of plenary
presentations followed by a TTX focused on
bioterrorism prevention, deterrence, and response
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Southern Caucasus
BioShield 2010 TTX
•
TTX scenario stemmed from concerns that criminal and terrorist networks
may converge at the operational level for monetary profit and irrespective of
their ideology
•
The 2010 Southern Caucasus Bioshield TTX primarily explored the
response actions but also raised questions on terrorism prevention and
deterrence (e.g. via BWC, UNSCR 1540 - required measures)
•
“Soft measures” (concerning education and outreach to the life
sciences community to provide guideposts for ethical behavior) were
also discussed
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Select Key Lessons Learned
•
National Response Plans offer the framework for coordination and response to biological
incidents, whether natural or deliberate
•
Since real-world experience does not come often, there is a strong need for more intersectoral (including media) training
•
Early warning and efficient mitigation of biological incidents are contingent on effective
implementation of WHO IHRs and national legislation (i.e. on UNSCR 1540 and BWC) to
prevent and criminalize activities of non-state actors who seek to acquire & proliferate WMDs
•
Established partnership and communication channels between law enforcement and public
health (both at the national and the international level) are critical elements for “connecting
the dots” early in a potential bio threat/incident
The report on the workshop and associated TTX, is available online at:
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Pages/southerncaucasus.aspx
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Trilateral (US-Romania-Moldova) Civilian-Military Forum
CBRNE on Outbreak Response and Bioterrorism Investigation
(ORBIT Forum and TTX)
•
Organized by DOD/EUCOM and HHS/ASPR in
Chisinau, Moldova, 19-21 October 2010
•
Supported by WHO, UNODA, BWC ISU, ECDC,
Interpol, and NATO
•
Aimed at:
– Strengthening BWC, UNSCR 1540 and WHO IHRs
implementation
– Building sustainable laboratory partnership and
regional/global connectivity through networking and
harmonization
– Sharing best practices in laboratory quality & management;
and biosafety / biosecurity
– Strengthening civilian-military unity of effort in response
to bio incidents (natural, accidental, or deliberate)
•
Chi şi nău, Mol dova
19- 21 Oct ober , 2010
TTX scenario focused on the convergence of
criminal/terrorist networks in regions of weak
governance or “frozen conflicts”
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ORBIT Tabletop Exercise
• In the first plot of the scenario, a
fictional terrorist group procured a
seed stock of tularemia bacteria from
the black market and perpetrated an
aerosol attack during a RomaniaMoldova soccer game in Chisinau
• In the second plot of this scenario, the
fictional terrorist group also purchased
a certain amount of dry/lyophilized
anthrax spores and transported it
across borders via established heroin
trafficking networks for a food borne
attack on the civilian and military
personnel at a military base
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•
ORBIT TTX –
Select Key Lessons Learned
National Response Plans
– National Disease Surveillance Systems are likely to provide early public health
alerts
– Gaps in sharing information between public health and law enforcement have
been identified primarily due to lack of joint training
•
Risk / Intelligence Communication
o Policy makers and legislative bodies should also be educated on the domestic
consequences associated with a weak and porous nonproliferation framework
– The partnership between the scientific community and law enforcement is not
common but possible and highly desirable at the national and international level
– Public health information management and outreach to the mass media and
public need to be re-evaluated to consider a coordinated strategic and tactical
approach
•
International Coordination
– There is no formal agreement on sharing information between WHO and Interpol
so neither will have a common operational picture
The report on the workshop and associated TTX, is available online at:
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Pages/orbitforum.aspx
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Countering Biological Threats:
National Implementation of the Biological Weapons
Convention & Multinational Outbreak Response &
Bioterrorism Investigation Demonstration
•
Workshop organized by the US DOD (EUCOM, AFHSC,
CDHAM, and DTRA) and HHS/ASPR with the support of
Georgia’s MoHLSA & Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Tbilisi,
Georgia, 17-19 May 2011
•
~ 100 participants including civilian & military public and
veterinary health, law enforcement, intelligence, and
affiliated professionals, representatives of academia,
industry, and other NGOs from US, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Turkey,
Poland, and Kenya; and representatives of IGOs (WHO,
UNODA, NATO, and ECDC)
•
The workshop aimed to establish regional and
international partnerships to enhance disease surveillance
and containment initiatives; and to strengthen the core
capacities required by the WHO IHRs and existing
national measures consistent with the obligations
under the BWC & UNSCR 1540 to deter, prevent, and
respond to biological incidents or threats
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Countering Biological Threats:
National Implementation of the Biological Weapons
Convention & Multinational Outbreak Response &
Bioterrorism Investigation Demonstration
• It included awareness
training, a TTX designed
to review the application
of UN Secretary
General's Mechanism
on Investigation of
Alleged Use of
Biological and
Chemical Weapons
(UNSGM), and a practical
demonstration by MoIA’s
CBRN Rapid Response
Team (Georgia)
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UNSGM TTX Key Lessons Learned
•
There is a need for additional training events on
UNSGM with all relevant national stakeholders
since it may take a ‘whole of government’
approach to facilitate the UNSGM’s fact-finding
mission in a respective country
•
In order to become an operational mechanism
able to inform the policy / international law
decision-making process, the UNSGM needs:
–
–
–
–
updated technical guidelines & procedures to include
bioforensics considerations;
standards/guidelines for field/lab investigations and data
validation;
integration of human, animal, and plant forensic/lab data;
an effective, credible, and a defensible technical
capability (i.e. established and sustainable expertise,
infrastructure, and resources) which should be exercised
on a regular basis
The report on the workshop and associated TTX, is available online at:
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Pages/counteringthreats.aspx
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26 September 2012, Rustavi, Georgia
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release
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FTX Overview & Objectives
•
GEORGIA-2012 was a Consequence Management field training exercise (FTX)
organized by NATO/EADRCC in Georgia on 22-28 Sep 2012
•
The consequence management activities on the ground during GEORGIA-2012 were
based on a severe earthquake scenario which also affected critical infrastructure in
the Rustavi exercise area
•
The US Army 773rd CST participated in GEORGIA-2012 as an EADRU (Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Unit) with the 7th Civil Support Command (7th CSC) providing the
Incident Management Team (IMT)
•
BIO GEORGIA-2012 FTX was based on a scenario drafted and executed by the 7th
CSC in the context of the main GEORGIA-2012 FTX, to provide additional training
opportunities for the 773rd CST with Georgian and NATO partners, identify laboratory
assets in Georgia for confirmatory identification of bio agents, and establish a
network of subject matter experts for technical reach back support (from NATO/Joint
Assessment Team and other US Government agencies)
Additional details available online at: http://www.safmls.org/Scopes/Scope%20-%202013%20Fall.pdf,
Strengthening
Health
Security
Laboratory Operations by MAJ D. Perkins and CPT C. Mason
Distribution
Statement
A: Approved
forThrough
public release.
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Participants & Observers
• 773rd Civil Support Team (CST)-- as EADRU
• 7th Civil Support Command (CSC)-- IMT
• US Department of Health and Human Services /
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC)
• US Department of Justice / Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
• US Department of Defense / Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA)
• US-Georgia “Richard G. Lugar Center for Public
Health Research”
• NATO / Joint Assessment Team (JAT)
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Scenario
CBRNE
-- inject # 1- Anthrax burial site mapping
LEMA (Local Emergency
Management Agency- Georgia
Ministry of Internal AffairsEmergency Management
Department) reports potential
anthrax burial sites VIC railway
incident site and requests
EADRU support for mapping the
incident site area

The On-Site Operations
Coordination Centre
(OSOCC) tasks the 773rd CST
with site survey, detection and
sampling the area for
environmental anthrax
contamination to establish an
"anthrax-free" footprint area of
operations for railway incident
management operations
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•
773rd CST (EADRU)
response and areas for consideration
Assessment and characterization of the incident site
- including the integration of information and data to
determine the location and source of bio hazard; use of
assessment data to provide shared situational
awareness with other US agencies as well as with
NATO and Georgia partners; coordinated assessments
with appropriate lead government agencies)
•
Preliminary risk assessment
•
Sampling strategy
- number, pattern and spacing of sampling locations,
and the depth of soil sampling at each location, will
depend on available information and the specifics of
each incident and/or contaminated site
•
Personnel and equipment decontamination
•
Waste management
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Scenario
-- injects # 2 & 3- Positive presumptive identification of
anthrax and request for confirmatory testing --
• Anthrax is presumptively identified by the 773rd CST in one of the collected
soil samples
• LEMA requests that the positive soil sample be transported from Rustavi to
the CPHR Laboratory in Tbilisi for confirmatory testing
• CPHR Lab provided personnel & assets for sample transport
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Scenario
-- inject # 4- Bio sample sharing with law enforcement--
•
Georgian intelligence agency provided FBI with low-confidence/non-verified
information that a foreign terrorist organization conducted an anthrax delivery
simulation exercise in the Rustavi area sometime in the past
•
FBI requests that the presumptively positive sample be sent to the US
National Bioforensic Analysis Center for forensic analysis
•
This inject helped identify sample sharing procedures with law enforcement;
national & international transportation security; chain of custody; import and
export issues; ICAO and IATA regulations on packaging/shipping bio agents
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-- select key lessons learned --
•
The “anthrax tombs” provide a constant risk of a persistent series of outbreaks, and
sporadic occurrences of the disease occur in susceptible animals and people
•
The presumptive and confirmatory testing of anthrax in the environment due to a deliberate
event do not differ significantly from the procedures exercised for “anthrax tombs”
•
A potentially deliberate release of a bio agent would require public health-law enforcement
collaboration (at the national and international level) and a joint epidemiological-criminal
investigation
•
Maintaining the “chain of custody” of biological samples, splitting the samples (if
necessary), and implementing validated microbial forensics analyses are critical factors of
lab operations contributing to detecting, preventing, & deterring terrorist or criminal attacks
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BW use /
bioterrorism /
illicit trafficking
Seize / Secure
Site Assessment
Evidence Gathering
Nationally-designated laboratories
for internationally accepted
definitive confirmation (and attribution) ?
Transport to Laboratory
Lab Testing
AND / OR
Lab Reporting
United Nations-designated laboratories ?
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