November 21, 2014 - Superior Court, El Dorado

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
1. BANK OF AMERICA v. VON RODENSTEIN, SCU20110099
Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
A motion for summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action may
be brought at any time after the answer is filed upon five days’ notice.
(Code of Civ. Proc. § 1170.7.) A party is entitled to bring a motion for
summary judgment where there are no triable issues of fact. (Id. § 437c.)
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing
there is no triable issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841].) The moving party has the burden
of showing, by affidavit, facts establishing every element necessary to
sustain a judgment in favor of the party. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v.
Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 627].) Once a
plaintiff proves its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that material facts are in dispute. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd.
(p)(1).)
To prevail in an action for unlawful detainer following a foreclosure,
plaintiff must show that (1) plaintiff purchased the property upon
foreclosure and title following the foreclosure sale has been duly perfected;
(2) defendant was served with a proper written notice to quit the property;
and (3) defendant continued in possession after expiration of the notice.
(Id. § 1161a.)
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff requests that the court judicially
notice the following: (1) certified copy of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale,
recorded in El Dorado County on November 12, 2009 (Ex. A); (2) certified
copy of the Deed of Trust signed by defendant, recorded in El Dorado
County on April 19, 2007 (Ex. B); and (3) copy of the Notice to Quit and
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Proofs of Service concerning the Notice to Quit (Ex. C). Plaintiff’s request
for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo
Bank (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264–265 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].)
Here, plaintiff provides evidence that it purchased the property at a
trustee’s sale and said title was duly perfected. (Pl.’s Separate Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts (“SSUMF”), ¶¶ 1, 2; Pl.’s Request for
Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A.) Plaintiff also shows that defendant, as the
former owner, was served with a notice to quit and vacate. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 3,
4; Pl.’s RJN, Ex. C.) Finally, plaintiff submits evidence that defendant
remains on the property after the expiration of the notice. (SSUMF, ¶ 5;
Def.’s Ans. to Compl.)
As plaintiff has made a prima facie showing in support of summary
judgment, the burden now shifts to defendant. Therefore, the appearance
of all parties is required at the hearing as defendant may appear and
provide evidence of a triable issue of material fact either in writing or
orally at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1351, subds. (b), (c).)
TENTATIVE RULING # 1: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER
DEPARTMENT FOUR.
–2–
21,
2014,
IN
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
2. BANK OF AMERICA v. VON RODENSTEIN, SCU20110100
Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
A motion for summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action may
be brought at any time after the answer is filed upon five days’ notice.
(Code of Civ. Proc. § 1170.7.) A party is entitled to bring a motion for
summary judgment where there are no triable issues of fact. (Id. § 437c.)
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing
there is no triable issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841].) The moving party has the burden
of showing, by affidavit, facts establishing every element necessary to
sustain a judgment in favor of the party. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v.
Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 627].) Once a
plaintiff proves its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that material facts are in dispute. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd.
(p)(1).)
To prevail in an action for unlawful detainer following a foreclosure,
plaintiff must show that (1) plaintiff purchased the property upon
foreclosure and title following the foreclosure sale has been duly perfected;
(2) defendant was served with a proper written notice to quit the property;
and (3) defendant continued in possession after expiration of the notice.
(Id. § 1161a.)
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff requests that the court judicially
notice the following: (1) certified copy of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale,
recorded in El Dorado County on November 12, 2009 (Ex. A); (2) certified
copy of the Deed of Trust signed by defendant, recorded in El Dorado
County on April 19, 2007 (Ex. B); and (3) copy of the Notice to Quit and
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Proofs of Service concerning the Notice to Quit (Ex. C). Plaintiff’s request
for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo
Bank (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264–265 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].)
Here, plaintiff provides evidence that it purchased the property at a
trustee’s sale and said title was duly perfected. (Pl.’s Separate Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts (“SSUMF”), ¶¶ 1, 2; Pl.’s Request for
Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A.) Plaintiff also shows that defendant, as the
former owner, was served with a notice to quit and vacate. (SSUMF, ¶¶ 3,
4; Pl.’s RJN, Ex. C.) Finally, plaintiff submits evidence that defendant
remains on the property after the expiration of the notice. (SSUMF, ¶ 5;
Def.’s Ans. to Compl.)
As plaintiff has made a prima facie showing in support of summary
judgment, the burden now shifts to defendant. Therefore, the appearance
of all parties is required at the hearing as defendant may appear and
provide evidence of a triable issue of material fact either in writing or
orally at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1351, subds. (b), (c).)
TENTATIVE RULING # 2: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER
DEPARTMENT FOUR.
–4–
21,
2014,
IN
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
3. BREWER, ET AL. v. HALL, ET AL., PC20060324
Petition of Judgment Creditor for Determination of Third Party
Claim
Plaintiffs and judgment creditors Lemoin Brewer and Michael
Palmer petition for a judgment denying the third party claim, dated
August 28, 2014, by Seismic Mining, Inc. (“Seismic”).
This proceeding arises out of plaintiffs levying on the proceeds from a
sale of a D9 Caterpillar, which sold for $185,000. After deduction of
commissions and transactional expenses, $155,908.50 was deposited with
the court. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 720.110, et seq., Seismic
filed its third party claim.
Plaintiffs argue their Notice of Judgment Lien, filed in February
2010, provides them a judgment lien that is senior in priority to any lien
claimed by Lee Hall. Plaintiffs also argue that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel precludes Hall, and thus Seismic, from relitigating the
indebtedness of L. W. Hall Company, Inc. (“Company”) to Lee Hall and
Sharon Hall.
Seismic asserts it is entitled to the sale proceeds because it was the
owner of the D9 Caterpillar, having received it from Lee Hall after he
obtained it from the Company, pursuant to a 1998 Security Agreement
and a new and supplemental 2011 Security Agreement. Seismic also
contends the doctrine of collateral estoppel only applies to final judgments
and to issues actually litigated. It argues that in 2010, the only issue
before the court was the validity of the 1998 Security Agreement and the
amount the Company owed Hall as of the end of November 2009. Seismic
explains the transactions giving rise to Hall’s security interest in the D9
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Caterpillar occurred after the end of December 2009 and prior to the filing
of the judgment lien with the California Secretary of State.
1.
Parties’ Requests for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs request that the court take judicial notice of the following:
(1) certified copy of February 24, 2010, Judgment on Personal Property
Lien (Ex. 1); and (2) certificate of California Secretary of State filed
Articles of Incorporation of Seismic Mining, Inc. (Ex. 2).
Plaintiffs’ request is granted as to both exhibits. (Evid. Code § 452,
subds. (d)(1), (h).)
Third party claimant Seismic requests that the court take judicial
notice of the following: (1) Turnover Order in Aid of Execution, and Order
for Execution in a Private Place, filed June 25, 2010 (Ex. 1); (2) Notice of
Levy and attached list, dated July 8, 2010 (Ex. 2); (3) Third Party Claim
filed by Lee W. Hall, dated July 14, 2010 (Ex. 3); (4) Lee Hall’s Summation
and Closing Arguments, filed October 5, 2010 (Ex. 4); (5) December 3,
2010, Ruling on Third Party Claim (Ex. 5); (6) Final Judgment on Third
Party Claim Determining the Validity and Amount Thereof and for
Disposition of Equipment and Bond Proceeds of Judgment Debtor, filed
December 15, 2010 (Ex. 6); and (7) Notice of Filing Report of No
Distribution, Combined with Order Fixing Deadline to Object Thereto,
filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of
California, Case No. 11-46759-C-7, filed August 21, 2012 (Ex. 7).
Seismic’s request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits 1
through 7. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (d)(1), (d)(2), (h).)
2.
Parties’ Objections
Seismic’s objection to the Declaration of Expert Witness Kenneth
Sanders Re: Bankruptcy of L. W. Hall Company, Inc., dba Cobalt
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Crushing Mining Contractors is sustained on the basis that the
declaration consists of improper legal opinion.
Plaintiffs’ objection to the Declaration of Lee W. Hall and its
attachments is overruled. (See Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 720.130, subd. (b),
720.230, subd. (b), 720.350.)
3.
Discussion
Code of Civil Procedure § 720.110 provides: “A third person claiming
ownership or the right to possession of property may make a third-party
claim under this chapter in any of the following cases if the interest
claimed is superior to the creditor’s lien on the property: [¶] .… (b) Where
personal property has been levied upon under a writ of attachment, a writ
of execution, a prejudgment or postjudgment writ of possession, or a writ
of sale.” (Id., subd. (b).) At the hearing on the claim, the third party
claimant has the burden of proof. (Id. § 720.360.)
Hall claims that in January 2010, at a meeting of the board of
directors of the Company, due to the insolvency of the Company and
pursuant to the 1998 Security Agreement, all of the Company’s equipment
and assets were surrendered to Hall in partial satisfaction of debt owed to
Hall by the Company. (Decl. of Lee W. Hall, Ex. A.) Hall contends these
transfers necessarily included the D9 Caterpillar at issue.
The Notice of Judgment Lien in favor of plaintiffs and against the
Company, in the amount of nearly $1.5 million, was filed in February
2010.
The court’s December 2010 Final Judgment on Third Party Claim
Determining the Validity and Amount Thereof and for Disposition of
Equipment and Bond Proceeds of Judgment Debtor affirmed the 1998
Security Agreement in favor of Lee Hall and Sharon Hall as a lien on the
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
machinery and equipment of the Company. (Judgment Creditors P&A in
Reply to Opposition of Third Party Claim, Ex. B at 2:9–11.) The court
denied the motion to add Hall as an additional judgment debtor. (Id., Ex.
B at 2:7–8.)
The Final Judgment also states, in part, the following: “Judgment
Creditors Lemoin Brewer, and Michael Palmer have a lien on all of the
equipment … and all accounts and bonds held by Lee W. Hall Co. Inc.”
(Id., Ex. B at 2:23–3:2.) Additionally, the court found “no evidentiary
support for the balance of the claim asserted by [Hall] at trial as of
September 30, 2009 of nearly $560,000. The Court places no weight on
[Hall’s] assertions and the testimony of his accountants as to any such
amount. Evidence to support [Hall’s] asserted loan amount in excess of
$196,373.25, simply does not exist.” (Id., Ex. B at 2:19–22.) The court also
adjudged that Hall “shall receive only the first $196,373.25 from the
proceeds of the Sheriff’s Sale of the seized assets or any other assets of
[sic] L. W. Hall Co., Inc. Individually and doing business as Cobalt
Crushing, and that the payment of that amount [Hall] fully discharges the
obligation of L. W. Hall Co., Inc. under the security agreement of
September 10, 1998.” (Id., Ex. B at 2:23–27.)
The June 2011 Security Agreement entered into between the
Company and Hall was for the purpose of further securing debt owed to
Hall. (Id., Ex. E.) This Agreement states, in part, that “[t]he collateral
covered by this Agreement and in which a security interest is hereby
granted and transferred to Secured [Party]” includes the D9 Caterpillar.
Additionally, there is a UCC Financing Statement filed with the
California Secretary of State in June 2011, which names Hall as the
secured party and lists the D9 Caterpillar as collateral.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
While the 1998 Security Agreement purports to surrender all of the
Company’s equipment and assets to Hall in partial satisfaction of debt
owed to Hall by the Company, it was not until the June 2011 Security
Agreement where the D9 Caterpillar is expressly transferred to Hall.
Moreover, the UCC Financing Statement was not filed with the state until
June 2011.
The June 2011 Security Agreement and the filing of the UCC Filing
Statement occurred subsequent to the court’s December 2010 Final
Judgment, which states that plaintiffs have a lien on all the equipment,
accounts, and bonds held by the Company. While the Final Judgment
denied the motion to add Hall as an additional debtor to plaintiffs, it is not
clear to the court that the D9 Caterpillar no longer belonged to the
Company by the issuance date of the Final Judgment. It should also be
noted that the court found no evidence to support Hall’s asserted loan
amount in excess of $196,373.25, which is an amount significantly less
than the balance of the debt Hall claimed was owed to him under the 1998
Security Agreement.
Therefore, it is the court’s tentative ruling that third party claimant,
Seismic Mining, has not met its burden of demonstrating its claim to the
net sale proceeds of the D9 Caterpillar is superior to plaintiffs’ claim.
Accordingly, Seismic’s claim is denied.
TENTATIVE RULING # 3: THE PARTIES ARE REFERRED
TO THE FULL TEXT OF THE TENTATIVE RULING.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
4. ARANDA v. CENTEX HOMES, ET AL., PC20090635
Motions for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (2)
TENTATIVE RULING # 4: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, (1) THE
MOTION
FOR
DETERMINATION
OF
GOOD
FAITH
SETTLEMENT OF RIDDIO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IS
GRANTED, AND (2) THE MOTION FOR DETERMINATION
OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT OF ENERGETIC PAINTING
& DRYWALL, INC., IS GRANTED.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
5. PENARANDA, ET AL. v. MO’S PLACE, ET AL., SC20130043
Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
On the court’s own motion, this matter is continued to January 9,
2015.
TENTATIVE RULING # 5: MATTER IS CONTINUED TO 1:30
P.M., FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 2015, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
6. UNITED RENTALS v. DISNEY CONSTR., ET AL., SC20130086
OSC re Dismissal
A Request for Dismissal as to one defendant was filed November 10,
2014. To date, there is no Request for Dismissal in the court’s file as to the
remaining defendants.
TENTATIVE RULING # 6: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER
21,
2014,
IN
DEPARTMENT FOUR. IF A REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL AS
TO THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS IS FILED PRIOR TO
THE
HEARING,
THE
MATTER
WILL
BE
TAKEN
OFF
CALENDAR AND APPEARANCES WILL NOT BE REQUIRED.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
7. BOATMAN v. LUCIDO, ET AL., SC20130138
Minor’s Compromise
On August 5, 2011, the minor, age 3 at the time, was riding his
tricycle in the parking lot of his apartment complex. He was struck by
defendant and dragged several feet through the parking lot. Presently
before the court is a Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim,
filed on behalf of the minor by his parent and guardian ad litem, Anna
Boatman.
The petition states the minor suffered significant abrasions on his
head, hand, back, and legs; there were two large scrapes across his head;
the whites of one eye was reddened; there was a small puncture in the
flesh over his lung; his left wrist was swollen and unbending; and the
abrasion on his back required six staples. Following the incident, he was
admitted to a pediatric ICU in Reno for two nights. He was then
transferred to the general pediatric ward, and he has had follow-up visits
with a physician. The petition states the minor has completely recovered
from the effects of the accident and there are no permanent injuries, with
the exception of a silver dollar-sized scar on his head which may be a
permanent bald spot.
The total amount offered by defendant is $100,000. Medical expenses
to be paid from the settlement proceeds is $24,500. The total amount of
statutory or contractual liens of medical service providers is $42,835, but
that amount is being negotiated. The total amount of requested attorney
fees and costs is $18,750, which the court finds is a reasonable fee. (El
Dorado County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 7.10.12.A(8); Cal. Rules
of Ct., Rule 7.955.) The proposed disposition is to invest the net proceeds
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
of $56,750 in a single-premium deferred annuity, subject to withdrawal
only upon authorization of the court.
TENTATIVE RULING # 7: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
DEPARTMENT
FRIDAY,
FOUR,
NOVEMBER
INCLUDING
21,
THE
2014,
PERSONAL
APPEARANCE OF PETITIONER AND THE MINOR.
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IN
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
8. FULWILER v. SIERRA GARDEN APTS., SC20140106
Motions to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint
This action stems from a trip and fall incident at Sierra Garden
Apartments in or about June 2012. The original complaint, filed June 5,
2014, named as a defendant Sierra Garden Apartments (“SGA”), a
commercial residential apartment complex of unknown business nature
and origin, along with naming as defendants Doe business entities and
individuals. Sierra Garden Apartments moved to quash service of the
summons and the original complaint, claiming it is not a business entity
and conducts no business under the name SGA. Because plaintiff filed a
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) prior to the hearing on the motion to
quash, the motion was denied as moot.
Plaintiff’s FAC, filed August 28, 2014, names as defendants SGA,
Saint Joseph Community, LLC, Saint Joseph Community Land Trust, and
Doe business entities and individuals. The three named defendants now
move to quash service of the summons and the FAC.
Defendants Saint Joseph Community, LLC, and Saint Joseph
Community Land Trust move on the basis that plaintiff failed to comply
with statutory requirements for the naming of fictitious defendants.
Code of Civil Procedure § 474, the fictitious name statute, states in
part: “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must
state that fact in the complaint ... and such defendant may be designated
in any pleading or proceeding by name, and when his true name is
discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly ....”
(Ibid.) Code of Civil Procedure § 474 is to be liberally construed. (Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 & 593–594, fn.
12 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871].) Section 474 permits a plaintiff to bring in a
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
defendant if the requirements of section 474 are met. If so, that defendant
is considered a party to the action from its commencement. (Munoz v.
Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942, 946 [154 Cal.Rptr. 472].)
“[T]he relevant inquiry when the plaintiff seeks to substitute a real
defendant for one sued fictitiously is what facts the plaintiff actually knew
at the time the original complaint was filed.” (Gen. Motors Corp., 48
Cal.App.4th at p. 588.) The phrase “ignorant of the name of a defendant”
is broadly interpreted to mean not only ignorant of the defendant’s
identity, but also ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action
against that defendant. (Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163,
1169–1170 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 776].) “[E]ven though the plaintiff knows of
the existence of the defendant sued by a fictitious name, and even though
the plaintiff knows the defendant’s actual identity (that is, his name) the
plaintiff is ‘ignorant’ within the meaning of the statute if [plaintiff] lacks
knowledge of that person’s connection with the case or with [plaintiff’s]
injuries. [Citations.] The fact that the plaintiff had the means to obtain
knowledge is irrelevant. [Citation.]” (Gen. Motors Corp., supra, 48
Cal.App.4th at pp. 593–594 [footnote omitted].)
Liberally construing Code of Civil Procedure § 474 and after
reviewing and considering the parties’ memoranda, the court is satisfied
that at the time of the filing of the original complaint plaintiff lacked the
knowledge concerning the connection of St. Joseph Community, LLC, and
St. Joseph Community Land Trust, and thereafter met the requirements
of section 474. Accordingly, the motions to quash service of summons and
complaint by both those defendants are denied.
Next, SGA also moves to quash service of the summons and the FAC,
on the basis that plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Code of Civil Procedure § 415.95 concerning service of summons on a
business entity, form unknown.
California law allows service to be effected on a business organization
of unknown form “by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during
usual office hours with the person who is apparently in charge of the office
of that business organization, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the person
to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint was
left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th
day after the mailing.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 415.95, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff served SGA at what he believed was the office of the
business entity, form unknown, with the person who was apparently in
charge of the office. At worst, plaintiff erroneously named the proper
defendant, which commonly occurs in civil litigation. The parties will
thereafter use the correct name of the defendant, and note the defendant
was erroneously sued under another name.
Moreover, technical perfection of service on a company is not
required if substantial compliance is achieved. In determining whether
service was valid, courts liberally construe the statutory requirements
concerning service and uphold the court’s jurisdiction if there is
substantial compliance and actual notice has been received. (Gibble v.
Car-Lene Res., Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 892].)
Here, after reviewing the court record and considering the parties’
memoranda, the court finds plaintiff substantially complied with the
statutory requirements concerning service of process, and that defendant
had actual notice of this litigation. Accordingly, SGA’s motion to quash
service of summons and complaint is denied.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
TENTATIVE RULING # 8: MOTIONS TO QUASH SERVICE OF
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ARE DENIED. DEFENDANTS
MUST FILE AND SERVE THEIR PLEADINGS IN RESPONSE
TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN
FIFTEEN (15) DAYS AFTER SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS OF
WRITTEN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING THEIR
MOTION.
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
9. NAME CHANGE OF WESLEY CHRISTENSEN, SC20140119
OSC re Name Change
To date, there is no Proof of Publication.
TENTATIVE RULING # 9: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER
DEPARTMENT FOUR.
– 19 –
21,
2014,
IN
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
10. NAME CHANGE OF HALVIN CHRISTENSEN, SC20140167
OSC re Name Change
Father petitions to change his minor child’s last name. The biological
mother has not joined in the petition, but it appears she resides in the
same household with petitioner and the child. The court needs
clarification whether or not the mother has been noticed of the petition
and consents to the name change. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1277, subd.
(a).) Additionally, there is no Proof of Publication in the court’s file.
TENTATIVE RULING # 10: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED
AT
1:30
P.M.,
FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER
DEPARTMENT FOUR.
– 20 –
21,
2014,
IN
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
11. NAME CHANGE OF KAMRYN CLELAN, SC20140192
OSC re Name Change
This matter was continued from November 14, 2014, in order for
petitioner to provide proof of consent to the name change from the
biological father. The amended petition, filed November 17, 2014,
indicates both biological parents join in the petition.
TENTATIVE
RULING
#
11:
PETITION IS GRANTED.
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ABSENT
OBJECTIONS,
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR
NOVEMBER 21, 2014
12. NAME CHANGE OF JAEDAN SMITHHART, SC20140193
OSC re Name Change
This matter was continued from November 14, 2014, in order for
petitioner to notice the biological father and provide proof of service as to
the biological father. The proof of service, filed November 17, 2014,
declares the biological father was served via mail on November 14, 2014.
“[T]he petitioner shall cause, not less than 30 days prior to the hearing, to
be served notice of the time and place of the hearing or a copy of the order
to show cause on the other parent ….” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1277(a).)
Because the biological father was served less than 30 days prior to this
hearing, the matter will need to be continued.
TENTATIVE RULING # 12: MATTER IS CONTINUED TO 1:30
P.M., FRIDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2014, IN DEPARTMENT
FOUR.
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